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1. Examine the transformative role that 
artificial intelligence may play in different 
sectors of the economy, including the 
opportunities, risks and challenges that 
advancement presents.
2. Examine the ethical, legal and social 
considerations and frameworks 
required to enable and support broad 
development and uptake of artificial 
intelligence.
3. Assess the future education, skills and 
infrastructure requirements to manage 
workforce transition and support thriving 




Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides us with myriad new opportunities and potential on 
the one hand and presents global risks on the other. If responsibly developed, AI has 
the capacity to enhance wellbeing and provide benefits throughout society. There has 
been significant public and private investment globally, which has been directed toward 
the development, implementation and adoption of AI technologies. As a response 
to the advancements in AI, several countries have developed national strategies to 
guide competitive advantage and leadership in the development and regulation of 
AI technologies. The rapid advancement of AI technologies and investment has been 
popularly referred to as the ‘AI race’. 
What is known is that the future role of AI 
will be ultimately determined by decisions 
taken today. To ensure that AI technologies 
provide equitable opportunities, foster 
social inclusion and distribute advantages 
throughout every sector of society, it will 
be necessary to develop AI in accordance 
with broader societal principles centred on 
improving prosperity, addressing inequity and 
continued betterment. Partnerships between 
government, industry and the community will 
be essential in determining and developing 
the values underpinning AI for enhanced 
wellbeing. 
Artificial intelligence can be understood as a 
collection of interrelated technologies used to 
solve problems that would otherwise require 
human cognition. Artificial intelligence 
encompasses a number of methods, including 
machine learning (ML), natural language 
processing (NLP), speech recognition, 
computer vision and automated reasoning. 
Sufficient developments have already 
Strategic investment in AI development 
is considered crucial to future national 
growth. As with other stages of technological 
advancement, such as the industrial 
revolution, developments are likely to be 
shared and adopted to the benefit of nations 
around the world. 
The promise underpinning predications of 
the potential benefits associated with AI 
technologies may be equally juxtaposed 
with narratives that anticipate global risks. 
To a large extent, these divergent views exist 
as a result of the yet uncertain capacity, 
application, uptake and associated impact 
of AI technologies. However, the utility of 
extreme optimism or pessimism is limited 
in the capacity to address the wide ranging 
and, perhaps less obvious, impacts of AI. 
While discussions of AI inevitably occur within 
the context of these extreme narratives, this 
report seeks to give a measured and balanced 
examination of the emergence of AI as 





AI is enabled by data and thus also access 
to data. Data-driven experimental design, 
execution and analysis are spreading 
throughout the sciences, social sciences and 
industry sectors creating new breakthroughs 
in research and development. To support 
successful implementation of the advances 
of AI, there is a need for effective digital 
infrastructure to diffuse AI equitably, 
particularly through rural, remote and ageing 
populations. A framework for generating, 
sharing and using data in a way that is 
accessible, secure and trusted will be critical 
to support these advances. Data monopolies 
occurred within the field of AI technology 
that have the capacity to impact Australia. 
Even if no further advancements are made 
within the field of AI, it will remain necessary 
to address aspects of economic, societal and 
environmental changes. 
While AI may cause short-term to medium-
term disruption, it has the potential to 
generate long-term growth and improvement 
in areas such as agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and health, to name a few. 
Although some of the opportunities for AI 
remain on the distant horizon, this anticipated 
disruption will require a measured response 
from government and industry and our 
actions today will set a course towards or 
away from these opportunities and their 
associated risks. 
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are already occurring and there will be a 
need to consider enhanced legal frameworks 
around the ownership and sharing of data. 
Frameworks must include appropriate respect 
and protection for the full range of human 
rights that apply internationally, such as 
privacy, equality, indigenous data sovereignty 
and cultural values. If data considerations 
such as these are not considered carefully 
or appropriately, it could inhibit the 
development of AI and the benefits that may 
arise. With their strong legal frameworks for 
data security and intellectual property and 
their educated workforces, both Australia and 
New Zealand could make ideal testbeds for 
AI development. 
New techniques of machine learning are 
spurring unprecedented developments in 
AI applications. Next-generation robotics 
promise to transform our manufacturing, 
infrastructure and agriculture sectors; 
advances in natural language processing 
are revolutionising the way clinicians 
interpret the results of diagnostic tests and 
treat patients; chatbots and automated 
assistants are ushering in a new world of 
communication, analytics and customer 
service; unmanned autonomous vehicles 
are changing our capacities for defence, 
security and emergency response; intelligent 
financial technologies are establishing a 
more accountable, transparent and risk-aware 
financial sector; and autonomous vehicles will 
revolutionise transport. 
While it is important to embrace these 
applications and the opportunities they 
afford, it will also be necessary to recognise 
potential shortcomings in the way AI is 
developed and used. It is well known, for 
example, that smart facial recognition 
technologies have often been inaccurate 
and can replicate the underlying biases of 
the human-encoded data they rely upon; 
that AI relies on data that can and has been 
exploited for ethically dubious purposes, 
leading to social injustice and inequality; and 
that while the impact of AI is often described 
as ‘revolutionary’ and ‘impending’, there is 
no guarantee that AI technologies such as 
autonomous vehicles will have their intended 
effects, or even that their uptake in society 
will be inevitable or seamless. Equally, the 
shortcomings associated with current AI 
technological developments need not remain 
permanent limitations. In some cases, these 
are teething problems of a new technology 
like that seen of smart facial recognition 
technologies a few years ago compared to its 
current and predicted future accuracy. The 
nefarious and criminal use of AI technologies 
is also not unique to AI and is a risk associated 
with all technological developments. In such 
instances however, AI technologies could in 
fact be applied to oppose this misuse. For 
these reasons, there will be a need to be 
attuned to the economic and technological 
benefits of AI, and also to identify and address 
potential shortcomings and challenges. 
Interdisciplinary collaboration between 
industry, academia and government will 
bolster the development of core AI science 
and technologies. National, regional and 
international effort is required across industry, 
academia and governments to realise the 
benefits promised by AI. Australia and 
New Zealand would be prudent to actively 
promote their interests and invest in their 
capabilities, lest they let our societies be 
shaped by decisions abroad. These efforts 
will need to draw on the skills not only of 
AI developers, but also legal experts, social 
scientists, economists, ethicists, industry 
stakeholders and many other groups. 
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Employment, education and access
AI talent, and Australia and New Zealand 
can take advantage of this by positioning 
themselves as world leaders in AI research and 
development, through strategic investment as 
well as recognition of areas of AI application 
where the countries can, and currently do, excel.
Although AI research and development will 
become an increasingly important strategic 
national goal, a larger – and perhaps more 
significant – goal is to ensure that existing 
workforces feel prepared for the opportunities 
and challenges associated with the broad 
uptake of AI. This will mean ensuring workers 
are equipped with the skills and knowledge 
necessary to work with and alongside AI, and 
that their sense of autonomy, productivity 
and wellbeing in the workplace is not 
compromised in the process. Education 
should emphasise not only the technical 
competencies needed for the development of 
AI, but also the human skills such as emotional 
literacy that will become more important as 
AI becomes better at particular tasks. In the 
short to medium term, the implementation 
of AI may require the application of novel 
approaches. It will be important to ensure that 
workers are comfortable with this. 
To ensure the benefits of AI are equitably 
dispersed throughout the community, 
principles of inclusion should underpin 
the design of AI technologies. Inclusive 
design and universal access are critical 
to the successful uptake of AI. Accessible 
design will facilitate the uptake and use of 
AI by all members of our community and 
provide scope to overcome existing societal 
inequalities. If programmed with inclusion 
as a major component, we can facilitate 
beneficial integration between humans and 
AI in decision making systems. To achieve this, 
the data used in AI systems must be inclusive. 
Much of society will need to develop basic 
literacies in AI systems and technologies 
While there is much uncertainty regarding 
the extent to which AI and automation 
will transform work, it is undeniable that 
AI will have an impact on most work roles, 
even those that, on the surface today, 
seem immune from disruption. As such, 
there will be a need to prepare for change, 
even if change does not arrive as rapidly or 
dramatically as is often forecast. 
The excitement relating to the adoption 
and development of AI technologies has 
produced a surge in demand for workers in 
AI research and development. New roles are 
being created and existing roles augmented 
to support and extend the development of 
AI, but demand for skilled workers including 
data scientists is outstripping supply. Training 
and education for this sector are subsequently 
in high demand. Tertiary providers are rapidly 
growing AI research and learning capabilities. 
Platform companies such as Amazon (Web 
Services) and Google are investing heavily 
in tools for self-directed AI learning and 
reskilling. A robust framework for AI education 
– one that draws on the strengths of STEM 
and HASS perspectives, that cultivates an 
interest in AI from an early age and that 
places a premium on encouraging diversity 
in areas of IT and engineering – can foster 
a generation of creative and innovative AI 
designers, practitioners, consultants as well 
as an informed society. Students from a 
diverse range of disciplines such as chemistry, 
politics, history, physics and linguistics 
could be equipped with the knowledge and 
knowhow to apply AI techniques such as ML 
to their disciplines. A general, community-
wide understanding of the basic principles 
of AI – how it operates; what are its main 
capabilities and limitations – will be necessary 
as AI becomes increasingly prevalent across all 
sectors. The demand for AI skills and expertise 
is leading to an international race to attract 
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– which will involve understanding what 
AI is capable of, how AI uses data, the 
potential risks of AI and so on – in order 
to feel confident engaging in AI in their 
everyday lives. Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs) and micro-credentials, as well as free 
resources provided by platform companies, 
could help achieve this educational outcome. 
Regulation, governance 
and wellbeing
Effective regulation and governance of 
AI technologies will require involvement 
of, and work by, all thought-leaders and 
decision makers and will need to include 
the participation of the public, communities 
and stakeholders directly impacted by the 
changes. Political leaders are well placed 
to guide a national discussion about the 
future society envisioned for Australia. Policy 
initiatives must be coordinated in relation 
to existing domestic and international 
regulatory frameworks. An independently-led 
AI body drawing together stakeholders from 
government, industry and the public and 
private sectors could provide institutional 
leadership on the development and 
deployment of AI. For example, a similar body, 
the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, regulates the communications 
sector with the view to maximise economic 
and social benefits for both the community 
and industry. 
Traditional measures of success, such as GDP 
and the Gini coefficient (a measure of income 
inequality), will remain relevant in assessing 
the extent to which the nation is managing 
the transition to an economy and a society 
that takes advantage of the opportunities AI 
makes available. These measures can mask 
problems, however, and innovative measures 
of subjective wellbeing may be necessary to 
better characterise the effect of AI on society. 
Such measures could include the OECD Better 
Life Index or other indicators such as the 
Australian Digital Inclusion Index. Measures 
like the triple bottom line may need to be 
adapted to measure success in a way that 
makes the wellbeing of all citizens central.
Ensuring that AI continues to be developed 
safely and appropriately for the wellbeing of 
society will be dependent on a responsive 
regulatory system that encourages 
innovation and engenders confidence in 
its development. It is often argued that AI 
systems and technologies require a new set 
of legal frameworks and ethical guidelines. 
However, existing human rights frameworks, 
as well as national and international 
regulations on data security and privacy, 
can provide ample scope through which to 
regulate and govern much of the use and 
development of AI systems and technologies. 
Updated competition policies could account 
for emerging data monopolies. We should 
therefore apply existing frameworks to new 
ethical problems and make modifications 
only where necessary. Much like the debates 
occurring on AI’s impact on employment, 
the governance and regulation of AI are 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty and 
disagreement. Our actions in these areas will 
shape the future of AI, so it is important that 
decisions made in these contexts are not only 
carefully considered, but that they align with 
the nation’s vision for an AI-enabled future 
that is economically and socially sustainable, 
equitable and accessible for all, strategic in 
terms of government and industry interests, 
and places the wellbeing of society in the 
centre. The development of regulatory 
frameworks should facilitate industry-
led growth and seek to foster innovation 
and economic wellbeing. Internationally-
coordinated policy action will be necessary 
to ensure the authority and legitimacy of 
the emerging body of law governing AI. 
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A national framework
The safe, responsible and strategic implementation 
of AI will require a clear national framework or 
strategy that examines the range of ethical, legal 
and social barriers to, and risks associated with, AI; 
allows areas of major opportunity to be established; 
and directs development to maximise the economic 
and social benefits of AI. The national framework 
would articulate the interests of society, uphold 
safe implementation, be transparent and promote 
wellbeing. It should review the progress of similar 
international initiatives to determine potential 
outcomes from their investments to identify the 
potential opportunities and challenges on the 
horizon. Key actions could include:
1. Educational platforms and frameworks that 
are able to foster public understanding and 
awareness of AI 
2. Guidelines and advice for procurement, 
especially for public sector and small and 
medium enterprises, which informs them 
of the importance of technological systems 
and how they interact with social systems 
and legal frameworks
3. Enhanced and responsive governance and 
regulatory mechanisms to deal with issues 
arising from cyber-physical systems and AI 
through existing arbiters and institutions
4. Integrated interdisciplinary design and 
development requirements for AI and 
cyber-physical systems that have positive 
social impacts
5. Investment in the core science of AI and 
translational research, as well as in AI skills.
An independent body could be established or tasked 
to provide leadership in relation to these actions 
and principles. This central body would support a 
critical mass of skills and could provide oversight in 
relation to the design, development and use of AI 




1. AI offers major opportunities to 
improve our economic, societal and 
environmental wellbeing, while also 
presenting potentially significant 
global risks, including technological 
unemployment and the use of lethal 
autonomous weapons. Further 
development of AI must be directed to 
allow well-considered implementation 
that supports our society in becoming 
what we would like it to be – one 
centred on improving prosperity, 
reducing inequity and achieving 
continued betterment.
• AI offers opportunities across many areas 
including, for example, the potential to 
advance health treatments; transform 
government processes; improve the 
wellbeing of society; be used for 
emergency response and early detection 
of natural disasters such as earthquakes 
and bushfires; and be applied in dangerous 
occupations to improve health and safety. 
• Change is inevitable and already 
underway; action and planning are critical; 
without assertive preparation for AI, 
we will be left behind and will be more 
reliant on importing AI technologies and 
expertise that may not be suitable for the 
local context. 
• AI should be developed for the common 
good. The protection of human rights 
and fairness must be built in from the 
outset, to ensure that AI is implemented 
safely and sustainably, to benefit all of our 
citizens. 
• Ensuring the safe, responsible and 
strategic development of AI would benefit 
from a national strategy that allows areas 
of major opportunity to be established 
while the range of social, ethical and legal 
challenges are embraced and held as core 
values for implementation.
• The national strategy would be 
complemented by an implementation 
framework that balances the need for 
social values, data-driven innovation 
and responsive regulation. The interplay 
between these pillars will determine 
the way that AI advances and the 
opportunities that we pursue.
• Meaningful dialogue between civil society, 
industry, academia and the highest levels 
of government is needed to shape the kind 
of society we want for future generations. 
For example, a national summit could be 
used to encourage advancement of AI and 
identify desired societal goals, as well as 
boundaries that ensure AI is developed 
within sustainable, ethical and socially 
responsible limits.
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2. Proactive engagement, consultation 
and ongoing communication with 
the public about the changes and 
effects of AI will be essential for 
building community awareness. 
Earning public trust will be critical to 
enable acceptance and uptake of the 
technology. 
• AI presents opportunities to make 
society more inclusive, to improve living 
standards for people with a disability 
and those experiencing disadvantage, 
and increase representation of minority 
groups. To maximise these benefits, there 
is a need to ensure that advancement is 
inclusive, protects human rights and is well 
communicated to align with social values 
that are openly accepted. 
• Increased focus on accessibility and 
inclusive AI design can minimise possible 
harm to society by reducing prejudice 
and bias introduced by AI systems. This 
includes access to digital infrastructure 
that supports, enables and diffuses AI 
systems; designing AI systems for diverse 
needs rather than adopting a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach; and working to increase 
representation of marginalised groups in 
the development of AI technologies. There 
are opportunities for us to lead in this area.
• Ensuring the protection of human rights 
may involve, for example, extending 
existing legal concepts such as liability 
to encompass decisions made by AI and 
protections for employees; or establishing 
ethical standards that will help to leverage 
the benefits of AI while also managing 
associated risks. 
• There is a need for initiatives that promote 
and provide broader digital literacy and 
understanding within society to support 
the transition to an AI future without 
marginalising sections of the community. 
• Community education initiatives should 
promote general knowledge and 
understanding of the principles of AI; how 
data are used; what it can and cannot 
achieve; and what we can and should 
expect from it. Explaining AI in such a 
manner will be critical to ensuring that 
people can make informed decisions 
about AI and how they use it in their 
everyday life. 
• Education should also encompass the 
risks and opportunities of AI. The public 
should be aware which risks are realistic 
and should understand that risks can be 
managed through adaptation or intelligent 
policy.
3. The application of AI is growing 
rapidly. Ensuring its continued safe 
and appropriate development will 
be dependent on strong governance 
and a responsive regulatory system 
that encourages innovation. It will 
also be important to engender 
public confidence that the goods and 
services driven by AI are at, or above, 
benchmark standards and preserve 
the values that society seeks. 
• Regulatory systems must engender public 
trust and limit adverse outcomes. Gaps 
in regulation, for example in automated 
decision-making technologies, raise 
significant human rights implications, 
especially regarding discrimination, 
implicit bias and undisclosed decision-
making processes. It is therefore essential 
to identify where there are gaps in our 
regulatory frameworks for AI technologies 
in order to address such gaps. 
• While greater regulation will be required 
for the application of AI within industry 
sectors, industry should take proactive 
steps to ensure safe implementation 
and readiness for AI systems. In doing 
so, industry should continue to explore 
and refine the use of AI and monitor the 
actions of global peers, competitors and 
activities in the research sector.
• An ethical certificate and privacy 
labelling system could be created for 
low-risk consumer technologies such 
as smartphones or home assistant 
technologies. Such a system could be 
maintained by experts and consumer 
and industry groups and reviewed by an 
independent auditor.
• Transparency and explainability are 
important for establishing public trust 
in emerging technologies. To establish 
public confidence, it will be necessary to 
provide the public with an explanation and 
introduction to AI throughout the initial 
adoption stage. 
10
4. AI is enabled by access to data. To 
support successful implementation 
of AI, there is a need for effective 
digital infrastructure, including 
data centres and structures for data 
sharing, that makes AI secure, trusted 
and accessible, particularly for rural 
and remote populations. If such 
essential infrastructure is not carefully 
and appropriately developed, the 
advancement of AI and the immense 
benefits it offers will be diminished. 
• AI technologies rely on digital 
infrastructure that is accessible, secure 
and fast. However, the lack of adequate 
infrastructure will inhibit the broad 
uptake of AI and will reduce the benefits 
it offers, particularly for remote and rural 
communities. 
• To be competitive in the AI sector, 
infrastructure development will 
need to expand and should keep 
pace with international progress in 
telecommunications networks, cloud 
computing, data at scale, and fast and 
secure connectivity. 
• AI will require high quality and 
comprehensive datasets that are 
accessible and useable for learning 
algorithms. The use of AI technologies 
to bolster data accumulation and 
aggregation can lead to positive societal 
benefits, particularly in healthcare. 
However, there are also potential negative 
impacts associated with data collection, 
including AI’s ability to derive personal 
information from aggregated datasets, 
and related considerations of consent, 
privacy and sharing. Transparent and fair 
data collection policies and procedures 
will be essential to building trust in how 
data are collected, accessed and used, and 




5. Successful development and 
implementation of AI will require a 
broad range of new skills and enhanced 
capabilities that span the humanities, 
arts and social sciences (HASS) and 
science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics (STEM) disciplines. 
Building a talent base and establishing 
an adaptable and skilled workforce 
for the future will need education 
programs that start in early childhood 
and continue throughout working life 
and a supportive immigration policy. 
• Governments should prepare and commit 
to long-term initiatives that prepare 
workers, business and the economy for 
technological change. This would include 
developing policy and legislation to ensure 
the benefits brought by technology are 
shared equally.
• Education curricula at all levels of 
schooling, particularly higher education, 
must evolve for students to develop 
the skills and capabilities required for 
changing occupations and tasks. Human 
skills will become increasingly important 
for AI and subsequently for the education 
and training of AI specialists. There is a 
place for education systems to focus on 
elements of human intelligence and how 
to protect basic human rights, dignity 
and identity. Ethics should be at the core 
of education for the people who are 
developing AI technology.
• Specific education and training programs 
will be essential for developing an 
appropriately skilled AI workforce. 
Specialist training will often need to 
augment established domain knowledge 
in fields such as health, energy, mining and 
transport and should be driven by deeper 
interactions between industry and the 
university sector. There also needs to be 
effort invested in ensuring diversity in AI 
training programs.
• AI technologies tend to impact on 
tasks and processes rather than whole 
occupations. While the full extent of 
displacement of workers is uncertain, 
skills and role types are evolving, new jobs 
are appearing and there will be a need 
to respond to these changing workforce 
needs by upskilling affected workers. 
Consideration should be given to not 
only upskilling and reskilling workers 
specifically in AI, but also across other 
unrelated industries and roles. 
• There may be a need to rethink the 
context of work itself. People will need 
to be meaningfully engaged in activities 
and roles independently of work. Income 
support could be considered for those 
displaced if they cannot be appropriately 
reskilled.
• Skilled working visa programs aimed at 
transferring experience and capability from 
overseas would benefit the advancement 
and uptake of AI and help the nation 
stay abreast of global development. 
The Australian Global Talent Scheme 
Pilot is a welcome approach to attracting 
skilled talent.
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6. An independently led AI body that 
brings stakeholders together from 
government, academia and the public 
and private sectors would provide a 
critical mass of skills and institutional 
leadership to develop AI technologies, 
as well as promote engagement with 
international initiatives and to develop 
appropriate ethical frameworks. 
• Through collaboration, there is an 
opportunity for us to compete on the 
international stage, become international 
role models and provide trusted 
environments for AI development. 
This would be stimulated by a robust, 
harmonised regulatory environment that 
is designed to support local innovation, 
help start-up companies to commercialise 
AI technologies and foster economic 
development. Sandbox opportunities 
include prominent industry areas such 
as healthcare, agriculture, mining 
and advanced manufacturing. Once 
demonstrated, established AI technologies 
can be exported internationally. 
• International cooperation and 
coordination in AI, data, privacy and 
security issues could be nurtured through 
increased participation in international 
fora. Cooperation between governments, 
corporations and researchers would 
support increased measures of global 
governance for AI. 
• An independent body that considers the 
full spectrum of interdisciplinary aspects 
of AI and allows stakeholders to connect, 
collaborate, exchange and train staff and 
share resources would provide significant 
value to the advancement and uptake 
of AI. Whether a new institute or an 
existing body with an enlarged remit, the 
institute could bring together researchers, 
developers and policy experts from both 
HASS and STEM disciplines to undertake 
long-term projects on issues spanning 
human rights, psychology, regulation, 
industrial relations and business. Such 
an institute could conduct integrated 
interdisciplinary design, facilitate 
stakeholder collaboration, develop 
cyberphysical systems, inform broader 
policy standards and allow for the full 
remit of AI to be explored in a holistic 
manner.
• Basic and translational research in areas 
of identified priority must be supported 
to ensure that we are among the most 
innovative AI nations. 
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not a specific technology, but rather a collection of 
computational methods and techniques. There is no single AI and there is a lack of 
consensus among AI researchers on a universal definition. This is because AI means 
different things to different people and can be used in conjunction with a variety of 
other technologies, such as the Internet of Things and robotics. However, in this report 
we define Artificial Intelligence as: a collection of interrelated technologies used to solve 
problems and perform tasks that, when humans do them, requires thinking.
Figure 1: Components of AI




























AI is sometimes equated with machine 
learning (ML), an often data intensive process 
in which a computer program ‘learns’ to 
do a task from examples. However, ML is 
only one part of AI, just as learning is only 
one part of human intelligence. AI also 
includes: natural language processing (NLP) 
to enable computers to understand and 
manipulate language; speech recognition 
to enable computers to understand speech; 
computer vision to enable computers to 
perceive the world; and automated reasoning 
techniques such as planning, scheduling and 
optimisation, which enable computers to 
reason about and solve complex goals. AI is 
used within a number of areas like robotics 
and intelligent user interfaces (Figure 1).
AI can be distinguished from simpler software 
technologies in its ability to handle problems 
involving complex features such as ambiguity, 
multiple and sometimes conflicting 
objectives, and uncertainty. AI software often, 
but not always, incorporates an ability to learn 
and improve over time. AI techniques can lead 
to computers learning through the extraction 
of information from data and optimising 
techniques such as self-improvement 
(unsupervised learning) or by being taught by 
a developer (supervised learning). In this way, 
AI is enabled by access to data and depends 
on existing digital infrastructure. Minsky, a 
founder within the field of AI described AI as 
computer systems that are able to perform 
searches, pattern recognition, learning, 
planning and inductive reasoning. For the 
purposes of this report, we discuss narrow AI, 
which are relatively simple systems limited to 
narrow problem domains. 
AI techniques may solve problems in a 
different manner to how humans solve the 
same problems. However, AI is currently 
limited in its ability to solve many problems. 
For example, while ML is effective at finding 
patterns in high dimensional data sets, it also 
has technical limitations. ML systems will 
often break in strange ways, do not provide 
meaningful explanations, and struggle to 
transfer to a new domain. AI systems currently 
have only a narrow focus and this will likely 
be the case for many years. AlphaZero, for 
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example, learnt to play two-person complete 
information games like Go and Chess at above 
the level of humans. However, AlphaZero 
cannot learn to play a game of chance like 
poker, translate English into Mandarin, or read 
x-rays. 
This report will not consider Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI), the attempt to build 
programs that match the full breadth of ability 
of humans. This is a very ambitious goal, that 
may not succeed, and is expected to take 
many decades or even centuries if it does. We 
will focus instead on the application of AI to 
narrow specialised problems where progress 
has already been made.
However, despite the limitations described, 
there have been recent advances in 
certain areas of AI and it is emerging as 
transformative technologies that promise 
to significantly alter our environment. 
AI is involved in many technologies and 
applications that already have an influence on 
our lives. As PwC stated in a 2017 report (PwC, 
2017: 3):
‘What comes through strongly … is just 
how big a game changer AI is likely to 
be, and how much value potential is 
up for grabs. AI could contribute up to 
[US]$15.7 trillion to the global economy 
in 2030, more than the current output 
of China and India combined.’
AI development is a truly global enterprise. 
It is being pursued by countries around the 
world because of the perceived benefits it has 
to offer and is likely to underpin economic 
competitiveness for both businesses and 
countries in the foreseeable future. For 
example, AI can advance health treatments 
to improve the wellbeing of society; be used 
for emergency response and early detection 
of natural disasters such as earthquakes 
and bushfires; and be used in dangerous 
occupations to improve workplace health and 
safety. Yet, as with most endeavours, AI also 
carries risks for both individuals and societies 
and it is likely that the changes will shift the 
prosperity and competitiveness of nations.
AI has deep implications for our lives, 
including the protection of human rights, 
quality of life, employment prospects, 
geopolitics, social inequality, trust in 
governments and corporations, education, 
ethics and law, the meaning of democracy, 
and identity and social relationships. It may 
be too early to say whether AI will be as 
transformative as the Industrial Revolution in 
the 18th and 19th century. However, what can 
be said with confidence is that it is moving at 
a far greater pace and is immediately global in 
a way that the Industrial Revolution was not.
It is therefore important that the development 
and implementation of AI is managed 
such that society can enjoy the benefits 
and opportunities presented without 
being harmed by the risks it can pose. With 
increasing development of AI, it is timely to 
consider what kind of society we want to 
be, what we would like to accomplish with 
machines and why. This consideration is 
important because the short-term choices we 
make in this field will have long term impacts. 
The pace of technological change demands 
agile and responsive policy responses to 
ensure that people feel prepared for the 
opportunities and challenges associated with 
the broad uptake of AI.
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The structure of the report
Chapter 4 examines the equitable 
development and implementation of 
AI technology in Australia. It considers 
the potential for inequality to be either 
exacerbated or reduced as a result of AI 
technologies and explores issues of human 
rights, public communication and inclusive 
design. Key considerations and principles for 
the equitable adoption of AI are also outlined. 
Chapter 5 details some of the regulatory 
and legal implications surrounding AI, 
including liability for AI decisions, the ability 
to appeal an AI decision, and the effects of 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. 
It provides suggestions for regulatory 
considerations and explores the potential for 
an independent body to provide oversight 
and governance in relation to AI technologies. 
Chapter 6 outlines the significance of data 
to the development and implementation 
of AI and describes the technical and legal 
components to data usage, including data 
collection and consent, data governance, data 
management and storage. 
Chapter 7 examines data with respect to 
social and ethical considerations. Trust, 
accessibility, indigenous data sovereignty and 
the potential for discrimination and bias are 
discussed. 
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the report 
and details the possibilities for AI.
This report considers a range of AI technologies 
and applications across sectors that permeate 
or will permeate our society. It places 
wellbeing at the forefront of AI development 
and implementation and considers what 
governments, industry, education institutions 
and society will need to anticipate in the 
coming years. While no time horizon is 
formally specified, the use of short, medium 
and long term is loosely considered to be 
within 5 years, approximately 10 to 15 years, 
and greater than 20 years, respectively. The 
huge uncertainty that is inherent in the rapidly 
evolving technological, social and economic 
contexts prevents specific prediction.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of AI, its 
promise and implications for international 
relations. The chapter discusses AI in relation 
to international treaties, global governance 
and geopolitics. 
Chapter 2 describes the scope of AI 
technologies and considers AI applications 
and infrastructure requirements. An overview 
of some of the various sectors impacted by AI 
is presented. While this overview cannot be 
comprehensive, it aims to illustrate some of 
the uses for AI technology. 
Chapter 3 discusses the future education, 
skills and workforce needs in a world of AI. 
It considers the potential impact of AI on 
these key areas and examines issues on the 
transformation of the Australian community, 
from the individual through to the workforce.
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How this report complements and differs from others
• Social implications and establishing 
frameworks to manage the array of 
potential issues spanning ethics, public 
trust, safety, productivity, employment, 
health and inequality
• Cultural impact and supporting positive 
public attitudes to technology uptake and 
change
• Industry and research capabilities and 
identifying niche areas of opportunity 
where Australia and New Zealand have 
a strategic advantage and can develop, 
adopt and lead. 
While Australia does not yet have a formal 
plan or strategy for AI, there are several 
national initiatives underway or completed. 
In 2018, the Australian Government launched 
Australia’s Tech Future (a digital economy 
strategy), the Australian Centre for Robotics 
Vision released a report A Robotics Roadmap 
for Australia 2018, and the Australian 
Government announced A$29.9 million in 
funding over four years for CSIRO’s Data61 to 
develop a national roadmap for AI including a 
national ethics framework and to strengthen 
Australia’s capability in AI and Machine 
Learning. Further, the Australian Human Rights 
Commission is undertaking a three-year 
project on the relationship between human 
rights and technology (Australian Human 
Rights Commission, 2018a).
It is anticipated that the ACOLA report will 
provide a broad interdisciplinary framework 
to support policy makers in Australia. 
This report places society at the core 
of AI development and explores issues 
specific to Australia and New Zealand such 
as our workforce, our education system, 
cultural considerations and our regulatory 
environment. It identifies areas of importance 
to Australia and New Zealand. Enlisting 
expertise from Fellows of Australia’s Learned 
Academies, the Australian Academy of Health 
and Medical Sciences (AAHMS) and the 
Royal Society Te Apārangi (New Zealand), 
the ACOLA report provides a comprehensive 
interdisciplinary study to map and establish a 
detailed understanding of the opportunities, 
benefits and risks presented by AI, including 
examinations of: 
• Technological enablers and barriers, 
spanning trends in uptake
• Standards and operating protocols 
to support interoperability, accessibility 
for users, innovation and technology 
advancement
• Employment and the workforce, 
including displacement and skill change, 
labour standards, the changing geographic 
distribution of workers and the career long 
interaction between education and work. 
• Education to ensure the effectiveness of 
education initiatives, support equity of 
access and increase public understanding 




This report builds on a number of existing 
national and international reports on AI. 
ACOLA and the working group have engaged 
with concurrent Australian, New Zealand and 
international initiatives to ensure the reports 
are not developed in isolation. It is hoped that 
the findings of this report can contribute to 
the effective and ethical development of AI as 
an opportunity to improve societal wellbeing. 
While application of AI to cybersecurity is 
important, it is not directly addressed in this 
report. Cybersecurity is strongly addressed 
by current Australian Government policy 
and program initiatives and therefore 
is acknowledged rather than analysed 
in the instances where it underpins 
other applications or implications of AI 
development.
The Internet of Things will be addressed by 
a parallel ACOLA Horizon Scanning report 
and is similarly not considered in this report, 
except when it underpins other applications 
or implications of AI development.
Artificial general intelligence (machines that 
match the full breadth and depth of human 
expertise) is also excluded from the report. 
General AI is likely to be pursued in the 
coming decades, but its development will 
require a longer time horizon than the issues 
presented in this report and therefore has 
been excluded from consideration.
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CHAPTER 1 
A WORLD OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
This chapter is based on input papers prepared by the generous contributions of Ziyang Fan and 
Dr Susan Aaronson (AI and Trade); Professor Dr Andrea Renda (Global Governance); and Adjunct Professor 
Nicholas Davis and Dr Jean-Marc Rickli (Geopolitics). The original input papers and views of the experts 
listed can be found on the ACOLA website (www.acola.org).
However, without full consideration of 
the economic, ethical, social and cultural 
implications of implementation, significant 
issues such as social inequity, discrimination, 
breach of human rights, unemployment, 
loss of social cohesion, gaps in education, 
geopolitical tension, and poor public trust in 
governments, democracy and corporations, 
could come to bear and may prevent effective 
deployment of the technology and diminish 
the benefits.
At a broad level there are four types of AI:
• Narrow AI (or weak AI), is well established, 
available, and pervasive. It is usually 
designed to focus on a narrow task or 
application. Narrow AI ranges from the 
early instances of computers being 
programmed to beat humans at chess 
through to chatbots and digital assistants 
such as Apple’s Siri. AI solutions in the 
market today are in this category, albeit 
with a very wide range of capability.
AI is already being used in many areas and will 
increasingly be the underlying technology 
that allows devices to run, communicate and 
analyse data. As AI becomes more advanced, 
its applications will become increasingly 
complex and will have widespread impact 
on our lives, workplaces, industries and 
the way we interact with each other. It 
offers opportunities for Australia and our 
neighbours for continued prosperity and 
global competitiveness. The way in which we 
interact with and adopt AI will fundamentally 
shape how it is developed in the future. 
As mentioned in the introduction, AI is 
a collection of computational methods 
and techniques. AI applications touch all 
corners of the economy, including disaster 
management, the environment, logistics, 
health, education, manufacturing, warfare and 
government services. If pursued appropriately, 
the opportunities presented by AI may be as 
transformative as the industrial revolution. 
1.1 Overview of artificial intelligence
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• Emerging and disruptive AI is under 
development and has emerging 
applications. Self-driving vehicles, drones, 
or advanced environments such as IBM’s 
‘Project Debater’ fall within this category 
of AI. AI of this type is characterised by a 
machine acting on what it sees based on 
either supervised or unsupervised learning 
(the latter of which is often referred to as 
machine learning, see Chapter 2). 
• Generalised AI (or artificial general 
intelligence), is a machine that is of 
equal intelligence to an adult human. 
Unlike narrow AI, a general intelligence 
machine can theoretically make decisions 
irrespective of any previous training, 
instead relying on what it learns on its 
own. The basis for human consciousness is 
still unknown and therefore it is difficult to 
speculate when or even if a machine will 
be able to emulate it. As such, scientists 
are divided on how close we are to 
achieving artificial general intelligence.
• Superhuman AI (or artificial emergent 
intelligence) is the evolution of 
generalised AI and refers to a theoretical 
machine that has a far superior intellect 
in every field including creativity, social 
skills and general wisdom. In effect, this 
level intelligence would be representative 
of a machine that would be capable of 
constantly learning and improving itself.
As AI is developed, solutions will also move 
towards augmenting human intelligence. 
This will encompass systems that can learn 
from interactions with humans and the 
environment, and inform human decision 
making to select and weigh options. 
Augmented intelligence is a route whereby 
we can ensure that the human remains in the 
decision-making loop and that human capital 
is not rendered redundant by AI. 
This report focuses on narrow and emerging 
AI and considers the potential opportunities 




AI has been a field of interest and study for 
decades. However, more recently, increases in 
computing power, technology advancements, 
increases in data availability from the rise 
of social media, the digitisation of the 
global economy and the development of 
the Internet of Things (IoT ) have led to its 
ascendance. 
The accumulation, aggregation and 
manipulation of high volumes, high velocity 
(speed of data) and high variety (range of 
data types and sources) of data in real-time, 
provides increasingly accurate insights into 
the complexities of modern social life, which 
can enhance policy and service insights and 
enable better choice-making for consumers. 
For example, AI can be used to enable 
better resource management through the 
collective use of smart grids, which can 
provide detailed understanding of electricity 
usage at every stage in the grid. Other areas 
of AI, such as natural language processing, 
are strongly contributing to the automation 
and streamlining of various tasks including 
machine translation (e.g. Google Translate), 
dialogue systems (e.g. the back-end systems 
that underlie Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa) 
and automatic question answering (e.g. IBM 
Watson). Machine learning (ML) algorithms 
are also helping to automate a range of 
processes, from autonomous vehicles to 
medical diagnosis.
Recently, some AI systems have demonstrated 
the ability to outperform humans in forming 
inferences from large, complex datasets 
to solve problems such as classification, 
continuous estimation, clustering, anomaly 
detection, data generation and ranking (Chui 
et al., 2018). These techniques have resulted 
in advances in important aspects of AI such as 
computer vision, natural language processing, 
robotics, planning and intelligence analysis.
These advances in AI have the potential to 
transform economies and societies, in terms 
of innovation, effectiveness, process efficiency 
and resilience. In 2017, it was suggested that 
AI could contribute up to US$15.7 trillion 
to the global economy in 2030 (PwC, 2017), 
equating to more than the current output 
of China and India combined. It is estimated 
that of this amount, US$6.6 trillion would 
likely come from increased productivity alone 
(PwC, 2017). 
While AI has the potential to advance society 
in new ways, much remains unclear about 
the future of AI and whether the promise of a 
radical transformation of economic and social 
life will be realised. Australia and New Zealand 
have an opportunity to develop policy 
frameworks for AI – frameworks that use data 
for national benefit and provide incentives for 
collaboration between industry, government, 
academics and everyday citizens.
1.1.2 Data
The internet has enabled rapid 
communication on a global scale, resulting 
in an unprecedented amount of data being 
produced, shared and recorded. Some 
analyses indicate that over 3.7 billion people 
use the internet, executing 5 billion searches, 
720 million tweets and 432 million status 
updates every day (Marr, 2018). Additionally, 
smart or internet-enabled technologies and 
services in homes, workplaces, cities and 
governments, rely on the extraction and 
sharing of large volumes of data between 
individuals, organisations and governments. 
Such data is often personal and sensitive 
information about an individual. Governments 
can analyse data to better understand 
citizens’ concerns and needs, while platform 
companies such as Twitter, Google and 
Facebook rely on this data to generate 
revenue in various ways. Much of this data is 
not provided by individuals per se, but rather 
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generated through various internet-enabled 
technologies and services that produce 
continuous streams of data. 
The availability of such large datasets is 
fundamental to the role of AI and underpins 
much of its development and use. Its 
collection, however, prompts questions about 
the legal, ethical and economic implications 
of data collection. For example, algorithmic 
decision-making tools raise concerns on 
potential bias and discrimination, while 
AI systems capable of deriving personal 
information from multiple datasets point to 
technical and legal challenges on tracing the 
‘provenance’ of data.
1.1.3 International context
As AI continues to rapidly advance, many 
countries are responding with government 
and industry strategies and investments 
to take advantage of its potential benefits 
and opportunities (Figure 2). While not 
representing an exhaustive list of the 
initiatives underway, it does demonstrate the 
level of interest globally, particularly in the 
past two years. 
The US is currently the world leader in AI 
research. Boosted by the world’s largest 
private sector research and development 
(R&D) environment, with companies such 
Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, 
IBM and Microsoft, the US is leading the 
way in the adoption of AI in high-tech 
and telecommunications industries, and 
the automotive, financial and resource 
sectors. The US Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) has been crucial in 
supporting this agenda. In 2017, the value of 
AI in the US medical industry was estimated 
at US$369.25 million, with compound annual 
growth of 41 percent (Mordor Intelligence, 
2017). In 2016, the United States National 
Science and Technology Council published 
a national AI strategy, The National Artificial 
Intelligence Research and Development 
Strategic Plan (NSTC, 2016). China, the UK, 
France and the EU followed suit, releasing 
national strategies that each demonstrate a 
different approach towards the uptake of AI-
powered technologies. In 2018, the Australian 
Government joined in these efforts.
China, through technology companies such 
as Huawei, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, is 
already a key player in a wide variety of AI 
development activities, including autonomous 
vehicles, facial and voice recognition, targeted 
advertising and marketing, as well as policing. 
In 2017, China’s State Council released 
the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence 
Development Plan, which lists several goals 
including: AI becoming a key source of 
growth; a primary driver of industrial advances 
and economic transformation; and for China 
to be the world’s top AI innovation centre by 
2030 (State Council, 2017). AI-driven facial 
recognition technologies developed by 
Chinese companies have been used in over 
100 million smartphones (Bloomberg, 2018) 
and have been used to streamline boarding 
processes in large airports and draw attention 
to jaywalkers by projecting their image on 
large screens at intersections in cities like 
Shenzhen (Xu and Xiao, 2018). However, 
errors within these systems can also occur. 
A Chinese businesswoman was recently 
identified by the facial recognition system as 
having jaywalked when in fact the system had 
captured her image on a bus advertisement 
(Shen, 2018). The bus had been driving 
through an intersection when the facial 
recognition system incorrectly identified and 
displayed the infringement. Approximately 
60,000 schools in China are participating in 
a program that uses AI software to grade the 
work of students, evaluate the structure of 
essays and incorporate notes from teachers 
(Chen, 2018).
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In Europe, the European Commission has 
called for €20 billion in investment in AI R&D 
from public and private sources by 2020 
(European Commission, 2018b, 2018c). The 
European Commission is also increasing 
its own investment to €1.5 billion via the 
Horizon 2020 fund, with that investment 
expected to spur an additional €2.5 billion 
in associated funding from public-private 
partnerships (European Commission, 2018b, 
2018c). There are further initiatives such as 
the European fund for strategic investments 
that will help coordinate an additional 
€500 million in AI R&D investments by 2020 
(European Commission, 2018b) and the 
Future Emerging Technologies programme. 
Citing the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), the European Commission’s Artificial 
Intelligence for Europe report states that 
Europe is at the forefront of ensuring data 
serves humanity and suggests that the EU 
can lead in developing an approach to AI 
that ‘benefits people and society as a whole’ 
(European Commission, 2018c). The EU is 
hoping to find a competitive advantage in 
developing a more ethical approach that 
enhances privacy and trust and plans to 
release documents to support this in late 
2018 (Rabesandratana, 2018b).
Building on a history of government 
investment in fundamental AI, the UK is 
home to some of the world’s leading AI 
companies, including the headquarters of 
DeepMind, a British AI company acquired by 
Google in 2014 and considered perhaps the 
world’s leading AI lab (Metz and Satariano, 
2018). In October 2017, there were more 
than 200 start-ups and small-to-medium 
enterprises (SMEs) developing AI products in 
the UK (Hall & Pesenti, 2017). In April 2018, 
the UK Government released its national 
AI strategy as part of its broader industrial 
strategy and established several new bodies 
to support the development of AI: the AI 
Council, the Office for Artificial Intelligence, 

























Figure 2: Global AI strategies and initiatives
Adapted from: Dutton, 2018.
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(HM Government, 2017). Additionally, the 
Alan Turing Institute’s remit was expanded 
as the UK’s national research centre for AI.
Canada was the first country to release a 
national AI strategy. The strategy includes 
funding for centres of excellence in AI 
research and innovation. Canada is ranked 
third in the Government AI Readiness Index, 
indicating that the government is well placed 
to implement AI in its delivery of public 
services (Stirling, Miller and Martinho-Truswell, 
2017). Canadian researchers and policy makers 
are producing strategies and principles to 
support the responsible development of 
AI. For example, the Université de Montréal 
is developing the Montréal Declaration for 
a Responsible Development of Artificial 
Intelligence (Université de Montréal, 2017), 
and Global Affairs Canada is leading a 
collaboration on AI and human rights with a 
number of Canadian universities (McKelvey 
and Gupta, 2018). Canada has also attracted 
international leaders in AI technology 
including Google, Uber, Facebook and 
Microsoft (Bernstein, 2018).
There are many other notable examples of 
national AI initiatives and programs.1 France 
recently revealed plans to create a National 
Artificial Intelligence Program alongside the 
launch of a national AI strategy promising 
€1.5 billion for AI projects by 2022 (Dillet, 
2018). Germany has announced €3 billion 
over six years for the Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) Made in Germany digital strategy with 
the aim to boost the country’s AI capabilities. 
Matching funds are anticipated from industry, 
which will bring the total investment to 
€6 billion. The strategy outlines several goals,
1 These are outlined in further detail in a supplementary 














































1 These are outlined in further detail in a supplementary report available on the ACOLA website (www.acola.org)
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including the creation of 100 university chairs 
with a focus on AI, alongside other strategies 
to enhance research and translation (Buck, 
2018). Estonia, a leader in digital governance 
initiatives, has already begun development 
of a legal framework for AI systems and 
is ranked sixth on the global Automation 
Readiness Index (Plantera and Di Stasi, 2017; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018a). The 
Indian Government recently released a report 
from the AI Task Force that outlines the key 
challenges for India in integrating AI into 
its economy and society, making a number 
of recommendations (NITI Aayog, 2018). 
Japan has produced a national AI strategy 
and with significant investment in R&D has 
been a major contributor to AI research 
(Japanese Government, 2017). Israel is host 
to a number of universities undertaking AI 
research, and Israeli start-ups have received 
overseas investment from large US companies 
(Solomon, 2017). Nigeria and South Africa 
are emerging as African leaders in the 
development of AI; the University of Lagos 
having opened an Artificial Intelligence Hub 
and the two countries hosting the majority of 
African industry start-ups (Ferrein and Meyer, 
2012; Ndiomewese, 2018; The Guardian, 2018).
Globally, technology giants spent 
$20-30 billion on AI in 2016, with 90 percent 
spent on R&D and deployment and 
10 percent on AI acquisitions. The majority 
of the funds (66 percent) were spent in the 
US, with China also receiving significant 
investment (17 percent). Indeed, investment 
in China is growing at a significant rate. 
Corporate investment examples include IBM’s 
investment of US$240 million over 10 years in 
a partnership with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT ). The aim of this investment 
is to create an AI laboratory to conduct 
advanced research and to explore the 
implications of the technology on industries 
such as health care and cybersecurity as 
well as on society. However, in comparison 
to overall spending, IBM’s investment is 
relatively small and indicative of the need 
for collaboration. In addition, Google has 
launched its AI-first strategy in 2016 and 
appointed a new research group dedicated 
to ML. 
In contrast to the international initiatives, 
Australia is placed eighth in the Government 
AI Readiness index, sitting between Japan and 
New Zealand. However, Australia is considered 
to be at the forefront of AI development and 
experimentation in the Asia-Pacific region 
(FTI Consulting, 2018). In 2018, the Australian 
Government announced A$29.9 million 
investment in AI, including the creation of a 
technology roadmap, a standards framework 
and a national AI ethics framework. Further, 
the Australian Human Rights Commission 
is undertaking a major research project 
examining the impacts of technology on 
human rights, with a particular focus on 
AI technology (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018a). 
To keep pace with international advances 
and ensure a growing and strong economy, 
it is necessary to be inventive and capable in 
the adoption of AI. It is likely that Australia 
will initially be a receiver of internationally 
developed technology and data standards 
and constraints. The research and strategies 
being undertaken by leading Commonwealth 
countries provide opportunities to cooperate 
in this area at a Commonwealth level. 
Australia and New Zealand’s AI capabilities 
and initiatives are further outlined in 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
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1.1.4 Emergence, impact and 
governance of AI
Global geopolitical changes are likely to occur 
as a result of developing AI technologies. 
While the US and China are global leaders in 
developing AI technology, other countries 
may develop AI expertise in niche areas. For 
example, Canada and Germany are emerging 
leaders in the development of ML and 
autonomous vehicles, respectively. To develop 
a globally competitive AI industry, Australia 
will require public and private investment, 
collection and sharing of large datasets, an 
appropriately skilled workforce and supportive 
regulation. 
Given the unpredictability and the 
pervasiveness of the impacts of AI on every 
sector of society and every institution, it is not 
possible to be comprehensive in reviewing its 
implications for every aspect of international 
relations. What follows is a series of case 
studies, each focusing on an area of major 
importance in which thinking is advanced and 
policy development underway.
While AI technologies may present 
opportunities, advanced AI technologies and 
capabilities may also introduce new risks to 
human rights, the economy, the environment, 
democracy and social cohesion, from 
individuals, criminal enterprises, non-state 
actors and rogue states, who could use the 
technology in undesirable ways. Commercial 
technologies that have the capacity to be 
repurposed for surveillance or offensive uses 
are already being used for untoward purposes 
and it is likely that AI technologies will be 
no exception. Nationally, AI technology will 
cut across applications such as energy grids, 
internet pipelines, the food chain, banking 
networks, hospital infrastructure and transport 
logistics. It will therefore remain important to 
ensure data collection and storage systems 
are secure and protected from external 
intrusion and threats. It has been suggested 
that national stability may be affected by 
workforce disruptions resulting from job 
automation. However, new opportunities for 
employment are also likely to emerge from 
the adoption of AI technologies. To ensure 
national security, governments may need 
to consider the way in which technological 
research and associated datasets are shared 
and accessed. 
1.1.4.1 Global governance of AI
While frequently associated with a slow and 
laborious process of negotiation, global 
governance has been successfully achieved in 
key areas of global concern including trade, 
human rights, security and the environment. 
The effects of AI are also likely to have far 
reaching, global impacts that would benefit 
from global management. The development 
of global governance in relation to AI 
was initiated on 12 July 2018 with the UN 
Secretary General’s appointment of a High 
Level Panel on Digital Cooperation. The 
panel’s ambition is to support ‘cooperative 
and interdisciplinary approaches to ensure a 
safe inclusive digital future for all taking into 
account relevant human rights norms’. Rather 
than seeking to create new international 
treaties, which could struggle to find 
agreement, efforts on the global governance 
of AI should build on, and be derived from, 
existing relevant sets of global agreements, 
such as international human rights law, the 
law of armed conflict, trade agreements and 
Security Council resolutions. 
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The creation of an International Panel on 
AI was recently announced by Canada and 
France. The purpose of the panel is to promote 
human-centric AI, which is ‘grounded in 
human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation 
and economic growth’ (Mandate for the 
International Panel on Artifical Intelligence, 
2018). The panel’s potential focus areas 
include, ‘data collection and access; data 
control and privacy; trust in AI; acceptance and 
adoption of AI; future of work; governance, 
laws and justice; responsible AI and human 
rights; and equity, responsibility and public 
good’ (Mandate for the International Panel 
on Artifical Intelligence, 2018). It is likely that 
other nations will join this panel, including 
members of the G7 and EU (Knight, 2018). 
Given the global context of AI development, 
international fora should encompass global 
participation and representation. Several 
countries beyond the G7 and EU members 
are also pursing the development of, and 
investment in, AI technologies and thus 
should be considered in this context. 
In this context, opportunities exist for countries 
like Australia and New Zealand to adopt a 
leadership role in the development of global 
frameworks for AI use. For example, Australia 
and New Zealand have the opportunity to be 
at the forefront of discussions that reframe 
AI as a public good and to lead inclusive 
approaches to the development of safeguards 
associated with AI use. This would involve the 
increased engagement of a variety of actors, 
including private and start-up companies, 
governments, international organisations and 
the academic community. New Zealand is a 
member of the D7 group of digital nations, 
which includes in its charter the idea that 
member nations will ‘lead by example and 
contribute to advancing digital government’ 
(Digital Government New Zealand, 2018). 
Expansion of such panels and fora to include 
Australia could offer opportunities for the 
country to collaborate internationally and 
to lead by example. 
1.1.4.2 Trade policy
AI technologies are powered by large 
quantities of data that are frequently sourced 
and exchanged across state borders. Data 
shared for the development of AI are therefore 
considered a commodity and subject to trade 
regulation. Trade guidelines are primarily 
established by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and other bilateral, multilateral and 
regional trade agreements, such as the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The 
CPTPP contains rules specific to the trade 
of data. 
However, several agreements, to which 
Australia and New Zealand are a member of, 
were established prior to the emergence of 
AI technologies. As a result, some agreements 
may require updating if international 
access to data is desired. There may be an 
intermediary step involved where existing 
regulations are applied to the new AI context 
prior to considering what amendments or 
new regulations may be required. Sourcing 
international data will be particularly 
important for states with smaller populations, 
such as Australia where there is limited 
capacity to access the large amounts of data 
needed for the development and application 
of AI technologies. For AI to be representative 
it requires representative data, otherwise 
models will be limited by incomplete data. 
WTO-plus trade agreements, which extend 
current WTO standards, could provide 
mechanisms for regulation around data 
obligations and trade.2 For instance, the
2 WTO-plus agreements are trade agreements wherein the 
contents and level of obligations exceed those required 
by WTO rules.
2 WTO-plus agreements are trade agreements wherein the contents and level of obligations exceed those required by WTO rules.
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United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) includes a chapter on digital trade 
and the CPTPP, which was ratified by Australia 
in October 2018, also contains provisions for 
data localisation, cross-border data transfers 
and source code disclosure requirements. 
International trade regulations will affect 
the operation of corporations that use 
internationally sourced data. For example, 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) establishes specific rules for the use 
of data sourced from EU citizens (discussed 
further in Chapter 6).
1.2 Improving our 
wellbeing
While periods of rapid change have 
occurred throughout history, the persistence 
and acceleration of rapid change being 
experienced from new technologies is 
unprecedented. Individuals will respond to 
this change in different ways, with some 
faring better than others. Similarly, businesses 
will differ in their ability to keep pace. The 
technology will undoubtedly outpace policy 
responses. Therefore, countries should 
consider how to develop and implement 
technology in a way that allows it to flourish 
while protecting society and wellbeing. 
As noted previously, AI presents both risks 
and opportunities in nearly every sector 
of society. It could lead to a dramatic rise 
in unemployment or a boom in new work 
opportunities, or both simultaneously. It 
could threaten democratic governance or 
make governments more responsive to a 
better informed populace. It could make 
many tasks much safer or make the world 
more dangerous. Only by managing its 
development in a way that places wellbeing 
at the centre can the social benefits 
be maximised.
There are several principles that should be 
considered in the development of AI that 
keep the wellbeing of society as the central 
consideration. These principles are: economic 
benefit, social benefit and sustainability. 
It will be necessary to determine what 
kind of society we want to have and how 
AI technologies might be able to uphold 
this vision. 
Economic
In 2016, it was predicted that worldwide 
revenues from the adoption of AI systems 
across multiple industries will experience 
an increase from US$8 billion in 2016 to 
over US$47 billion in 2020 (International 
Data Corporation, 2016). Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, global GDP could increase 
by 14 percent, or US$15.7 trillion by 2030 
because of AI, with US$1.2 trillion extra 
economic growth forecasted GDP gains in 
Oceania (PwC, 2017). By 2030, Australia could 
increase its national income by A$2 trillion 
from productivity gains afforded by increasing 
automation and AI technologies (AlphaBeta, 
2017). The potential income gains of AI will, 
however, need to be set against the costs 
associated with its implementation, including 
the cost of archiving, curating, trading and 
protecting data and of reskilling workers.
AI should be implemented in a manner that 
limits economic disadvantage or exacerbation 
of inequalities, and instead generates broad 
positive economic benefit to society. It can do 
this by fundamentally reducing the economic 
cost of creating or producing goods and 
services, and by providing new goods and 
services that would have otherwise been 
impossible or not economically viable.
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Societal
As a society, we will coexist with AI, form a 
variety of relationships and attachments to 
AI and will react to AI (both positively and 
negatively). Therefore, a discussion is needed 
about what kind of society we want to be, 
and embedded within that, the desired 
relationship with AI, and the boundaries 
that should be established and protected. 
Developments will require continual 
monitoring and agile responses, because they 
are certain to play out in ways that cannot 
be predicted, as different technologies and 
different developments interact with society. 
Governments, industry and society will need 
to ensure AI is developed and is implemented 
in a way that protects individual dignity, 
human rights and the capacity of people to 
advance.
Inclusive AI design can meet the needs of 
minority groups and create the possibility of 
better products and services for everyone. 
The implementation of AI must proceed 
with the aim of protecting and promoting 
human rights – including civil and political, as 
well as economic, social and cultural, rights 
– and enable more informed and objective 
decisions. For example, AI can limit direct 
and indirect discrimination by humans in 
decision making processes, who may act on 
their own prejudices and without empirical 
support. It can provide more accurate and 
targeted health diagnoses and treatment; 
improve emergency response planning; and 
enhance workplace health and safety. Further, 
AI algorithms – if rigorously and thoughtfully 
developed – can assist in identifying systemic 
bias and may present opportunities for more 
effective assessment of compliance with 
fundamental human rights. AI technologies 
should improve access to services and 
improve outcomes across a range of socio-
economic indicators, through better systems 
or interventions in health and education, or 
for groups who experience vulnerability and 
disadvantage.
Environment and sustainability
AI can be used to create a more sustainable 
society. Environmental sustainability is 
a complex issue and requires geo-scale 
management and interaction with processes 
that are inherently poorly predictable. Dealing 
with complexity and improving predictability, 
sustainability depends on having enough 
data, using data that is available, and 
identifying where new data will make the 
biggest difference. AI can help deal with this 
complexity and help humanity make the best 
use of limited resources.
More specifically, AI can make a significant 
contribution to environmental management 
in a number of sectors. AI can, for example, 
reduce the environmental footprint of 
agriculture through better management 
of chemical use, soils, on-farm waste, and 
through improvements to animal welfare. AI 
can improve energy performance through 
enhanced data collection and analysis from 
smart meters and smart electrical grids, 
as well as ML algorithms in buildings to 
optimise energy consumption. Another area 
is precision of mining, where AI techniques 
can be applied to improve efficiency so that 
there is less waste, and less water and energy 
use. Blockchain technology can be used as 
a way to confirm ethical and sustainable 
production. AI can be used to create virtual 
scenarios minimising human impact on the 
environment. AI technologies can also provide 
opportunities to mitigate climate change 
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and reduce pollution and can be used to 
optimise urban spaces, support individual 
and community use and ensure minimal 
environmental impact. AI and automation can 
also be used to assist in recycling processing. 
For example, Apple has developed Liam, a 
collection of autonomous machines that 
dismantle and sort iPhone components for 
recycling, and a Polish start-up has created 
a smart bin that is able to recognise and 
sort rubbish for the purposes of recycling 
and space management (Leswing, 2017; 
Best, 2018).
1.2.1 4Ds (dirty, dull, dangerous 
and difficult)
AI and automation have the capacity to 
free workers from dirty, dull, difficult and 
dangerous tasks. Some jobs include tasks that 
people do not want to do or should not be 
made to do. For example, robots powered 
by AI can undertake dirty tasks such as mine 
exploration, or inspecting, monitoring and 
fixing clogged sewer pipes. Dangerous tasks 
such as investigation of unstable structures, 
mining, disaster response and space 
exploration provide another avenue for AI 
use to minimise potential harm to workers. 
AI and applications in robotics are also being 
developed for difficult tasks that require 
a high level of detail with a low margin of 
error, such as surgery. However, AI may also 
threaten to automate interesting high-value 
tasks, rather than just unattractive tasks. This 
is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
1.2.2 Measuring success
Traditional measures of success, such as 
GDP and the Gini coefficient, will remain 
relevant in assessing the extent to which 
Australia and New Zealand are managing 
the transition to an economy and a society 
that takes advantage of AI opportunities. 
These measures can mask problems, however, 
and innovative measures of subjective 
well-being may be necessary. We may, for 
example, need to transition to measures 
such as the OECD Better Life Index, or other 
indicators such as the Digital Inclusion 
Index to better characterise the effect of AI 
on society. Measures like the triple bottom 
line, incorporating three dimensions of 
performance (social, environmental and 
financial), may need to be adapted to measure 
success in a way that makes the wellbeing of 
society central. Issues such as the knowledge 
gap, the digital divide, and economic and 
social stratification will need to be considered. 
New Zealand is moving away from GDP as a 
standalone measure of success – in 2019, the 
country will launch its ‘Wellbeing Budget’, 
which will draw on a range of measures to 
evaluate wellbeing. The indicators build on 
international best practice and are tailored to 
New Zealand citizens by incorporating culture 
and Maori perspectives. A similar approach 
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2.1 Introduction
The application of AI technologies within 
public and private sectors can provide 
national economic benefit and social value. 
AI represents the potential to address social 
problems, such as climate change, an ageing 
population and emergency response, as well 
as provide technologies and methods to 
enhance productivity. According to the Centre 
for Data Innovation (2016), the evolving 
nature of AI technologies and associated 
applications means that ‘it is difficult to 
predict just how much value AI will generate’. 
Nevertheless, increases in global GDP by 
2030 have been predicted as a result of the 
adoption of AI technologies, productivity 
gains from automation and augmentation 
of the existing workforce, and increased 
consumer demand of AI enhanced products 
and services (PwC, 2017). It is anticipated 
that the economies of Africa, Oceania and 
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Asia (other than China and developed Asia) 
will experience GDP gains of 5.6 percent as a 
result of AI adoption whilst China’s GDP might 
grow by 26.1 percent. However, realising 
these gains will be largely dependent on 
the adoption and strategic deployment of 
AI technology by companies and industry 
(Bughin et al., 2017). McKinsey states that 
gains from AI adoption are most likely to be 
experienced by developed economies with 
slower productivity growth. According to 
the McKinsey report, Australia is within the 
average threshold of global AI investment 
and research, but has higher than average 
potential to benefit from automation driven 
productivity gains (Bughin et al., 2018).
AI technologies have application across a 
wide range of industry sectors, however 
the pace of adoption and the value add will 
vary by sector. Sectors will need to apply AI 
techniques to specific areas of value that will 
most benefit from the use of AI technology 
and the potential to realise gains from the use 
of AI will be reliant on the availability of data 
and the applicability of algorithmic solutions. 
Those industries with complex business 
operations are reliant on forecasting and 
accurate decision making and are most likely 
to be at the forefront of AI adoption. McKinsey 
examined 19 industry sectors and identified 
the areas that are likely to experience the 
most incremental value from the use of AI 
technologies over other analytic techniques. 
For example, transport and logistics, supply 
chain manufacturing and oil and gas 
were among the areas discussed to have 
great potential to use and benefit from AI 
technologies. Industries which are expected 
to derive relatively smaller value from the 
use of AI when compared to other analytical 
techniques include insurance, advanced 
electronics and aerospace and defence (Chui 
et al., 2018; Peng, 2018). Given the rapid pace 
at which AI technologies and applications are 
anticipated to emerge, it will be necessary 
that industry are aware of, and are responsive 
to, these new developments (Callaghan 
Innovation, 2018). 
The development of powerful mathematical 
tools and the increase in computer power 
has combined to make AI useful for a wide 
range of tasks. These tasks include: translating 
speech; enhanced computer vision and object 
tracking from video; enabling driverless cars; 
deep analysis of large datasets to find patterns 
and relationships; chatbots; and control of 
robotics in manufacturing and health and 
agricultural settings. 
This chapter describes some of the key 
techniques of AI, the need for more powerful 
computing and explores how AI techniques 
can be applied across sectors of the Australian 
economy. Data considerations, including data 
governance, collection, storage and use are 
presented in further detail in Chapter 6.
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2.2 AI Technology 
As noted in the introduction, AI is not a 
specific technology, but rather a collection of 
computer methods and techniques (Figure 1). 
These techniques include machine learning 
(ML) and natural language processing (NLP) 
and can lead to computers learning through 
the extraction of information from data 
and optimising techniques such as self-
improvement (unsupervised learning) or by 
being taught by a developer (supervised 
learning). 
In supervised learning, the AI learns a function 
from data labelled by humans. For example, 
an AI model used to distinguish human faces 
may derive its knowledge from a library of 
images where humans have labelled those 
that contain human faces. An unsupervised 
learning approach is where an AI model 
learns by improving its actions against a 
well-defined objective. For example, an AI 
model might learn to play chess with the aim 
of winning more games. Supervised learning 
can outperform humans (i.e. it can learn more 
data than any human can process). Further, 
there is the possibility for AI to learn in a semi-
supervised mode using both labelled and 
unlabelled data.
2.2.1 Machine learning
ML is an important component of AI. It 
refers to making computers execute tasks 
through processes of ‘learning’ that derive 
inspiration from (but are not reducible to) 
human intelligence and decision making. 
Through analysis of large volumes of data and 
examples, ML algorithms can autonomously 
improve their learning over time. ML relies 
on algorithms ranging from basic decision 
trees through to artificial neural networks 
that classify information by mimicking the 
structure of the human brain. Predictive 
and anticipatory forms of ML are qualities 
that differentiate AI from previous forms of 
automation.
The use of ML techniques is based on large 
databases of information. This information 
is often collected and provided by a small 
number of powerful economic actors, such as 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, Alibaba and Uber, 
as well as institutions such as government, 
health providers and medical practitioners. 
However, this should not disparage the actual 
and potential benefits of using ML techniques 
across a wide range of sectors. Here as 
elsewhere, the question arises as to whether 
this new general purpose technology will 
be used to primarily meet important human 
needs (e.g. assist in the provision of analysed 
bulk data on which to base public policies to 
combat poverty, or the design of robots to 
assist people with a disability), as opposed to 
satisfying the economic imperatives of a small 
group of dominant market actors (e.g. profile 
based targeted advertising and marketing). 
The functions and needs of the public and 
private arenas often differ. As a result, AI may 
be designed in fundamentally different ways 
in order to meet varying applications of use. 
ML is a highly effective pattern recognition 
system, however alongside the opportunities, 
there are questions about the benefits 
and technical limitations of ML and the 
distribution of these to disadvantaged groups 
under existing and emerging local, national 
and global institutional arrangements. Some 
of the issues facing the operation of ML 
include the following:
• It can be difficult – even for an expert – to 
understand how a ML system produces its 
results (the so-called ‘black box’ problem). 
There can be deficiencies and limitations 
of internal validity within the datasets 
that ML techniques rely on, such as 
false data and databases of information 
to which owners have not provided 
consent to access. This includes not only 
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personal data, but also data collected 
via ‘background’ technologies such as 
internet-enabled traffic lights, electric 
meters and sewerage systems
• Questionable or undesirable uses of ML 
techniques, such as Cambridge Analytica’s 
use of ML techniques to intervene 
in electoral processes in the US and 
elsewhere.
International and domestic law and human 
rights standards provide a framework 
through which to assess and respond to 
these challenges. Rather than inventing new 
standards for AI, we should use the existing 
frameworks and, if there are gaps, explore 
how they can be filled. Indeed, existing 
frameworks may require expansion or addition 
in order to address new, AI specific challenges. 
In the same way that Europe has driven 
responsible regulation around the use of data, 
Australia has an opportunity to lead in the 
development of initiatives and frameworks 
governing the safe and ethical use of AI 
technologies.
2.2.2 Natural language processing 
NLP is a core pillar of AI and encompasses 
all AI technologies related to the analysis, 
interpretation and generation (of text and 
speech based) natural language. NLP has 
prominent applications including machine 
translation (e.g. Google Translate), dialogue 
systems (e.g. the back-end systems that 
underlie Google’s Assistant, Apple’s Siri and 
Amazon’s Alexa), and automatic question 
answering (e.g. IBM’s Project Debater). 
NLP has matured substantially in the past 
decade due to the unprecedented amount 
of language being produced, shared and 
recorded in electronic and spoken forms. 
This large volume of language information 
requires automated analysis and represents 
Box 1: ML and privacy, national security and human rights concerns
arise as a result of cooperation between state 
and market actors. Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica are both market actors, yet bulk 
data stored by Facebook and ML techniques 
deployed by Cambridge Analytica played a 
central role in the targeting of ‘vulnerable’ 
voters in an attempt to undermine US 
democratic processes. Potential regulatory 
measures to deal with this problem include 
bans on micro-targeted political advertising, 
mandatory transparency by way of public 
registers of the source of any political messages 
being disseminated and, at a more general 
level, deeming Facebook and other social 
media platforms to be publishers or to have 
similar responsibilities and legal liabilities to 
those of publishers in respect of certain types 
of content communicated via their platforms.
In addition to the privacy, national security 
and human rights concerns associated with 
platform companies generating and providing 
data for ML applications, there is also concern 
that the widespread use of ML techniques by 
government to collect large volumes of data 
may undermine individual rights. In countries 
with liberal democracies, there are political, 
legal and other deliberative processes that 
are well underway to try to ‘balance’ security 
requirements against individual rights. 
However, these issues are far from resolved 
when it comes to the collection of bulk data 
comprised of personal information and the 
use of ML techniques. 
The recent Cambridge Analytica scandal 
provides a case study of the moral problems 
and national security implications that can
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of different populations to benefit from AI; it 
can also actively disadvantage populations. To 
alleviate such biases, there generally needs to 
be explicit knowledge of the existence of the 
bias, with training data then used to mitigate 
the bias. This is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 7. 
There are advances in NLP capabilities that 
can be expected in the next decade, including 
models that can justify their outputs to 
humans, NLP with world knowledge and 
multilingual support. These are discussed in 
further detail in Box 2.
2.2.3 Computing hardware
Future AI and ML will require large amounts 
of data, and traditional computers are starting 
to reach the limits of possible data processing 
power. Classical computer architectures do 
not scale well with respect to the power 
required to process the information, and 
much of the complexity experienced in AI 
and ML scales poorly with increasing datasets 
and breadth of task attempted (such as 
language-independent or multi-lingual NLP). 
Quantum computers have the potential to 
alleviate this problem. The development of 
quantum computers, on both experimental 
and theoretical fronts, has accelerated in 
the past few years, due mainly to increased 
investment from industry and governments 
(Palmer, 2017). 
The fundamental component in a quantum 
computer is the quantum bit, or qubit. 
Classical bits, which can take on binary 
values of either 1 or 0, act as strings of on/off 
switches that underlie computation. A qubit, 
on the other hand, can represent both 1 and 
0 at the same time. This is referred to as 
‘superposition’ of 0 and 1 states. In a quantum 
computer, binary strings can be encoded 
over multiple qubits, and the subsequent 
quantum register put into a superposition 
significant opportunities and challenges. NLP 
is strongly contributing to this automation as 
well as improving accuracy and tractability 
in production systems. Some of the elements 
of this maturation include better language 
models (meaning more reliable and fluent 
natural language outputs); a move towards 
character-based models rather than word-
based models (leading to better handling of 
rare, misspelled, and otherwise, low-frequency 
words); and improvements in the ability to 
train models over multimodal inputs (e.g. text 
and images), vastly improving the accuracy 
of models at tasks such as image captioning. 
Many of these developments have been 
driven by ‘deep learning’ – a subset of ML 
that pervades modern-day NLP. However, 
NLP still has limitations as demonstrated 
by the Winograd Schema Challenge, a test 
of machine intelligence. The Winograd 
Schema tasks computer programs with 
answering carefully tailored questions that 
require common sense reasoning to solve. 
The results from the first annual Winograd 
Schema Challenge ranged from the low 
30th percentile in answering correctly to the 
high 50s, suggesting that further research 
is required to develop systems that can 
handle such tests. Notably, human subjects 
were asked the same questions and scored 
much higher, with an overall average of 
approximately 90 percent (Ortiz, 2016).
Most of the advances in NLP over the past 
decade have been achieved with specific tasks 
and datasets, which are driven by ever larger 
datasets. However, NLP is only as good as the 
data set underlying it. If not appropriately 
trained, NLP models can accentuate bias in 
underlying datasets, leading to systems that 
work better for users who are overrepresented 
in the training data. Further, NLP is currently 
unable to distinguish between data or 
language that is irrelevant and damaging. This 
can create inherent inequities in the ability 
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Box 2: Advances in NLP capabilities
Models that can justify their outputs 
to humans
Trust and accountability will become 
increasingly important when it comes to 
tracing the provenance of a NLP output.
World knowledge
‘World knowledge’ refers to a model’s 
ability to derive meaning from language by 
resolving ambiguities or picking up on subtle 
inferences based on background knowledge 
of the world.
Cross-domain and cross-task robustness
Significant advances are expected in 
general-purpose language processing 
through cross-training across multiple 
tasks and explicit domain debiasing. These 
advances will mean that off-the-shelf system 
components can be applied to novel tasks 
or domains with reasonable expectation 
of competitive performance.
Improved context modelling
Most NLP systems still operate at the sentence 
level. A NLP system will usually process a 
document by first partitioning it into its 
component sentences before processing 
the sentences one at a time independent 
of each other. Large advances are expected 
in the modelling of context, beyond simple 
document context to include social context 
(e.g. personalising the translation based on 
the identity of the author and their social 
network, the intended audience for the 
translation, or a particular viewpoint on 
the content) or author demographics (e.g. 
personalising the translation of a document 
or the output of a chatbot to a particular 
persona, in terms of age, gender and 
language background).
Multimodal processing
When humans learn language, they do so 
over a lifetime, in a rich, situated context 
using all their senses with a myriad of 
feedback mechanisms. There is an increasing 
body of work attempting to achieve similar 
outputs for NLP via multimodal AI – most 
notably by combining text and image analysis.
Improvements in task-oriented 
discourse processing
There have been many advances where 
hands-free language-based interaction with 
an intelligent agent enable more effective 
decision making. These include automobile 
navigation systems, and question-answer 
customer service bots, which are enabling 
more flexible interactions.
of states. However, the power of a quantum 
computer is not solely derived from the 
superposition over binary numbers. Rather, 
a quantum computer derives its power from 
its ability to correlate qubits with each other, 
thus enabling quantum logic through what is 
known as ‘entanglement’. 
While the long-term vision of a universal 
quantum computer is reasonably well 
understood theoretically in terms of the 
types of tasks that could be carried out, the 
experimental and engineering challenges 
involved in realising such a machine mean 
that it is likely to be decades away. 
There are several opportunities for 
conventional ML to assist the development 
and deployment of quantum technology 
itself. For example, the design and 
optimisation of complex control sequences 
and analysis of quantum measurement data 
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lends itself to a ML paradigm, and there are 
a number of examples of this application 
already (see for example Kalantre et al., 2018). 
In Australia, research and development 
in quantum hardware is well supported 
through the Australian Research Council 
Centre of Excellence Scheme and the 
National Innovation and Science Agenda 
(e.g. the Centre for Quantum Computation & 
Communication Technology). Research and 
support in quantum software, specifically 
associated with quantum and ML, is more 
diffuse. One pathway for the future is for 
quantum software and hardware and ML 
communities to work together. Indeed, 
Australia’s first quantum computing hardware 
company Silicon Quantum Computing, 
launched in 2017, is working to develop 
and commercialise a quantum computer by 
2022 using intellectual property from the 
Australian Centre of Excellence for Quantum 
Computation and Communication Technology 
(CQC2T). The company is owned by the 
Australian Government, the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia, Telstra, the University of 
NSW and the NSW State Government. 
2.3 AI applications
Advances in ML, NLP and computing 
hardware will drive AI over the coming 
decades. Innovative researchers and 
companies are already establishing new AI-
based products and services across a number 
of sectors. 
This chapter aims not to provide a complete 
overview of AI applications, but rather to 
illustrate the breadth of applications that 
are being developed across sectors. Some 
applications will bring AI into our lives in 
overt ways, while others are likely to work in 
the background. Few areas of our lives will 
not be influenced by these advances and 
many industry sectors are expected to derive 
benefit from the use of AI technologies. 
However, given the evolving nature of the 
technology, which, in many instances, has 
unforeseen applications, there remains 
uncertainty as to the precise ways in which AI 
will transform and deliver benefit to industry. 
Therefore, to ensure growth throughout the 
economy, investment should not be restricted 
to singular sectors, but be wide ranging and 
explorative.
In parallel to industry innovation and 
investment, industry bodies have also started 
to develop and implement safety and ethical 
standards in relation to the development and 
application of AI. For example, at the request 
of its employees, Google pledged not to 
develop autonomous weapons. Additionally, 
the company also developed a set of 
principles and guidelines for the development 
of AI technologies, which includes a 
commitment to ensure the socially beneficial 
nature of AI (Mehta, 2018). To ensure both 
competitiveness and the safe implementation 
of AI systems, Australian business sectors 
should remain aware and responsive to the 
activities of global peers.
The applications of AI technologies discussed 
here include robotics, manufacturing, 
health and aged care, resources (mining 
and energy), environment, arts and culture, 
agriculture, transport and mobility, justice 
and law, defence and emergency response, 
government, financial services and 
infrastructure requirements. The opportunities 
highlighted are by no means exhaustive, 
rather they are illustrative of some of the 
recent advancements across different 
sectors. This broad range of applications is 
driving social change and, in some instances, 
influencing demand for further technological 
development. Inclusive design and equity of 
access will be crucial to ensure that everyone 
will be able to access the benefits and 
applications of AI. 
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2.3.1 Robotics
AI and robotics have a long history 
of interaction. In the 1950s, robotics 
arose from the fields of mechanical and 
electrical engineering, while AI arose 
out of the then-new field of computer 
science. Early researchers explored the 
nature of intelligence and the possibility of 
programming computers to solve problems 
that were traditionally seen as requiring 
human cognitive skills. 
Robotics is often characterised as the 
intelligent connection of perception to 
action in engineered systems (Brady, 1984). 
Robotics include not only human-like robots, 
but any kind of technological system that 
uses sensors such as cameras, thermal 
imagers, tactile and sound sensors to collect 
data about the operational environment and 
build a ‘world model’. A world model is an 
internal representation of the surrounding 
environment that enables a robot to interact 
with its surroundings. These interactions 
may include navigation tasks such as 
obstacle avoidance and trajectory planning, 
or manipulation and sensory tasks. Data 
from multiple sensors are combined using 
probabilistic sensor fusion techniques, and 
simultaneous localisation and mapping 
algorithms determine both the world model 
and the motion of the sensors or robot 
through the world. Application domains 
for robots include agriculture, mining, 
transport, defence, medical assistance and 
consumer services. The Australian Centre 
for Robotic Vision’s Robotic Roadmap report 
(2018: p. 131) suggests that intelligent 
robotics and physical automation could 
provide a ‘cost-effective way of addressing 
global maintenance and construction 
issues’, especially in terms of ‘building and 
maintaining (especially ageing) infrastructure, 
or difficult-to-access infrastructure over large 
geographic areas, while removing humans 
from dangerous working environments’.
Box 3: Strategic opportunities 
for AI-augmented robotics 
in Australia
There are several areas where substantially 
autonomous (AI-augmented) robotic 
systems are of significant strategic 
importance to Australia. Two examples 
are autonomous vehicles and unmanned 
aerial vehicles.
Autonomous unmanned ground vehicles 
that can operate in cross-country 
conditions are useful for applications such 
as long-distance transportation, mining, 
agriculture, biosecurity and biodiversity 
assessments, science surveys, and safety. 
Communication and technological 
advances are needed in the combination 
of localisation and mapping methods, 
motion planning, obstacle detection, 
obstacle avoidance and situation 
awareness, as well as in translating these 
technologies into operational and useful 
platforms that can increase productivity 
and safety across a wide range of 
applications (Kunze et al., 2018).
Unmanned aerial vehicles, popularly 
known as drones, are considered a core 
technology for a future digital society. 
They are especially important for Australia, 
which has low population density with 
only a small number of cities. The civilian 
market is booming, with the vehicles 
being primarily used to generate data 
at local scales. In the future, unmanned 
aerial vehicles may be extensively 
used for transport, delivery services, 
medical supply services, biosecurity 
assessments, agricultural surveys, and 
border surveillance on a continental 
scale. Indeed, a technology company 
is trialling drone deliveries of food and 
chemist supplies in Canberra with plans to 
make the service permanent and expand 
delivery locations (Jervis-Bardy, 2018). 
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For the next generation of robotics, priorities 
include the development of core technologies 
for highly autonomous, competent, and 
reliable robotic systems that can execute 
complex missions in Australia’s unique 
environments. These robots also need to 
interact safely and seamlessly with humans 
and other dynamic agents and be deployed 
in a range of applications that are of strategic 
relevance to Australia and the world. 
2.3.2 Manufacturing
Recent manufacturing trends are redefining 
business strategies across the sector (Lasi 
et al., 2014). The increasing adoption of 
sustainable practices, stronger demand for 
personalised products, blurred boundaries 
between manufacturing and the services 
sector and an interest from Australian 
producers in high-value activities across 
global supply chains, are all imposing 
opportunities and challenges for the 
domestic industry. Manufacturers are 
seeking alternative solutions to seize global 
opportunities. 
An area of opportunity is the development 
of AI assistive technologies to enhance 
manufacturing workers, rather than replace 
them through automation. This is an approach 
that has been suggested as having the 
potential to be an enabler for economic 
success (Brea et al., 2013). As AI-driven 
automation lowers production costs, there 
are opportunities for Australia to increase its 
competitiveness of manufacturing goods . In 
this context, AI may augment work processes, 
increase safety, or work with humans to 
increase productivity. However, if AI enhances 
productivity in these ways, it may result in 
companies employing fewer staff. Whether 
or not people are assisted or replaced in their 
workplaces may be considered a commercial 
and social issue rather than a technological 
one (see Chapter 3). 
Manufacturing efficiencies can be gained 
through AI-driven automation and 
optimisation, and are essential for high cost 
economies, such as Australia, to remain 
competitive. AI and ML can be used within 
the manufacturing sector to optimise the 
manufacturing process. Across many areas 
of manufacturing and technology, there is 
a move from production lines of identical 
items to a new wave of increasingly flexible, 
adaptive, and customised products. Some 
of this is being driven by rapid prototyping 
and construction techniques. Diversity is 
provided by libraries of selectable ‘base 
components’ that are assembled into bespoke 
solutions. One area that is poised to benefit 
from this shift is robotics. Conventional 
automation, such as that used in automotive 
manufacturing, is driven by the need to 
automate specific mass manufacturing tasks. 
However, economic drivers demand less 
focus on large volume production, and more 
concentration on mass personalisation of 
products. This macroeconomic environment 
predicates a national quest for affordable 
assistive AI enabled automation that supports 
high-variety, low-volume production runs that 
are easy to implement, and highly flexible, 
adaptable operational processes.
These new technical capabilities, initially 
leveraged from advances in assistive mining 
technologies, are placing Australia at the 
forefront of a new AI assistive systems 
industry. The capabilities will also serve 
as a foundation for the next phase of the 
manufacturing evolution in Australia in 
association with future advances in AI and 
digitisation.
2.3.3 Health and aged care
There are numerous possibilities for the 
application of AI in health, many of which 
are already underway (Figure 3). The linkage 
of data provides opportunities for positive 
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Figure 3: AI in health care
Adapted from McKinsey Global Institute, 2017.
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outcomes from understanding disease 
pathways, early recognition of disease, 
monitoring disease and end of life care. We 
will need systems of analysis to facilitate and 
optimise the use of health data to enhance 
medical understanding and improve care. 
While still in the early stages of development, 
AI systems could be used to process large 
amounts of medical literature, clinical 
notes, and guidelines using NLP; interpret 
the results of diagnostic tests; design more 
personalised treatment plans based on data 
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extracted from the analysis of large numbers 
of patients; detect fraud, waste, and error in 
health insurance; and collect, summarize, 
and relay information about a patient back 
to clinicians in a continuous loop. While the 
early developments in this area are promising, 
some aspects remain undeveloped. For 
example, there are currently limitations 
with this technology as highlighted by IBM’s 
Watson, which has demonstrated difficulty 
in learning about the different forms of 
cancer (Ross and Swetlitz, 2017). Ensuring the 
systems are fit for purpose before integrating 
them into the healthcare system will be 
critical, as will establishing trust, transparency, 
and explainability in these AI systems and 
processes. 
However, despite the limitations experienced 
with some technologies, there is also a role for 
AI to identify people at high risk of developing 
a chronic condition, experiencing an adverse 
event, or recovering poorly from an injury, by 
combining individual health data with expert 
opinion. AI-enabled systems could also allow 
clinicians to compare themselves to others, 
allowing them to make fair comparisons that 
consider the varying composition of patients 
they treat. AI solutions that are capable 
of recognizing and responding to human 
emotions have great potential to deliver 
computer-controlled assistants that can 
interact with humans, known as Intelligent 
Virtual Agents (Bedi et al., 2015; Luxton, 2015).
Further, AI can be used to tailor individual 
treatments or diagnosis. In Australia, a 
Queensland based collaboration has received 
federal government funding of A$2.6 million 
to help advance cancer patient treatment 
using AI. The collaboration will use AI to 
examine genetic information of an individual 
to tailor cancer treatment with the view to 
prescribe the most effective treatment for 
individuals (Crockford, 2018). In New Zealand, 
MedicMind has recently created a world-first 
AI medical platform for medical researchers 
and clinicians, that will eventually use AI to 
auto-diagnose a large range of diseases based 
on a single photograph (MedicMind, 2018). 
Another example includes a recently 
announced collaboration between Microsoft 
and SRL Diagnostics in India, that aims to 
use AI to improve early detection cancerous 
cells. This collaboration will train Microsoft’s 
AI system using more than one million 
pathology samples from SRL’s records to 
make faster and more accurate assessments 
that support doctors to make a quick and 
accurate diagnosis. This will reduce the cost 
of treatment and better utilize the time of 
trained specialists to reach more patients 
(Microsoft, 2018b).
As the population ages, there is an increasing 
need for AI technologies that can help older 
people who wish to live independently 
or who suffer from chronic diseases. AI 
technologies and software applications can 
provide cognitive aids for monitoring health 
status, assistance in managing medication, 
therapies such as physical and breathing 
exercises, as well as tools for classifying 
activity patterns, detecting possible falls, 
entertainment, and social support for 
loneliness. 
The government can play a crucial role in 
speeding up the adoption of AI in health 
by informing citizens about the benefits 
and implications of the personalisation of 
medicine. To achieve any level of personalised 
medicine, some personal data will need to 
be analysed, and an honest and informed 
discussion will need to occur between policy 
makers and citizens regarding the use of data.
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2.3.4 Arts and culture
The creative industries are typically at the 
forefront of technological change, embracing 
novelty, often at the sacrifice of employment 
stability (Threadgold, 2018). Despite 
references in the media to creative work 
being ‘fun and free’ (Brooke and Wissinger, 
2017), many creative tasks involve menial 
and repetitive physical and mental routines 
that are appropriate for automation. AI could 
bolster numerous creative tasks across the 
range of different sectors from music to film, 
with examples including composing music 
and rendering digitally generated characters 
in a film to make them look more realistic. 
There are many examples of applying AI in the 
creative industries. For example, AI is being 
used by platform companies such as Netflix 
and Spotify to determine gaps in creative 
content production and generate content 
recommendations. Software development 
tools such as Unity are providing videogame 
developers with ML techniques to promote 
innovative design. The Epoch Times, an 
Australian company, drew on an AI tool 
to gather insights into online readers and 
subscribers, to help the company provide 
tailored news and content. The computer 
generated imagery (CGI) used in films such 
as The Hobbit and Lord of the Rings relied 
on AI software to automate the individual 
movements and interactions of virtual soldiers 
so that they appeared lifelike and convincing, 
without recruiting hosts of humans in 
expensive and environmentally damaging 
real-world simulated conflicts. In the 2012 art 
instillation series, Fifty Sisters, academic and 
artist John McCormack electronically ‘grew’ 
plants using computer code. Using sensors, 
visitors to the gallery space found that their 
movements responded to various stimuli 
and influenced the growth of the flowers.
Box 4: Case study: AI’s 
application in health and 
aged care 
In New Zealand, there have been 
field trials over the past decade to 
determine the acceptability, feasibility, 
and effectiveness of robots as cognitive 
aids to deliver aged care support. 
The results from the research have 
suggested that robot assistance is 
acceptable to the elderly and staff in 
aged care, that it is feasible to deploy 
such robots in people’s homes and in 
aged care facilities, and that there can 
be cost benefits (Broadbent et al., 2016). 
MiCare in Australia has introduced 
autonomous mobile robots in aged care 
facilities to assist staff in the delivery of 
services, allowing for greater efficiencies 
and improvements in patient care 
(Stoyles, 2017). Additionally, studies 
of a companion pet robot suggested 
that robots can have psychological and 
physiological benefits for older people 
(Robinson, Broadbent and MacDonald, 
2016). 
Australian and New Zealand hospitals 
are also using smart technologies to 
manage rehabilitation for stroke sufferers 
and developing effective direct brain-
computer communication to help people 
control prosthetics and communicate 
with technology that can provide 
assistance. Researchers are studying the 
feasibility of using data gathered from 
wearable devices such as accelerometers, 
to estimate people’s activity patterns, to 
indicate conditions such as dementia, 
and to detect events such as falls.
The use of AI in healthcare is underway 
and will benefit from the development 
of ethical systems to facilitate 
implementation. 
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The application of AI to arts and culture can 
present mixed responses with experts in the 
field being uncertain about possible disruptions 
to their work (see for example, Ames, 2018). 
However, there are predictions that the music 
industry (Box 5) could enlist AI to ‘create 
algorithms enabling the creation of customised 
songs for users’, with the aim of helping ‘sound 
creators to focus more on being creative’, 
thereby boosting revenue (Naveed, Watanabe 
and Neittaanmäki, 2017).
2.3.5 Mining
Automated mining operations in Australia 
represent some of the largest industrial 
automation programs in the world. They are 
a combination of automated hauling and 
drilling, intelligent sensing, mine-wide asset and 
supply-chain optimisation, and remote tele-
operation. Mine sites are less structured than 
many other application areas and autonomous 
haulage systems must operate in dusty and 
harsh environments as well as react to a range 
of unexpected events such as debris on the 
road. The application of AI technology in mining 
provides opportunities to reduce operational 
risk and increase competitiveness. 
In a progression towards fully automated, 
intelligent mines, several companies (including 
Rio Tinto, BHP, Stanwell, Suncor, and Fortescue) 
have begun using autonomous haul trucks at 
their mines. Industrial vehicle manufacturers 
Komatsu, Caterpillar, and Hitachi have been 
developing these driverless haul trucks in 
close collaboration with mining operations, 
employing a combination of wireless 
communication, object-avoidance sensors, 
on-board computers, GPS systems, and AI 
software that enables the trucks to operate 
(semi-)autonomously where most trucks are 
supervised at a distance. Rio Tinto, which has 
employed a fleet of approximately 400 Komatsu 
haul trucks in its Pilbara mine, reports that their 
autonomous trucks have improved safety and 
Box 5: Case study: AI in audio 
mastering
Various companies have started to use 
AI enabled audio mastering, web-based 
platform company LANDR being one 
example. LANDR and other AI-based 
audio mastering applications use 
AI to analyse audio mixes and then 
apply different mastering processes 
depending on what the AI engine 
determines as the audio mix needs. 
While not yet widely adopted, AI 
applications present audio mastering 
engineers with opportunities to reduce 
costs and decrease the potential 
introduction of error to the process. 
AI could subsequently increase 
opportunities for experts by creating 
a market for audio mastering among 
people who would not normally use 
the service or through promoting their 
own expertise through comparing 
their results to AI. Likewise, humans 
could offer mixtures of AI and their 
own signature sound through using 
AI to automate the routine or menial 
tasks in their work and to offer more 
cost-effective options. Humans could 
offer their critical listening skills to 
audit, or vet, the productions of AI 
masters to ensure acceptable standards 
and would therefore remain crucial as 
a safeguard against misjudgements 
by AI, yet be removed from the actual 
processes of labour. Finally, AI could be 
used in the toolchain alongside other 
analogue and digital technologies 
with differing degrees of automation. 
AI could be consigned to only menial 
tasks, such as error correction of 
metadata insertion into physical 
or digital media.
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cut costs by nearly 15 percent, partially due 
to the fact that the vehicles can be operated 
continuously. Further, Rio Tinto’s autonomous 
trains are the first long distance, heavy haul 
trains and the world’s largest and longest 
robots (RioTinto, 2018). The vehicles are 
controlled remotely from the Perth Operations 
Centre, 1,500 km away from the mine. 
Similarly, BHP is running remote operations 
centres to optimise mining, maintenance and 
logistic activities across the Pilbara.
Many other mining companies are using 
digital technology and machine automation 
to improve the productivity and safety of 
mining operations. Companies within Anglo 
American that have digitised their technical 
equipment have seen around a 30 percent 
improvement in their business (15 percent in 
productivity and 15 percent in cost savings) 
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).
AI is being used in an effort to improve 
mineral exploration. In 2017, mining giant 
Goldcorp teamed with IBM Watson to 
comb through a vast quantity of geological 
information to find better gold deposits. 
Further, Australian gold miner, Resolute 
Mining, is building the world’s first fully 
autonomous underground mine in Africa. 
As the level of automation increases it is 
likely that there will be a decrease in workers 
being flown in to work on the mines. In 
addition to autonomous vehicles, many 
mining companies are incorporating digital 
innovations into their operations to further 
enhance performance. This is ranging from 
remote monitoring and sensing, improving 
decision making through the use of real-time 
data, analytics and predictive tools, and block 
chain technology. AI and ML can help increase 
the efficiency of mining operations by 
improving the precision of mining, resulting 
in less consumption of water and energy, and 
less production of waste.
Through improving application of sensor 
technology, advanced analytics and process 
automation, mining sector digital advances 
have potential to add A$40-$80 billion in 
earnings before interest and taxes. Capturing 
this opportunity will require end-to-end 
integration for real-time performance 
monitoring, optimisation and control 
(McKinsey & Company, 2017). 
2.3.6 Energy
The Australian energy sector is currently 
undergoing profound changes triggered 
by high energy prices, the adoption of new 
technologies for renewable energy and 
storage (both residential and commercial), 
a growing consumer preference for 
increased control over energy usage, and 
the proliferation of smart energy tools such 
as smart meters. These changes are putting 
pressure on existing business models and 
creating the need for new regulations, policies 
and incentives. There is significant uncertainty 
concerning the transition to a cost-effective, 
secure, reliable and sustainable energy 
future. One example is in the planning of a 
carbon-free, cost-effective and secure future 
grid, including the ideal mix of generation and 
storage technologies over the next 30 years, 
the ideal locations of these generation 
and storage sources, and expansion of 
the network.
AI will play a crucial role in addressing these 
challenges and providing technological 
solutions. There is, for example, a need for AI 
systems that manage and optimise energy 
consumption, production and storage in 
residential and commercial buildings. This 
is a well-developed research area, and there 
are commercial systems in Australia that 
perform some of these functions. Examples 
include the BuildingIQ 5i platform for 
heating, ventilation and air-conditioning 
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management in buildings, the Evergen 
Energy Management System and Reposit 
Gridcredits. Melbourne Water is also using 
AI to reduce electricity usage through the 
regulation and optimisation of pump speeds. 
The use of AI to determine and implement 
optimal pump settings is expected to 
reduce Melbourne Water’s energy costs by 
20 percent per annum (Melbourne Water 
Corporation, 2018). AI systems may play a role 
in coordinating distributed energy resources 
(such as residential energy management 
systems) to manage network constraints. AI 
systems that can handle automated planning 
and scheduling will play an important role, 
whether to schedule loads, coordinate 
distributed energy resources, plan renewable 
deployment and the expansion of the future 
grid, or to restore power systems following 
outages.
Many countries have public or private 
research institutes dedicated to future energy 
systems, which are well-versed in state of the 
art data analytics and AI and optimisation 
techniques (e.g. North America has the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory and 
the Electric Power Research Institute; the 
French company Électricité de France has 
over 2,000 staff in six research centres across 
Europe; and Iran has the Niroo Research 
Institute). Such specialised R&D labs are 
lacking in Australia (not just in energy), 
which can make it more difficult for basic 
and applied research from universities and 
publicly funded research organisations to 
find its way into consumer products. Notably, 
France is starting to harness the power of AI 
by creating AI interdisciplinary institutes in 
selected public higher education and research 
establishments; each institute will focus on a 
specific application area. 
Here as elsewhere, there are ethical concerns 
surrounding adoption of AI. For example, 
data analytics and smart meters might be 
used in potentially intrusive or compromising 
ways. Likewise, the use of AI systems to share, 
aggregate, and coordinate resources among 
participants in smart energy systems may 
exacerbate existing inequalities for people 
who cannot afford rooftop solar, batteries and 
energy management systems and AI systems 
may automate tasks performed by energy 
sector workers. Addressing these concerns will 
require a measured response from industry 
and government. 
2.3.7 Environment
AI offers a new way by which to address 
environmental concerns and can make a 
significant contribution to the management 
of urban, rural, and natural environments. 
Climate change increases the complexity and 
uncertainty of managing the environment. 
Developing AI to augment human decision 
making and policy development will be 
important for ensuring environmental 
sustainability. According to the World 
Economic Forum, the use of AI technologies 
has immense potential to provide solutions 
for the Earth’s greatest environmental 
challenges. This assertion has been echoed 
by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
Australia. However, as with other electronic 
hardware, the development of AI technologies 
could also contribute to environmental 
degradation due to the extraction of materials 
to build equipment through to the disposal of 
superseded hardware. Therefore, an important 
consideration will be the sustainable 
development of AI technologies. Regulation 
or governance has been suggested as a way 
to ensure environmentally friendly AI systems 
(World Economic Forum, 2018a). Additionally, 
NGOs, social enterprises, academia and 
industry partners, could play a role in 
guiding the use of emerging technologies 
for public good. For example, WWF Australia 
has established Panda Labs, an innovation 
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program, which, in conjunction with industry, 
start-up, and academic sectors, seeks to 
develop and advance emerging technologies 
for beneficial social and environmental 
impact. 
Examples of AI used for environmental 
applications include the use of AI 
technologies and techniques to analyse 
data output from smart cities to improve 
the liveability and sustainability of cities or 
enhance conservation practices (World Wide 
Fund for Nature Australia, 2017). For instance, 
Deakin University has developed AI that has 
the ability to extensively record and track 
animals in national parks for the purposes 
of generating new park management 
processes (Deakin University, 2018). Given 
Australia’s diverse natural environment, the 
country could present a testbed for the 
development and evaluation of AI solutions 
for environmental issues such as climate 
change and renewable resources. Currently, 
robots using AI powered software have 
been deployed to assist in the preservation 
of the Great Barrier Reef. Resulting from a 
collaboration between Queensland University 
of Technology, Google and the Great Barrier 
Reef Foundation, the RangerBot (previously 
known as COTSbot) uses computer vision to 
administer a lethal injection into the crown 
of thorn starfish that pose a significant threat 
to the reef. The robot is also capable of 
conducting underwater surveying and water 
sampling. This system is a world first and is 
significantly cheaper than traditional, acoustic, 
underwater systems (Gartry, 2018). Further, 
there is a trial underway in Western Australia 
to use AI to identify plants, vertebrates and 
insects that may pose a biosecurity threat to 
Australia. 
Future developments in AI systems for 
environmental management may rely on 
data produced from the proliferation of 
internet-enabled devices, that is, the Internet 
of Things (IoT ) (Mattern and Floerkemeier, 
2010). IoT has the potential to allow for more 
efficient use of energy and resources by 
providing continuous streams of data that 
can be used by AI systems to model more 
effective responses to environmental issues. 
As an example, IoT devices could be set to 
use electricity only when there is an excess 
supply of renewable electricity. If electricity 
generated from coal-fired power stations late 
at night is cheap, such devices could exploit 
these sources. 
2.3.8 Agriculture
By 2050 there are likely to be close to 10 
billion people on our planet, requiring a 
significant increase in food production. Most 
of this population growth will occur in Africa 
and Asia, where there will be an increased 
demand for higher quality and quantity 
Box 6: Case study: IBM’s 
solution to China’s air 
pollution problem
In 2014, IBM launched the ‘Green 
Horizons’ initiative in China, with the aim 
of alleviating air pollution in cities such as 
Beijing. The initiative draws on cognitive 
computing techniques in weather 
prediction and climate modelling to 
generate predictive models that indicate 
the source and likely effect of pollution. 
These systems enable city planners 
and officials to model scenarios and 
suggest potential actions to reduce the 
particulate load in the atmosphere. Since 
its inception, the initiative has reduced 
particulate load in the atmosphere by 
about 18 percent with minimal negative 
impact on the economy (because of 
source elimination).
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of food, more protein-rich foods, fruit and 
vegetables, and an increasing vegetarian 
and vegan market. This will also result in a 
desire to reduce environmental footprint 
including chemical use, to improve soil 
management, to reduce on-farm waste and 
energy consumption, and to improve animal 
welfare. These increasing demands and 
desires will affect farmers who are seeking to 
meet demand, while dealing with issues such 
as climate change. Consumer demands for 
quality at low cost reduces growers’ margins, 
further exacerbating the challenges. This has 
led to farmers around the world seeking new 
technologies that can help with their daily 
tasks on-farm, as well as provide a competitive 
economic edge.
AI systems and technologies are poised to 
have a major impact on-farm production 
of crops and livestock. A development 
that is already taking place is the design of 
autonomous farming machines, which can 
work throughout the night, collaborate with 
human and non-human peers, and request 
assistance if a condition arises that has not 
been programmed. There is increasing use 
of precision agriculture farming devices to 
collect and analyse data on, for example, 
crops and livestock, which can then be 
used to make informed farm management 
decisions (Figure 4). For instance, CSIRO is 
collaborating with partners in Queensland 
on the Digital Homestead project that aims 
to evaluate and demonstrate technologies 
that enable better decision making on 
farms, leading to improved productivity 
and profitability (CSIRO, 2015a). One of the 
technologies includes a solar-powered, 
wireless cattle collar that gathers information 
about the animal’s location and behaviour. 
This provides information that can lead 
to better management decisions about 
grazing management, feed supply and when 
to muster. Additionally, researchers at the 
University of Sydney have developed an AI 
enabled robot that can identify weeds on an 
farm and autonomously apply herbicide in 
controlled amounts (Rural Industries Research 
and Development Corporation, 2016). 
A component of AI, machine vision, can 
precisely locate a growing crop. This is 
superior to GPS guidance, which locates 
the vehicle relative to where the crop was 
thought to have been planted. Machine vision 
can assess the yield of fruit-bearing trees and, 
in the not-too-distant future, may lead to 
efficient selective harvesting.
While early applications are showing promise, 
key areas of advancement in this area include:
• Greater use of stochastic ML techniques 
that can capture and learn from semi-
structured data, and that need to deal with 
very noisy and inconsistent data, such as 
changing light conditions, moving animals, 
plant variability and effects of different 
pests and diseases
• Developments in semi-supervised and 
unsupervised learning techniques to easily 
capture the great variety of food produced 
without the need for experts to train the 
algorithms for each type
• ML techniques for decision making, 
especially in automated crop and animal 
growth models, to assist in yield and 
quality prediction for each individual plant 
and animal
• Automated decision support tools that 
can identify what physical action needs 
to be undertaken to support the use of 
continuous on-farm robotic solutions. 
This includes automated mechanical 
weeding, targeted fertiliser applications, 
foreign object detection and removal, and 
eventually automated harvesting.
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Across the farm, descriptors 
and sensors collect data that 
can be stored in the cloud and 
accessed by the farmer, who can 
monitor and adjust ‘farm settings’ 
(e.g. irrigation levels) as required
Figure 4: AI and agriculture
Adapted from: Australian Computer Society, 2018a.
Drones and fixed 
cameras and similar 
sensors allow conversion 
of visual impression 
into AI-analysable 
data, enabling security, 
maintenance monitoring 
and farm coordination etc.
The health and 
location of livestock 
can be monitored
Descriptors and sensors 
provide real-time 
productivity monitoring 
of machinery as well as 
inventory management and 
tracking of key maintenance 





Autonomous vehicles will 
improve farm productivity
Descriptors and sensors 
monitor the environment 
(e.g. temperature, water levels); 
the system can respond 
automatically (e.g. automatic 
irrigation) when certain 
thresholds are reached
Robots undertake repetitive 
tasks, autonomously recognising 
livestock and humans in the 
vicinity for safety, and efficiently 
collaborating with humans, heavy 
machinery and other robots
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Box 7: Gaps in agriculture in Australia
Policy. Policies surrounding the 
implementation of AI technologies in 
agriculture in Australia are still in their infancy. 
Unlike other countries who are leading 
in the deployment and application of AI 
technologies, Australia has not implemented a 
national AI strategy. Industry could help rural 
development corporations develop a unified 
plan that is broad enough to deal with the 
various issues that AI can solve for the whole 
industry, while also dealing with the specific 
problems faced by commodities.
Data. There is great benefit in the collection 
and ownership of data across the value supply 
chain by those who write the algorithms. 
There is also benefit in the information being 
shared to support biosecurity concerns. 
However, the growers would be relinquishing 
a significant asset that could draw financial 
returns or could give up significant freedom 
of operation if the data were used improperly. 
Telecommunication infrastructure. 
Telecommunication infrastructure is 
also another gap in Australia, with many 
developing countries having greater 
connectivity than Australia. This will affect 
how much data can be transferred, especially 
given that AI technologies are ‘data hungry’. 
While it is currently difficult for ground-based 
networks to achieve 100 percent coverage, 
there is the potential that in the next 2-5 years 
use of LEO satellite constellations could 
provide pole-to-pole broadband coverage. 
The Australian agriculture market’s 
relationship to technology is unique. There are 
many advances in agriculture technology that 
have been developed in Australia, or were 
initially tested here before going international. 
AI is expected to take the same pathway; 
however, for this to be realised, several gaps 
must be addressed.
The technical digital divide. Computer 
scientists and automation engineers 
lack practical agriculture knowledge and 
agricultural experts generally have little (or 
no) understanding of the complexities of 
technologies such as AI, ML and robotics. 
This is a common problem internationally, 
although in some countries where there 
has been a greater emphasis on digital 
technologies in food production (e.g. 
urban food production and large-scale 
greenhouses), multidisciplinary teams are 
being formed and there is additional training 
of engineers and computer scientists in 
agronomy or vice versa.
The spatial digital divide. Most AI 
courses, training programs, start-ups and 
AI communities occur within the city 
areas where there are large financial and 
engineering hubs. This generally means that 
any activity in AI for agriculture will gravitate 
to these areas at the expense of the rural areas 
where this knowledge is needed. This is a 
particularly significant challenge for Australian 
agriculture. A focus at the secondary school 
level, especially in rural schools, on greater 
ICT knowledge and the applications to food 
production would help facilitate bridging 
this divide. 
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2.3.9 Transport and mobility
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are among the 
most highly anticipated AI developments, 
and will have far-reaching impacts. AVs 
refer to a variety of transportation methods, 
including autonomous cars, planes, 
trains, trucks and ships. There has been 
international activity in the rollout of AVs, 
for instance, Rio Tinto is already using 
autonomous trucks and trains in Australian 
mining operations, France anticipates 
semi-autonomous trains to be deployed in 
2020, with fully autonomous services being 
implemented by 2023, Rolls-Royce has 
partnered with Finnish universities to develop 
an autonomous unmanned ocean ship by 
2035, and a Norwegian company is currently 
developing the world’s first fully-autonomous, 
zero-emissions cargo ship (Rolls-Royce plc, 
2016; Carlstrom, 2018; Railway Gazette, 
2018). Given the expense associated with 
slow moving cargo ships, which remain a 
key component in global trade, the use of 
autonomous ships could significantly reduce 
costs associated with product transportation. 
Additionally, autonomous buses have been 
trialled at Australian cities and universities, 
with the initiatives demonstrating 
partnerships between academia, industry 
and government that have potential for 
widespread application (Monash Unviersity, 
2018; Thomsen, 2018). The buses can operate 
on existing roadways without the need for 
additional infrastructure and can travel up to 
45km per hour. 
The potential benefits of road AVs are that 
they may decrease traffic accidents to almost 
zero, increase the efficiency of traffic control, 
decrease emissions, increase intermodality, 
improve accessibility for mobility impaired 
people, and increase social participation. 
However, these changes are anticipated to 
take effect over a prolonged period and we 
are likely to see semi-AVs long before fully-AVs. 
AI can also be applied to smarter road use for 
conventional vehicles through dynamic road 
pricing, optimising traffic management, and 
improved routing, utilising exiting roads more 
effectively.
The discourse around AVs promises more 
comfort and shorter travel times. However, 
the assumption that AI in transport will lead 
to any significant reductions in transport 
volumes has been challenged (Dennis 
and Urry, 2013; Dassen and Hajer, 2014; 
Rifkin, 2015; Maurer et al., 2016; Greenfield, 
2017). Leading experts expect increases in 
vehicle use due to increased accessibility 
for people of all ages, including the aged, 
mobility impaired individuals and people 
who dislike driving (Dudenhöffer, 2008; 
Diez, 2017; Meyer and Shaheen, 2017). 
Forecasting has suggested that without 
the right planning and regulatory controls, 
there may be a danger of AVs creating more 
traffic, congestion, emissions and sprawl as 
a result of the increased uptake due to the 
convenience and comfort that may lead 
passengers to use AVs instead of mass public 
transport. Some also predict the increased use 
of AVs will lead to increasing social conflict 
and social inequalities, as early model AVs are 
likely to be expensive. The use of expensive 
technologies in these vehicles as well as the 
possible higher risks of accidents in a changed 
automated environment may result in 
insurance companies charging higher rates for 
driver-owners of cars. Additionally, truck, bus, 
taxi, and other transport drivers may find that 
their jobs are threatened by the uptake of AVs. 
It is anticipated that it will take decades 
for AVs to replace all cars. Due to the slow 
rollout and varying costs associated with 
different levels of autonomy, it is likely that 
there will be AVs with different amounts 
of human involvement on the road 
simultaneously. Autonomous vehicles are 
likely to be shared, rather than individually 
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owned (Deloitte University Press, 2016; 
McKinsey&Company, 2016). Moreover, the 
development of autonomous vehicles is 
likely to have significant implications for 
transport labour in Australia and New Zealand. 
This includes not only transport drivers, as 
discussed above, but also those associated 
with road maintenance and infrastructure. 
There is also the question of what people 
will do during AV transportation; work, rest, 
entertainment? Much will depend on public 
acceptance of new technologies and the 
trust people put into these highly complex 
systems (Fraedrich and Lenz, 2016). Carefully 
considered and implemented regulatory 
frameworks will provide a basis for public 
trust in AV and would signal that Australia 
and New Zealand are open for business for 
driverless technology. In 2018 the Australian 
Government announced that it would 
establish an Office of Future Transport 
Technologies to help prepare for the pending 
arrival of autonomous vehicles (Australian 
Government, 2018g). Approximately 
A$10 million in funding has been earmarked 
for the initiative which aims to improve 
transport and road safety outcomes.
2.3.10 Justice and law
AI in the legal services focuses on the use 
of computer systems to perform or assist 
research, analysis and decision making 
normally performed by humans. Computers 
and automated services have assisted the 
legal profession for decades, using techniques 
such as Boolean keyword searching and 
simple hand-coded expert systems. In the 
legal profession today, AI is being used and 
developed to enable a range of automated 
solutions, including:
• Intelligent searching of primary sources 
of law and precedents
• Automated document review using 
predictive coding or statistical pattern 
analysis in, for example, contract analysis 
and e-discovery
• Smart forms that tailor legal information 
and advice to individual circumstances 
(e.g. to draft a will or settling financial 
arrangements following relationship 
breakdown or divorce)
• Legal data analytics for practice and 
judicial decision-support
• Online dispute resolution.
Box 8: Impact of AI and AVs 
on social inequalities
Autonomous vehicle technologies 
have the potential to produce and 
perpetuate new and existing forms 
of social inequality. The design of 
autonomous vehicles, for example, is 
not necessarily value neutral. Research 
undertaken by Jensen (2007) highlights 
how the development of new mobility 
systems can intensify social segregation, 
leading to multi-tier services based 
on differential speed and comfort. For 
autonomous vehicles, the ‘kinetic elite’ 
(Elliott and Urry, 2010) may have greater 
access to autonomous vehicle services, 
allowing them to travel further and 
faster than others, and these privileged 
services may also provide higher levels 
of flexibility and comfort. Autonomous 
vehicles may also radically transform how 
car insurance operates, leading to new 
forms of inequality. This effect may be 
transient; however it will be important 
for industry and government to be 
aware of these potential inequalities and 
ensure equitable standards of design 
and implementation. 
Box 9: AI in Australian judicial settings
On the other hand, critics express concerns 
over using big data analytics predictively 
to create such individualised assessments. 
Debate over the use of COMPAS in the 
US specifically highlights design risks and 
uncertainties, and the negative consequences 
of (unintended) algorithmic bias in such high 
stakes decision making (Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, 2016). COMPAS is a commercial 
tool used in the criminal-justice system 
that aids decisions about, among other 
things, parole. COMPAS scores, based on 
questionnaires completed by prisoners, are 
predictive of risk of reoffending, but a recent 
study in the US shows a strong correlation 
between COMPAS score and race (Larson et 
al., 2016).There is judicial recognition in the 
US that, at present, such tools should be no 
more than part of the material used in making 
a determination. Scholars have also stressed 
the importance of policymakers focusing 
on standards of ‘fairness, accountability, and 
transparency’ when deciding whether, and 
how to, deploy such tools (Kehl, Guo and 
Kessler, 2017).
Australia is more conservative than other 
countries in adopting AI technologies in 
judicial settings for criminal law, although 
there are some who advocate its use (Norton 
Rose Fulbright, 2018). The US, in contrast, has 
used AI-informed sentencing since the early 
2000s (Dressel and Farid, 2018). Similarly, in 
China, ‘robo-judges’ have been used since 
2016 to determine nearly 15,000 cases for 
criminal sentencing (Connor, 2017).
Criminal bail and sentencing are technically 
amenable to AI-informed decision making 
(Stobbs, Hunter and Bagaric, 2017: 261), but 
there remain critical questions about how 
such technology is to be used. The sentencing 
stage of trial requires the analysis of past 
sentencing decisions against the balancing 
of factors such as the maximum penalty, 
offence tariffs (if one exists for the offence 
in question), sentencing objectives and 
aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
Programs can build-in risk profiling and 
assessment factors that assist in determining 
whether a defendant is, for example, more 
likely to be a flight risk, or to re-offend (Stobbs, 
Hunter and Bagaric, 2017: 272). Supporters of 
an AI approach argue that once these factors 
are weighed, the result is quicker and more 
consistent than human decision making.
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It has been suggested that the use of AI in 
the legal sector could improve access to 
traditionally high cost legal services and 
thereby improve social equity. Applications 
in this area are already underway and include 
a chatbot that was developed by a Stanford 
University student to provide free legal 
advice. This service initially helped more than 
160,000 people overturn parking tickets and 
has since been expanded to provide advice to 
individuals seeking asylum (World Wide Fund 
for Nature Australia, 2017).
Take-up and deployment of technology appears 
still to be slow and unevenly distributed within 
and across legal services markets. This is likely 
to reflect differences in market scale, patterns 
of both internal and external investment in 
the sector and restrictions on deployment 
flowing from legal services and regulation. 
There are no specific standards that regulate 
the use of AI in the Australian or New Zealand 
legal services market – beyond protections 
against the misuse of AI in the justice system, 
although the Lawyer and Conveyancers Act in 
New Zealand does specify that legal services 
must be delivered by a lawyer (interpreted as a 
person with a practicing certificate). Whether 
there should be standards is an important 
question, with significant ramifications for 
the development of the legal services market, 
and for access to justice (Bennet et al., 2018). 
These might include restriction on the use of 
automated legal information and advice; quality 
and competence of different automated advice 
systems; and transparency and explainability 
standards, which remain fundamental 
principles underpinning the justice system. 
2.3.11 Defence, security and 
emergency response
AI will have implications for intelligence 
collection and analysis, logistics, cyberspace 
operations, command and control and 
emergency response. Internationally, it will 
have implications for military, information 
and economic superiority (Allen and Chan, 
2017). These changes will require the 
development of skills to harness advances in 
AI, with training doctrine, recruitment and 
organisation structures having to adjust as a 
result (Nicholson, 2018).
AI could enhance the capacity of emergency 
services to react to, and prepare for, natural 
disasters and humanitarian emergencies and 
enable planners and responders to analyse 
population and physical environmental 
data, physical infrastructure schematics, 
risk assessments and response plans. This 
information could be merged with data 
from social media, and first responders’ 
information, helping command and control 
personnel make effective decisions. By being 
continuously updated with new information, 
algorithms could provide a constant picture of 
changing needs and where resources should 
be prioritised during emergencies. 
Deep cognitive imaging, an advanced 
form of pattern recognition, has been used 
in Australia to estimate the incidence of 
wildfires with respect to climate change 
(Dutta et al., 2013). The system was provided 
with a scenario based on Australia’s climate 
between 2001-2010 and was able to replicate 
the real-world occurrence of fire hotspots 
with 90 percent accuracy. Further, CSIRO 
has also developed ‘Spark’, an AI powered 
system that has the capacity to predict the 
spread and location of bushfires and allow 
for better preparation, targeted deployment 
of resources, and to plan evacuation 
routes. Looking abroad, the Cincinnati Fire 
Department has developed an AI system 
that can classify the urgency of emergency 
calls and has effectively reduced delays 
in transporting patients to hospitals by 
22 percent.
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In Australia, drones have been employed 
at Australian beaches to detect sharks 
and other potential threats to swimmers. 
The Westpac Little Ripper Lifesaver and 
SharkSpotter uses ML techniques to analyse 
live video from a camera attached to the 
drone. It can identify sharks, issue alerts and 
can even conduct rescues by deploying a 
rescue pod. AI can also be used to better 
anticipate earthquakes through the use of 
neural networks and thus alert the public 
seconds to minutes before an event occurs 
(Kuma, 2018). 
In the defence sector, robotic automation 
could augment or replace soldiers, freeing 
them from simple tasks and allowing them 
to focus on more cognitively complex work. 
Tasks undertaken by AI could be conducted 
faster, with greater precision and reliability, for 
durations that exceed human endurance and in 
dangerous environments, reducing the risk to 
soldiers in the field (Scharre and Horowitz, 2018). 
A common public discussion about drones has 
been their use in support of military and covert 
actions for targeted killing and assassinations. 
Another significant proportion of drone activity 
is for surveillance and information gathering. 
Box 10: Autonomous weapons
Autonomous weapons are AI systems that, 
once programmed and activated by a human, 
can identify, track and deliver lethal force 
without further intervention by a person. 
This weaponry includes those used in 
targeted and non-targeted killing, such as 
autonomous anti-aircraft weapons systems 
used against multiple attacking aircraft.
Autonomous weaponry that uses AI and ML 
can be categorised in the following way. 
These categorisations are quoted directly 
from a report prepared by Human Rights 
Watch (2012): 
• Human-in-the-loop weapons: Robots that 
can select targets and deliver force only 
with a human command.
• Human-on-the-loop weapons: Robots that 
can select targets and deliver force under 
the oversight of a human operator who 
can override the robots’ actions. 
• Human-out-of-the-loop weapons: Robots 
that are capable of selecting targets and 
delivering force without any human input 
or interaction.
Compared to countries that lead the world 
in the production of autonomous weapons, 
Australia’s outputs are very limited, and so 
would be unlikely to have any significant 
impact on these technologies through 
technological leadership or innovation. 
However, even if Australia does not lead in 
the development of autonomous weapons, 
it is in our interest to ensure autonomous 
weapons are appropriately regulated, as we 
will have to deal with them in conflict zones. 
It is also in our interest to demonstrate ethical 
leadership in the use of new technologies 
like AI. Australia can have an impact through 
involvement in international dialogues 
and discussions to promote norms. For 
example, Australia has been active in United 
Nations discussions on the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons. A parallel 
opportunity for influence at this international 
level is the United Nations Institute on 
Disarmament Research (UNIDR), one of the 
research arms of the UN that has been closely 
exploring and shaping debates about lethal 
autonomous weapons systems.
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However, there are other applications, such as 
using AI in bomb or munitions disposal units 
(Singer, 2009) or for emergency response. The 
ethical, legal and social concerns with drone 
use vary depending on whether they are 
being used in defence, to gather information, 
or to support people.
Fully autonomous vehicles are already being 
deployed in the battlefield by states such as 
Israel (Gross, 2017). Militaries are working on 
capabilities to ‘pair’ older vehicles with newer 
ones, tasking them with conducting tasks 
to support manned systems (Hoadley and 
Lucas, 2018: 11). This could include carrying 
extra equipment and ammunition on the 
battlefield, reacting to electronic threats such 
as jamming, conducting reconnaissance, 
surveillance and removal of explosives. On-
board sensors are being developed to alert 
users when repairs are required, allowing 
individually customised maintenance on an 
‘as needed’ basis, lowering maintenance costs 
(Hoadley and Lucas, 2018: 9). 
AI is likely to play an increasing role in 
decisions on military practices that are neither 
mission critical nor involved in the actual 
application or use of force. The command 
structures of militaries are likely to ensure that 
mission critical decisions and those relating to 
use of lethal force are likely to remain within 
the realm of humans. 
The likely uses of AI in counter-terrorism, 
cyber warfare and network centric warfare 
include identifying ‘abnormal’ or ‘antisocial 
behaviour’ (Smith, 2014), facial recognition 
(Smith, B., 2018), moderation of illegal or 
offensive material online (Breland, 2018; 
Leetaru, 2018), recognition of foreign 
influence operations (Mueller, 2018), and, 
in the context of criminal law, sophisticated 
spear phishing (scam emails). 
AI will be fundamental to harnessing and 
integrating ever-greater amounts of data 
across air, space, cyberspace, sea and land 
(Hoadley and Lucas, 2018: 11). This could 
transform command and control operations, 
enabling faster decisions and accelerating the 
speed of conflict (Hoadley and Lucas, 2018: 
27). Additionally, identifying patterns across 
large datasets will allow improved image 
recognition, labelling and targeting. Better 
predictions of events such as terrorist attacks 
or civil unrest will also be possible (Scharre 
and Horowitz, 2018). Equally, there could be 
undesirable feedback loops (‘flash wars’). 
Box 11: Moral decision making?
AI cannot possess moral motivations, 
such as courage, moral innocence, moral 
responsibility, sympathy or justice, nor 
does it recognise moral ends. However, 
this does not that mean that AI cannot 
act in the interest of moral ends or 
principles. A robot can refrain from killing 
something because it is programmed 
not to kill things of that kind in the 
circumstances in question. If a robot 
is taught never to attack a vulnerable 
person (assuming the categories of 
vulnerability are readily identifiable for 
the robot), for example, it might be less 
likely to commit an immoral act than 
a soldier who has been subjected to 
the stresses of war and is presented 
with an opportunity to take revenge 
on a defenceless civilian (provided the 
robot understood and had a consistent 
framework for ‘defenceless civilian’). The 
fact that the robot has no inherently 
moral motivation may not be critical, 
particularly if the moral motivation of the 
programmer is successfully imbued in the 
robot’s decision-making system. However, 
moral decision making often requires the 
ability to infer the consequences of one’s 
actions, which is something that narrow 
AI is particularly ill-equipped to do. 
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A cybersecurity vulnerability for military and 
national security agencies is the security 
of their devices. This becomes increasingly 
important if the military use third party 
vendors to provide products from states 
whose strategic interests either do not align 
or are in direct conflict with Australia and 
New Zealand. Given that AI technologies 
used in this context are often quite opaque 
– technically and legally – they may present 
information security vulnerabilities. In a 
situation where an AI is used in an area of 
information security, it may be necessary for 
those involved in the procurement process 
to understand these opacities in order to 
determine that they cannot, and will not, lead 
to information security issues in the future.
2.3.12 Government
Many governments are employing AI 
technologies and systems for the purposes 
of, for example, managing access to, and 
delivery of, public services, health and aged-
care, national security, employment, and 
making decisions based on legislation. It 
has many other applications, ranging from 
human resources, welfare, child support and 
services, assessing and providing advice on 
fines, homeland security, immigration and 
urban planning. The use of AI within the 
public sector therefore has the potential to 
deliver economic gains, increase productivity 
and efficiency, and deliver higher quality 
public service with the aim of increasing 
reliability, accuracy and accessibility 
(Capgemini Consulting, 2017). Given that the 
Australian government is custodian to large 
amounts of data, including aggregated and 
disaggregated personal data, there is great 
potential to adopt AI for various aspects of 
governance and public policy. New Zealand is 
also curating and using government-related 
data through its Integrated Data Infrastructure 
(IDI), which contains linked, deidentified 
data about people and households from 
government agencies, Stats NZ surveys, 
and non-government organisations, as well 
as its use of predictive risk modelling for 
policy development and implementation 
(Boston and Gill, 2018). However, care and 
consideration should be given to preparing 
people, organisations, functions and policy 
documents for this emerging landscape. 
AI is being employed within government 
services for is its opportunities to alleviate 
administration processing. Administration 
processes are often tedious and repetitive 
and can delay governmental processes. This 
can be circumvented with the use of robotic 
process automation (RPA). RPA is a rule-based 
system, which is employed alongside ML, 
computer vision, speech recognition, and 
NLP to automate transactional, rules-based 
tasks by mimicking human interactions 
(Figure 5). RPA is most recognised in the 
form of a chatbot or virtual assistant and its 
incorporation into the workforce can provide 
employees with more time to perform 
complex decision-making tasks. 
Globally, there have been several applications 
of RPA into government institutions to 
meet the increasing demands of paperwork 
processing and queries. Some examples 
include:
• DoNotPay Bot, a UK specific free app 
that assists people who have limited 
knowledge of the legal and welfare system 
with application filing. The app enables 
citizens to lodge applications and manage 
disputes over small legal matters such 
as parking fines, mail delivery as well as 
management of welfare, government 
housing, eviction and repossessions. 
• The UK National Health Service has 
implemented the use of an AI assisted 
chatbot that can assess symptoms of 
urgent but non-life-threatening conditions 
of a patients to relieve pressure off 
emergency wards and helplines.
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• The US Department of Homeland Security 
and Immigration use a computer-
generated virtual assistant, Emma, that 
can to provide immediate responses to 
questions and direct users to where they 
may find more information regarding 
their matter. 
Australia has initiatives such as the Digital 
Transformation Strategy, which focuses on 
taking human services and business data to 
an online, central and accessible platform 
for both users. The strategy has three 
focus areas of development: ‘Government 
that’s easy to deal with; Government that’s 
informed by citizens; and Government that’s 
fit for the digital age’ (Digital Transformation 
Agency, 2018). However, consistent 
improvement through the appropriate use 
of consumer or user data will be crucial to 
improving agility of AI tools in government 
applications. The Department of Human 
Services recently launched their virtual 
assistant, Roxy, to help process queries and 
minimise the time spent waiting for personnel 
to process consumer requests. The use of Roxy 
has successfully reduced workload and is able 
to respond to 78 percent of requests, however 
an expert is still required for more complex 
cases. Additionally, the taxation office uses a 
chatbot assistant named ‘Alex’ to assist with 
customer service. Alex exceeded industry 
benchmarks and achieved a first contact 
resolution rate of 80 percent (Capgemini 
Consulting, 2017). 
AI can also be used for purposes such 
as fraud detection in massive datasets, 
easing congestion and optimising traffic 
management systems, optimising public 
spaces and generating public services that 
are transparent and accountable. However, 
these applications present both significant 
opportunities and challenges for governance. 
For example, facial and voice recognition 
technologies could be used to improve 
national security and delivery of public 
services – the Australian Taxation Office, for 
example, has already implemented a voice 
recognition system to authenticate callers – 
but these technologies are currently often 
inaccurate and may prevent people accessing 
essential services if deployed incorrectly. 
Likewise, the use of internet-enabled 
technologies and remote sensing devices for 
the collection of data may be useful in, for 
example, improving city planning, but may 
also compromise privacy. For the applications 
of AI to progress from assistive technology 
to an intelligent and integrative technology 
it will require continual development and 
refining of algorithms and policymakers 
will need to ensure that these (and other) 
AI developments comply with regulatory 
mechanisms and societal acceptance. 
2.3.13 FinTech
Technological developments play an 
integrative role in the deployment of 
financial services. Intelligent financial service 
technologies (FinTech) are already being 
widely employed for a variety of tasks in 
financial services firms, including in Australia 
and New Zealand (Institute of International 
Finance, 2018). These algorithms and 
techniques have the potential to expand 
access to credit, better manage risk, reduce 
fraud, improve firms’ compliance with laws 
and codes of conduct, influence the speed 
and correction of recovery in trading, and 
significantly expand industry revenues in the 
financial services sector. 
FinTech may significantly disrupt the banking 
sector (PwC, 2017). The International Data 
Corporation predicts that worldwide revenues 
from the adoption of such cognitive systems 
across multiple industries will experience an 
increase from US$8 billion in 2016 to over 
US$47 billion in 2020 (International Data 
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Box 12: Case study: Adoption of AI within New Zealand banks
In New Zealand, AI adoption for improving 
customer experience is being developed 
by a number of banks:
• ANZ New Zealand launched ‘Jamie’, a digital 
banking assistant designed to interact via 
video or text to answer 30 of the bank’s 
most frequently asked ‘help’ questions. 
• New Zealand bank, ASB, announced 
a digital assistant named ‘Josie’, who 
helps people in the early stage of 
setting up a business. Josie is based 
at ASB’s premises in Auckland and is 
available by appointment. ASB has also 
established AI-powered ‘connected 
customer conversations’, a multi-channel 
automated marketing program that aims 
to deliver timely and targeted customer 
conversations at scale. 
• Westpac has released ‘Wes’, a text only 
chatbot accessible via its website. 
• BNZ has created two chatbots – one for 
their internal helpdesk, and another built 
in Microsoft Azure, which is being trialled 
for KiwiSaver customers. 
For the efficiency and accuracy of core 
business including risk management, BNZ 
has partnered with Intel, using the Saffron 
Anti-Money Laundering Advisor; Westpac has 
adopted ACI’s Up Payments Risk Management 
Solution, which uses adaptive ML; and ANZ 
uses voice biometrics, powered by AI, to 
identify customers using the characteristics 
of their speech to improve security on mobile 
devices. 
New ways of conducting lending and 
payments have also been created. Harmoney, 
a New Zealand FinTech that facilitates digital 
peer-to-peer lending, has created its own 
digital marketplace of 15,000 members while 
using AI to increase the accuracy of credit 
risk predictive models and to accelerate 
deployment of predictive models (CIO New 
Zealand, 2018). ANZ New Zealand and BNZ 
have addressed potential disruption in 
payments by forming enabling partnerships – 
ANZ New Zealand partnered with Apple Pay 
in 2016, and BNZ with Alipay in 2018.
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global GDP could increase by 14 percent, 
or US$15.7 trillion because of AI with 
US$1.2 trillion extra economic growth 
forecasted GDP gains in Oceania (PwC, 2017). 
In addition, over US$1 trillion of today’s 
financial services cost structure could be 
replaced by ML and AI by 2030 according to 
the 2018 Augmented Finance and Machine 
Intelligence report. Accenture estimates that AI 
will add US$1.2 trillion in value to the financial 
industry by 2035 (Purdy and Dougherty, 2017).
There are many opportunities for banks to 
explore these emerging technologies while 
rethinking corporate strategies, evaluating 
potential partnerships and paving the way 
towards a genuine transformation of the 
industry itself (Manning, 2018). FinTech may 
help banks improve customer experience by, 
for example, providing personalised customer 
interaction and advisory services through 
chatbots. The four major Australian banks are 
in the process of adopting AI tools in line with 
worldwide developments within the sector. 
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s 
‘Ceba’ chatbot is able to assist customers 
with more than 200 banking tasks, including 
card activation, checking account balance, 
making payments and obtaining cardless 
cash. The National Bank of Australia has 
introduced the Digital Virtual Banker, which is 
able to answer approximately 200 customer 
service questions by drawing on data from 
countless customer service interactions. 
The ANZ Banking Group has created biometric 
voice capability with technology company 
Nuance to allow customers to bank by talking 
to the app (Eyers, 2018). In the same context, 
the Westpac Banking Corp is using AI to 
conduct data analytics and visualisation and 
provide personalised advice in managing 
financial matters.
These developments may lead to customers 
feeling more empowered to make choices 
that were previously accessible only to 
wealthy people who could afford experts such 
as financial advisors, researchers, coaches and 
consultants. FinTech can also improve the 
core efficiency, productivity, and accuracy of 
a bank, through AI systems that manage risk, 
security, transparency and accountability. 
However, despite these opportunities, 
financial institutions are faced with numerous 
challenges in taking advantage of the 
benefits of AI in a timely manner (Capgemini, 
2018). Such challenges include budgetary, 
regulatory, data quality and resource 
limitations in AI implementation; a lack of 
literacy and confidence with the technology 
among some consumers; as well as the 
potential for FinTech to exacerbate biases in 
areas of banking and insurance. AI systems 
deployed in these contexts are subject to 
cyber-crime and hacking and will require 
adequate protection. Policies that enable the 
public to understand clearly when AI is being 
used and whose interests AI is representing 
will be important to retaining the free market 
principles on which our economy has been 
successfully based.
2.3.13.1 Australia’s response to the global 
financial crisis
The global financial crisis (GFC) revealed 
regulatory weaknesses within the banking 
sector. In response, risk models have come 
under greater scrutiny and regulation. The 
detailed standards and guidelines can be 
adapted and enhanced to accommodate 
AI techniques and ML algorithms, primarily 
in those parts of the business for which 
financial stability considerations are of high 
importance. A key lesson from the GFC is 
that business leaders must understand how 
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the models at the heart of their businesses 
are designed, implemented, validated and 
used, and the limitations of those models, 
including their main assumptions and the 
nature of their reliance on historical data. It is 
therefore essential that business leaders take 
responsibility for the outcomes, decisions and 
actions that are created by, or a consequence 
of, the use of the models in the business, and 
to consider the use of AI techniques and ML 
algorithms in these models.
Issues such as these are of significant interest 
overseas where because of their exposure to 
the GFC, banks and regulators have invested 
deeply in risk management and developed 
strong regulatory requirements. For instance, 
the Federal Reserve’s “Guidance on Model Risk 
Management” (SR Letter 11-7) recommends 
embedding critical analysis throughout the 
life cycle of an algorithm – from outlining 
assumptions in the underlying model through 
to the data used to train the algorithm (US 
Federal Reserve, 2011). 
2.3.13.2 Resources and actions required 
to realise the potential of AI in 
the financial services sector 
The emergence of FinTech has encouraged 
the experimentation and gradual adoption 
of numerous AI applications within the 
financial services industry, particularly in the 
areas of capital market, consumer banking, 
insurance and portfolio management. Some 
applications have already created a solid 
footprint; however, numerous areas remain 
undeveloped. Australia and New Zealand will 
need to continue to develop, or have access 
to, the technology and skills necessary to 
benefit from developments in FinTech. 
Opportunities are likely to emerge for 
Australian companies and consumers to 
be at the forefront of FinTech, including:
• Being the international standard in the 
way AI-powered financial services are 
provided to the individual and society. 
This standard could see the ability for 
people to effectively allocate capital based 
on their individual circumstances and life 
goals. To achieve this goal, people will 
need to have access to the technology 
and confidence to use it
• Being an exporter of FinTech AI capabilities 
through local entrepreneurs using the 
technology to solve business problems in a 
way that creates international leadership in 
AI-powered FinTech
• Creating an engaged community with 
good domestic job opportunities and 
standard of living through an appropriate 
social and legal framework combined with 
well-developed education and retraining 
industries
• Building a prosperous and competitive 
economy through a world class financial 
services system that is able to mobilise and 
empower people and businesses to build 
and manage their wealth.
These benefits come with risks, including:
• The potential that advice and decisions 
issued through the ‘black box’ are not in 
the clients’ interest or discriminate against 
customer groups. However, AI can be 
trained to verify if regulatory requirements 
are being met
• Procurement of AI and ML as well as deep 
customer related data become the main 
competitive factors in financial services. 
This could see the continued expansion of 
big technology companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Amazon and WeChat into 
financial services, potentially disrupting 
current institutions with implications for 
the whole sector
• A gap in workforce talent who possess 
the appropriate skills and experience to 
effectively develop, implement or work 
with AI systems
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• A population that becomes distrustful of 
the technology as it misleads or breaches 
the trust of those who use it
• Misuse of AI systems to undertake 
fraudulent activities
• The risk that FinTech systems could be 
hacked or compromised.
Financial services regulators will need to 
develop a robust set of regulatory standards 
and detailed associated supervisory guidelines 
for model risk management and governance 
for banks and other financial services firms. 
These standards should be clearly and 
prominently articulated as part of a broader, 
coordinated, national strategy and approach 
for AI across all sectors of the economy. 
However, because of the unique and central 
role that banks play in our economy – and 
the very large risks that their failure may pose 
to the national economy and society – some 
very high quality, sector-specific controls 
are needed to ensure the safe and effective 
development and implementation of AI 
approaches in the financial services sector. 
Regulators may benefit from AI to implement 
oversight, and could make use of compliance 
AI bots to ensure that banking is conducted in 
accordance with established regulations.
2.3.14 SMEs and start-ups
Small-to-medium sized enterprise (SMEs) and 
start-ups will be a part of the shift towards an 
AI-enabled society, and it will be important 
to consider how they can benefit from, and 
contribute to, AI development. 
Data and computers are critical resources 
to enable AI, yet often these resources are 
unevenly distributed. This may suggest that 
large corporations are destined to be in a 
more advantageous position when it comes 
to leveraging AI to grow their businesses. 
However, there are also benefits for SMEs 
and start-ups who can often adapt faster to 
technological change as they are usually not 
burdened by legacy IT systems or complex 
business structures. Further, AI has the 
potential to automate some human tasks 
that are expensive for small companies to 
maintain. This provides opportunities to 
free up time, money and human resources, 
making it possible for such businesses to 
more effectively compete with larger well-
established organisations. 
Smaller businesses can also take advantage 
of inexpensive application programming 
interfaces (APIs) and tools. Companies such 
as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft have 
developed APIs supporting the incorporation 
of AI functionalities, such as natural language 
and text processing, speech processing, 
image processing and computer vision. Some 
of these are open source, while others are 
inexpensive. These tools are enabling smaller 
companies to create novel AI applications 
without the need to hire software engineers. 
2.3.14.1 ‘Off-the-shelf’ AIs
There are numerous ‘off-the-shelf ’ AI products 
that can add significant value to any business, 
and to SMEs and start-ups in particular. For 
example, SMEs may benefit from off-the-
shelf tools that automate human resource 
management. Companies such as Tangowork 
provide chatbots with human resource 
functionalities, allowing employees to use 
natural language to ask questions or make 
requests about human-resource-related 
matters, such as ‘I’d like to apply for leave 
from tomorrow until next Friday’. Over time 
the chatbot learns the patterns of interaction 
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of each employee and effectively becomes a 
personal assistant, anticipating requests and 
providing notifications accordingly. 
AI can also be used to coach salespeople to 
refine their conversational skills during a call 
to improve sales performance. For example, 
solutions such as ‘Gong’ record and transcribe 
calls, then correlate sales success with features of 
the call, such as choices of expressions, ratio of 
time talking versus listening and call duration.
Further, some AI tools can help with product-
market fit, which is a major challenge for start-
up companies. Natural language processing 
can be used to create sentiment analysis tools 
such as Keatext, compressing and interpreting 
vast amounts of textual data. This allows 
start-ups to screen different market niches for 
similarities with potential product offerings.
2.3.14.2 The impact of AI on SMEs and start-ups 
over the next 10 years
Leading nations are investing heavily to 
support AI in general and the AI business 
ecosystem in particular. The UK Government 
worked with over 50 technology companies 
to develop an AI sector deal worth over 
£1 billion, articulated in a policy paper 
released in April 2018 (UK Government, 
2018). The French Government announced 
an investment of €1.5 billion in AI until 2022 
(Rabesandratana, 2018a). In comparison, 
Australia’s 2018-19 federal budget allocated 
approximately A$30 million to AI, a modest 
amount by comparison even when 
accounting for the differences in GDP and 
investment time horizons. 
To support the growth of SME and start-up 
AI in Australia, there are several factors that 
will be key including incentives to support AI 
development, growing the AI talent pool and 
connecting entrepreneurs to AI talent. 
Incentives for AI development – There are 
several mechanisms that can be used to 
support development of new technologies, 
such as providing both direct and indirect 
incentives for the private sector to invest 
in local AI developments and incentives for 
researchers to collaborate with industry (and 
vice versa). 
Growing the AI talent pool – Without AI 
scientists and engineers, entrepreneurs 
cannot materialise their vision. Developing 
a strong AI skill base in Australia will be 
important as will retaining the existing 
talent in the country and attracting overseas 
talent. This could be done through several 
independent initiatives such as AI-specific 
postgraduate scholarships and programs. 
Additionally, Government programs such as 
the Australian Global Talent Scheme Pilot 
provide opportunities to attract skilled talent. 
Connect entrepreneurs to AI talent – A 
wide range of mechanisms could help 
bring together entrepreneurs and AI 
talent, with the aim of spreading ideas, 
brainstorming solutions and seeding new 
SME and start-up teams. A range of activities, 
such as innovation precincts, AI events, 
technology meetups, and entrepreneurs-
in-residence could provide opportunities 
for connections, communication and 
collaboration. For example, a recent initiative, 
the Victorian Innovation Hub, aims to 
connect entrepreneurs and start-up with 
mentors, investors and funding bodies such 
as LaunchVic that provide seed funding to 
support start-ups.
Given appropriate investment in research and 
development, by calling upon homegrown 
expertise and by attracting world-quality 
talent, we can play an important role in 
guiding the international development of AI.
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2.4 Realising the potential
and inter-regional collaboration on AI 
development and literacy; establishing 
guidelines and advice for procurement, 
especially for public sector and small 
and medium enterprises; and reviewing 
regulatory mechanisms to address potential 
issues arising from the implementation of 
AI while also supporting local innovation 
and deployment. Australia’s Industry Growth 
Centres could play a role to help drive AI 
innovation, productivity and competitiveness 
across different sectors.
Development of AI standards and guidelines 
that follow best practices in other jurisdictions 
will assist with the successful implementation 
of AI (data governance will be further 
discussed in Chapter 6). These regulations 
should apply to both human-created 
and machine-created models to ensure 
that current and future AI techniques 
are used appropriately and responsibly. 
Support through education, advice and 
community and government consultation 
will be important for enabling innovators 
to understand and comply with regulation.
AI specialists often do not have sector or 
industry specific knowledge in areas such 
as agriculture, energy, health and mining. 
Likewise, those in specific sectors do not 
necessarily have the technical knowledge to 
apply AI to their area. Education and training 
programs will help to develop, implement, 
work with, and harness emerging AI systems 
across sectors. Emerging university programs 
are seeking to address this gap by offering 
technology-related subjects. For example, the 
University of Technology, Sydney, now offers 
a major in ‘legal futures and technology’, and 
Melbourne Law School offers a small suite of 
This chapter has highlighted some of 
the existing applications and emerging 
opportunities for AI across various sectors 
across the economy. To ensure these 
applications are effectively applied and to 
realise the economic and social potential 
associated with AI technology, a proactive 
approach in investment, leadership and 
coordination will be necessary. Government, 
civil society, and industry all have a role in 
establishing the future direction and adoption 
of AI technologies. The successful examples 
discussed demonstrate ways by which AI 
can be developed and harnessed for new 
purposes. 
Whether the opportunities presented by AI 
are achieved is likely to depend on how both 
government and the sectors themselves 
address several fundamental risks and 
challenges. Some of these challenges include 
the following:
• technological unemployment and 
de-skilling and re-skilling




• unintended consequences of both 
the technology and its regulation
• vulnerability to cyber-attack 
• misleading or biased AI
• expanding infrastructure requirements.
Managing the transition to AI-enabled sectors 
will require building on existing capabilities 
by promoting educational, interdisciplinary 
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legal technology subjects – law apps, new 
technology law and start-up law – as well 
as a legal research stream in this area. 
Advanced economies have invested in 
research and development to take advantage 
of new waves of AI and automation. The 
technical skills and knowledge obtained 
gives these countries an edge over their 
international competitors. The more technical 
capabilities these countries can create, the 
more they are capable of putting together 
complex ideas and technologies to create 
higher value and complex goods (Hausmann 
and Hidalgo, 2010). An AI capability is 
essential to leverage current investments, 
maintain our high quality of life, and create 
an AI-enabled economy – a compelling 
ecosystem of high-tech businesses and 
highly productive workers in both private 
and public sectors. 
None of this will be achieved without the 
appropriate infrastructure. AI is enabled by 
access to data and digital infrastructure that 
are secure, fast and accessible. However, 
the physical infrastructure to fully support 
AI is lacking. As internet and smart device 
use increases there will be an increase in 
the volumes of data being transmitted. This 
will require high quality connectivity to 
support the adoption of AI and associated 
digital technologies. Effective digital 
structures that help diffuse AI equitably – 
especially with ageing populations, people 
with disabilities and those living in remote 
and rural communities – will be required 
to ensure everyone can benefit. New or 
updated infrastructure may be required for 
the adoption of fully autonomous vehicles 
or the shift toward smart cities. In addition, 
soft infrastructure requirements for the 
adoption of AI include education, workforce 
and regulatory provisions. These requirements 
will be addressed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
5 respectively. Digital infrastructure 
requirements, such as data storage and 
cloud computing, should also be considered. 
Given the likely transnational nature of AI 
technologies and trade, global developments 
in these areas should be monitored. It will 
be important to keep pace with the global 
infrastructure requirements required for AI 
technologies.
In rural and regional areas, access to AI 
technologies supported by appropriate 
digital infrastructure could transform 
many sectors of the economy or alleviate 
social inequality by providing, for example, 
better access to healthcare, connectivity 
to social support services, education and 
employment opportunities. AI technologies 
are also poised to play a transformative role 
in agriculture. However, AI technologies 
cannot be successfully implemented in rural 
areas without the necessary infrastructure 
connectivity to support them. For example, 
an autonomous machine could work on crop 
management throughout the night, but to 
do this requires communication via satellite 
broadband or proprietary wireless networks, 
which are lacking in many areas of Australia. 
There will be a need to establish greater 
communication infrastructure in rural areas 
to speed the development and trialling of 
AI, with expansion to other areas in a staged 
manner. 
To remain competitive, the deployment of 
AI will need to keep pace with international 
developments in telecommunications 
networks, capacity for data storage, cloud 
computing, computer infrastructure data 
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at scale, and fast and secure connectivity. 
There will be a need to develop capacity to 
leverage data produced by IoT technologies 
and components to respond to growing and 
complex infrastructure demands. This will 
depend on a national implementation of up-
to-date broadband and mobile connectivity 
infrastructure, fibre-optic backbone networks 
and data centres capable of storing and 
processing significant amounts of sensory 
data. These data could also be used to better 
manage urban populations and city planning, 
as evidenced by the increasing demand for 
smart city infrastructure projects and the use 
of ‘open data’ by city planners, entrepreneurs, 
businesses and citizens.
Recent government investment has provided 
support to certain sectors to advance data 
and computing capabilities. Examples of 
Australian initiatives to develop infrastructure 
to support AI include:
• The establishment of the Digital 
Transformation Agency to improve and 
increase the delivery of online government 
services
• Increased accessibility of open access data 
from the public sector in conjunction with 
fostered crowd innovation designed to 
use this data in a meaningful way through 
hackathons
• Investment for new supercomputers at the 
Pawsey Supercomputing Centre
• Investment into the Australian Digital 
Health Agency and rollout of the My 
Health Record; a platform for access, 
storage and integration of diverse data 
systems including genomic data. 
These investments in certain areas of 
research and industry are a welcome 
addition to supporting AI developments and 
infrastructure, however further expansion will 
be needed across all industries.
AI techniques and technologies can present 
significant opportunities for development 
and can be used to achieve a more robust 
digital infrastructure. Intelligent robots can 
be deployed for infrastructure, such as using 
autonomous aerial vehicles to build or inspect 
(via machine vision) complex, precarious, 
or high-standing structures; below-ground 
infrastructure, such as using AI-enabled 
digging equipment to provide a legible 
map using radars, sensors, and sonars; and 
underwater infrastructure, such as using 
unmanned underwater vehicles to carry out 
inspections of cabling (Australian Centre for 
Robotic Vision, 2018: 132-3). AI developers will 
need to ensure these intelligent infrastructure 
systems are safe, able to accurately perceive 
their environments, have the necessary 
dexterity to perform tasks in and around 
complex structures, and can cooperate 
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3.1 Introduction
The impact of automation and robots on 
society – particularly on employment – is 
fiercely debated. Some argue that the 
widespread adoption of AI technologies 
in workplaces will lead to massive job loss, 
disruption and demand for new skills (Ford, 
2016; Turner, 2018), while others suggest 
that AI’s impact on employment has been 
overstated, distracting us from other, more 
profound economic and social changes. Some 
credit the AI revolution with producing a 
world of comprehensive change. 
There is much uncertainty about AI’s impact 
on the future of work, society and the 
individual. The impact of AI and automation 
on the Australian workforce needs to be 
understood in a global context and this 
uncertainty is reflected in recent international 
reports on AI. For example, widely cited 
findings on employment in the USA by 
Frey and Osborne (2013, 2017), replicated 
by Haldane in the UK (Haldane, 2015) and 
Durrant-Whyte et al. in Australia (CEDA, 
2015), suggest between 40-50 percent of 
jobs are vulnerable to replacement by new 
technology. Likewise, a 2016 report from the 
World Economic Forum estimates the net loss 
of over 5 million jobs across 15 developed 
countries by 2020 (World Economic Forum, 
2016). A report, published by the International 
Labor Organization, predicts that over 137 
million workers in the Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia are likely 
to be replaced by robots in the near future. 
However, a more recent report has suggested 
far fewer jobs vulnerable to AI replacement, 
claiming that approximately one-fifth of 
workers are in occupations that are likely to 
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3.1.1 AI and the future of work: 
An overview of key issues
The 2014 Australian Industry Report estimates 
that up to half a million people employed 
– many of them tertiary-educated – are at 
risk of their jobs being automated. However, 
the report notes that while innovation will 
inevitably lead to some job displacement in 
the short term, there is a lack of evidence 
to suggest this displacement is long term 
(Australian Government, 2014b). A 2015 CEDA 
report predicts nearly 40 percent of existing 
jobs are at risk in the next 15 years (CEDA, 
2015). However, it is worth considering the 
historical and methodological factors that 
shape our thinking, as well as clarifying the 
short and medium-term effects of AI and 
reviewing other economic developments 
that may play a role in reshaping the future of 
work. A recent New Zealand report estimated 
that sectors that have a large labour force and 
high use of technology were most likely to 
benefit from AI, while sectors like agriculture, 
with relatively small labour pools and 
relatively low technology penetration, would 
shrink, with the authors stating that the figure 
is much lower than suggested by recent 
studies of automation (Bakhshi et al., 2017).
The research presented in this chapter 
shows that it is important to acknowledge 
the potential for AI to generate widespread 
economic and social change. It is important 
to consider the underlying social and 
economic forces that generate uncertainty 
about AI’s impact on the future of work, 
and to acknowledge that this uncertainty 
may indirectly shape the way government 
and industry respond to the uptake of 
AI technologies. 
Education should be considered in the 
context of an AI-enabled society – not only 
in terms of ensuring learners are equipped 
with the proper skills to develop AI systems 
and technologies, but also that AI techniques 
are effectively deployed in education. More 
broadly, people will need to be provided 
with the tools and support to have sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
about how and when they interact with 
AI technologies in their lives.
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expect less direct benefit from AI created 
labour efficiencies (The AI Forum of New 
Zealand, 2018).
Technological innovation from the Industrial 
Revolution onward suggests that major 
technological shifts create new forms 
of employment while simultaneously 
undermining others, often over prolonged 
periods. For example, while the introduction of 
computers in the latter half of the 20th century 
undermined much routine manual and clerical 
employment, computers helped to stimulate 
more complex cognitive, interpretive and 
abstract work (Borland and Coelli, 2017: 379). 
With respect to AI, there is the suggestion that 
machine-learning may also undermine many 
different forms of complex employment, a 
claim explored in later sections of this chapter. 
Further, it has been suggested that advancing 
AI technology might, for the first time in 
history, eliminate jobs faster than it can create 
new ones (Colvin, 2015).
Yet, AI technologies currently tend to affect 
tasks rather than whole occupations (this is 
true for narrow and broad AI but may change 
with general AI). Any given work role consists 
of several interconnected tasks. Machines are 
programmed to perform discrete tasks. The 
tasks that are easiest to codify are most likely 
to be automated. Where a series of tasks are 
involved, the occupation is far less likely to be 
completely automated. Humans may still be 
required to perform certain occupations (or 
oversee an AI performing certain tasks), even 
where a proportion of the tasks previously 
associated with them are automated. 
Moreover, changing the tasks involved in a job 
is likely to have significant effects on its value 
and desirability. Even so, some commentators 
argue that few if any, existing occupations will 
remain untouched by AI (Ford, 2016).
The methods and procedures used to 
measure the impact of AI and related digital 
technologies on employment are often based 
on subjective grounds. As such, there is a 
risk of exaggerating or inflating the scale of 
job vulnerability and loss of employment. 
Reports are often premised on subjective 
observations regarding the degree of routine, 
manual skill, social intelligence or creativity 
involved in any given occupation (see for 
example, Borland and Coelli, 2017). Yet, while 
there is undoubtedly a danger associated with 
overstating the impact of AI on the future of 
work, it is equally important not to simply 
assume that everything will be the same as it 
was before the introduction of AI. 
One way of reconciling these conflicts is 
to distinguish between short-term and 
medium-term effects of AI. As discussed in the 
introduction to this report, short, medium and 
long term in this context is loosely considered 
to be within 5 years, approximately 10 to 
15 years, and greater than 20 years, respectively. 
The short-term effects of AI will be associated 
with systems and technologies that can 
produce repetitive and predictable rule-based 
outputs. The tasks most under threat here 
include routine manual and cognitive work. 
Yet, while the proportion of jobs of this kind 
in Australia and New Zealand has fallen, this 
fall may be due to factors like globalisation 
as much as automation. In the medium-
term, when advances in AI and ML render it 
possible for technologies to learn by actively 
interpreting and responding to data, higher-skill 
employment will also be at risk. Klaus Schwab 
(2017), founder of the World Economic Forum, 
has argued that the fourth industrial revolution 
is ‘unlike anything humankind has experienced 
before’. According to Schwab, there will be 
multiple long-term impacts of the AI revolution 
on the economy, business, regions and cities, 
as well as geopolitics and global order.
Even if there remain enough jobs to retain 
full employment, the nature and frequency 
of occupations will change in an AI-enabled 
society, meaning that many people will have to 
transition between jobs during their working 
lives. There is therefore a danger that changes 
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in the frequency of various types of work 
might effectively force significant numbers of 
workers into low value, low paid work, thereby 
exacerbating inequality (Turner, 2018).
An additional connection between AI and 
employment trends involves the platform 
economy and the growth of precarious casual 
employment in the ‘gig economy’. Platforms 
are digital infrastructure that enable users to 
create, interact, and transact in diverse ways. 
For example, consumer goods platforms such 
as eBay, Amazon and Alibaba bring together 
buyers and sellers. Advertising platforms such 
as Facebook and Google aim to generate and 
extract data, which can then be packaged and 
sold to advertisers to match users to potential 
sellers. Other platforms such as Github, Job 
Rooster and Wannalo offer software tools 
for applications such as human resources. 
Such platforms typically transform types of 
employment that provide a space to mediate 
buyers and sellers. Many of these platforms 
make use of, or provide users with, AI APIs 
to, for example, translate or interpret large 
amounts of written text.
A key consideration is whether the growth of 
platforms undermines secure work and other 
employee benefits. Using mainly US evidence, 
Kenney and Zysman (2016) argue that such 
undermining may eventuate where the 
private governance structures of the platform 
economy escape public regulation. However, 
employment conditions vary depending on 
the platform and the kind of labour facilitated 
by the platform. Those directly employed 
by companies such as Google or Facebook, 
for example, generally retain traditional 
employment conditions. Those working in 
under-regulated areas such as taxi driving 
through Uber and Lyft, or those competing 
for episodic contracts to produce apps, are in 
a far less secure position. However, aspects of 
professional labour are also at considerable 
risk. Richard and Daniel Susskind (2015) show 
that new AI technology is reordering the 
professions and suggest that contemporary 
patterns of technological innovation are 
enabling intelligent machines and para-
professionals to assume many traditional tasks 
once performed only by professionals. 
Protection of worker rights will need to 
be considered as part of this workplace 
transformation and may involve consideration 
of civil society involvement, such as 
unions, throughout the process. How the 
transformation to automation is handled by 
management in relation to employees will 
be a key ingredient of a successful transition. 
Responses to digitally enabled employment 
changes have started to emerge in certain 
areas, including for-hire drivers working for 
Uber and Lyft (Fisher, 2017).
There is much uncertainty in knowing quite 
how AI will affect employment. There is also a 
broader question of how AI technologies can 
provide scope to revalue and reshape ideas 
on a meaningful recreational life. Australia and 
New Zealand will nonetheless need to prepare 
for the potential of widespread economic 
and social change. The most pressing need 
will be to focus on the types of employment 
most vulnerable to change in order to help 
facilitate retraining and income support. It 
may also be necessary to consider whether 
current work regulations need to be modified 
to anticipate and respond to challenges in 
the restructuring of employment tasks. These 
changes may also require a new workforce 
to create, maintain and monitor AI systems, 
as well as techniques for data curation and 
management. There may be a role for industry, 
governments and professional bodies to assist 
in this transition and collaborate to address 
potential issues associated with reskilling and 
upskilling of individuals as well as analyse 
the skills required for the future workforce. 
To this end, New Zealand has created a Future 
of Work Tripartite Forum and a New Zealand 
Digital Skills Forum (Digital Skills Forum, 2018; 
Robertson, 2018).
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3.2 Employment and 
the workforce
3.2.1 Automation and the workforce
Contemporary debates about the 
transformative impacts of AI are often 
based on an arguably limited conception of 
autonomy, in which technologies are seen 
to be in conflict or harmony with human 
autonomy. This conception of autonomy 
informs not only the public response to AI, 
but also researchers in the field and those 
who design public policies and implement 
corporate strategies involving AI (Natale and 
Ballatore, 2017).
Recently, understanding of autonomy 
in relation to AI and robotics has shifted 
away from that of an independent agency 
towards a new model in which agency is 
understood as an emergent relationship. 
Ekbia, Nardi and Sabanovic (2015), for 
example, differentiate between automated 
and heteromated systems. Put simply, where 
automated systems are designed to shift 
some or many tasks performed by humans to 
machines, heteromated systems (e.g. Upwork, 
InnoCentive, Freelancer, Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk and other microwork or crowdsourcing 
applications) are designed to work by 
incorporating end users as indispensable 
system mediators.
By conceptualising autonomy as an emergent 
relationship, we can reframe the AI debate 
from one where humans are being displaced 
by robots to one where humans might play a 
more active role in moderating AI systems in 
their lives and work. Boyd and Holton (2017) 
stress the importance of critically evaluating 
the range of discourses about technological 
change because such discourses can 
constitute and direct or redirect change. 
Shifting the discursive frame of debate in this 
way enables AI and ML to be more closely 
aligned with ongoing processes of social 
learning and literacy regarding the adoption 
of new technologies (Stilgoe, 2018).
Recent economic modelling on the 
Queensland workforce suggests, based on 
conservative growth, that 250,000 more jobs 
will be created with a A$37.4 billion boost 
to the gross state product from the robotic 
and automation economy. Further, growth 
of the robotic and automation economy is 
predicted to generate three work categories: 
people who work for machines; people 
who work with machines; and people who 
work on machines (Synergies Economic 
Consulting, 2018).
Should the adoption of AI lead to a decrease 
in required working hours, this too could 
lead to benefits for both employers and 
employees. The four day work week has 
previously attracted attention with benefits 
including increased productivity, reduced 
worker stress, reduced strain on transport 
systems, a more equitable domestic division 
of labour and the potential to redistribute 
income across the economy (Jones, 
2017). The four day work week has been 
associated with an emerging trend within the 
Netherlands, Germany and has been trialled 
in New Zealand. 
Uncertainty remains as to the ultimate impact 
of AI on the workforce and, undoubtedly, 
many of the applications and associated 
effects of AI cannot be adequately foreseen 
at present. Should AI eventuate in workplace 
disruption that negatively impacts on certain 
populations, it will be necessary to investigate 
the ways in which these impacts may be 
ameliorated. 
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3.2.2 Productivity and changing 
employment
It is important to consider the implications 
of AI for ensuring employee satisfaction, 
autonomy and productivity in the workplace. 
As mentioned in 3.1.1, while the eradication 
of jobs and the associated need for people 
to reskill are important issues to consider, 
it is usually tasks that are automated, rather 
than whole occupations (Chui, Manyika and 
Miremadi, 2016). Tasks exist within a broader 
occupation or role, alongside many other 
duties that might escape automation. To 
take one example, precision medicine may 
be transformed by the application of ML to 
genomics, clinical imaging, and radiotherapy 
(Mesko, 2017). But this does not replace 
physicians, surgeons, medical scientists and 
researchers who are tasked with decisions 
involving interpretation, therapeutic 
intervention and professional responsibility.
This raises critical questions about how 
automated tasks fit within wider work roles, 
and within the whole system of work. For 
example, how might tasks be effectively 
shared between humans and machines? 
How do human workers interact with the 
technology and shape it to achieve their 
goals? How can people and machines best 
coordinate their activities, or work as a team, 
to achieve the overall goals and objectives of 
the workplace? These questions need to be 
considered alongside the wider implications 
of digital technologies that are transforming 
business models, where and when people 
work, the costs of production and many other 
aspects of work (Cascio and Montealegre, 
2016).
A key concept through which to consider 
the impact of AI on employment is that of 
work design. Work design is concerned with 
the physical, cognitive, biomechanical, and 
social aspects of tasks involved in any work 
role (Parker, 2014; Safe Work Australia, 2015). 
Positive aspects of work design include 
providing employees with autonomy over 
work timing, methods, and decisions; a variety 
of tasks; the opportunity to make a difference 
or have an impact; job feedback; the chance 
for social contact and support; and moderate 
or reasonable levels of job demands (e.g. work 
load, emotional demands, and time pressure). 
While work design research has long 
advocated for the need to consider human 
and technological issues together (see for 
example Clegg, 2000), scholars have called 
for renewed focus on how new technologies 
effect, and are effected by, work design (see 
for example Parker, Van den Broeck and 
Holman, 2017). For example, there is often 
a focus on replacing or automating human 
labour with new technologies, with ‘leftover’ 
tasks being allocated to people. Such an 
approach can result in poor work designs, 
with negative consequences for employee 
health, wellbeing, safety and productivity 
(Grote and Kochan, 2018). Rather than 
focusing on replacing human labour with 
AI and other automated technologies, it is 
important to consider how work systems 
operate as a whole, including the various 
tasks, responsibilities, and relationships 
that might elude automation. This means 
considering not only how existing skillsets 
need to change to fit new technologies, but 
also how new technologies can be designed, 
implemented, and managed to fit workers and 
organisational systems. 
In preparing for an AI-enabled future of 
work, employers may need to consider 
which tasks and decisions should and should 
not be carried out by AI, as well as how to 
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Figure 6: The effect of automation on work
Adapted from: AlphaBeta, 2017.
Box 13: Australia’s future workforce
In 2016, drawing on economic statistics from 
Australia, Google Australia commissioned 
AlphaBeta to provide an empirical view of the 
current state of automation in Australia and 
its effect on the workforce. The industry report 
suggests that from 2000-2015 the average 
Australian worker experienced two hours of 
automation for routine and predictable tasks, 
both physical and intellectual, across their 
working week. 
The report estimates that automation is set to 
increase and by 2030 another two hours will 
be automated each working week (Figure 6). 
According to the report, this might allow 
workers to spend their time on higher-value 
activities (Figure 7) with an estimated boost to 
the Australian economy of A$1.2 trillion over 
2015-30 (AlphaBeta, 2017). Tasks that have 
proved more resilient to automation include 
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Notes: Assumes a full-time worker works 40 hours per week, figures rounded to nearest hour.
1 Unweighted average of ANSZSCO 1 digit code used to estimate manager timeshares (excluding farmers and CEOs).
2 Example based on high-school teacher.
Source: ABS, O*NET, AlphaBeta analysis.
Figure 7: The effect of automation on the workforce
Adapted from: AlphaBeta, 2017.
creativity, and synthesis of information from 
multiple sources and a degree of qualitative 
judgement.
The report estimates that 3.5 million 
Australian workers are at high-risk of being 
displaced by automation between 2015 and 
2030. Workers who perform a large share of 
automatable tasks may need support to find 
new ways of working, either in the same jobs 
or in new ones. With an additional 6.2 million 
people projected to join the Australian 
workforce by 2030, the report suggests that 
Australia will need to adequately prepare its 
future workers for automation. 
However, this domain is very difficult to 
model, and that the effects of increased 
automation are likely to be unevenly spread. 
Further insights in this area are required 
from academic experts and independent 
organisations.
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3.2.2.1 Digital technologies and the quality 
of work design
There are many anecdotal examples of how 
AI can positively affect work, such as using 
chatbots to remove uninteresting and routine 
work (see Mesiter, 2018). Research on older 
technologies likewise supports the idea that 
technology can improve work design, such 
as electronic monitoring systems that enable 
people to monitor and improve their own 
productivity (Osman, 2010), and that this 
technology enhances job autonomy because 
greater information availability decentralises 
power and supports localised decision making 
(Davenport and Short, 1990).
However, there can also be negative 
consequences for work design, which affect 
the health, well-being, and performance of 
workers. New technologies can, for example, 
result in reduced work agency and deskilling. 
As an example, Eriksson-Zetterquist et al. 
(2009) describe how new global purchasing 
technologies radically altered the roles of 
purchasers in a Scandinavian automotive 
company. Where purchasers once had a 
high level of responsibility, autonomy, social 
contact, and a strong professional identity, 
the introduction of new technologies created 
an environment where purchasers mainly 
followed standard operating procedures with 
reduced need for skills, yet also experienced 
increased bureaucracy and workload. 
Likewise, electronic monitoring systems 
can result in excess surveillance, invasion 
of privacy and reduced job autonomy. As 
a consequence, employees can sometimes 
experience high levels of stress, fail to comply 
with organisational rules or engage in deviant 
behaviours (Alge and Hansen, 2014).
In theory, allocating tasks to AI technologies 
should leave operators free to do other tasks, 
but it can also create social, cognitive, or 
biomechanical problems. These might include 
decreased situation awareness; distrust of 
automation; misuse, abuse, or disuse of the 
machines; complacency; reduced vigilance; 
impaired performance; and erosion of skillsets 
(Redden, Elliott and Barnes, 2014; Grote and 
Kochan, 2018). 
3.2.2.2 The effect of new technologies on work 
design and outcomes
There are many factors affecting the design 
of work such as national institutional regimes, 
employment policies, organisational culture 
and local leadership (Parker, Van den Broeck 
and Holman, 2017). These factors can also 
shape the impact of technology on work 
design. For example, in the specific area of 
computer-based monitoring, one study (Alge 
and Hansen, 2014) shows that the effects of 
electronic monitoring systems tend to be 
negative, resulting in reduced job autonomy, 
greater demands and higher stress. However, 
when the organisational culture is a highly 
supportive one, employees are more likely to 
be involved in the design of the monitoring 
system. This means that the focus is on 
fostering employee development, resulting 
in employees regarding the system as fairer 
and less stressful. Other factors, such as how 
the data are collected and their accuracy, also 
shape how employees perceive and react to 
monitoring systems.
3.2.2.3 Tasks and decisions carried out by AI 
or machines
AI technologies can assist workers in 
performing their tasks and in making 
decisions, but may be considered ineffective 
or inappropriate for certain tasks. For example, 
big data analysis can be used to simplify 
personnel selection, but it is unlikely to be 
a good substitute for leadership functions 
(such as inspiring employees), nor some of 
the other highly complex and cognitively 
demanding tasks in managerial jobs (Cascio 
and Montealegre, 2016). Moreover, AI may 
exacerbate existing human demographic 
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biases in who performs which jobs, as 
seen with Amazon’s recruitment tool that 
contained gendered bias (Dastin, 2018). 
However, if the algorithms are developed 
without bias and the underlying data is 
inclusive, AI holds the potential to be less 
biased than humans.
Likewise, there is the question of when 
algorithms should replace human judgement, 
and when they should not. For example, in 
the discussion of the use of algorithms in 
financial decision making, Bhidé (2010) argues 
that ‘predictions of human activity based 
on statistical patterns are dangerous when 
used as a substitute for careful case-by-case 
judgment’. Bhidé describes how financial 
decisions are replaced by the ‘robotization 
of credit’, which can result in poor decisions 
(see also Alam and Kendall, 2017). In an ideal 
scenario, an AI system could provide data 
analysis, learn from its mistakes and provide 
feedback, while leaving the ultimate decision 
to a human agent. 
3.2.2.4 Workers adapting, shaping and using 
AI technologies
Workers can use technologies in ways 
not anticipated by designers. One reason 
for this is that workers often do not trust 
the technology and hence do not use it 
effectively. If workers are to interact effectively 
with robots, for example, they need to trust 
the robots, communicate effectively with 
them and coordinate their actions with them. 
Research shows that the level of trust in AI is 
affected by factors such as the transparency of 
algorithms (Dietvorst, Simmons and Massey, 
2016), having positive experiences with AI 
(Alan et al., 2014) and the responsiveness of 
the technology to humans (Bickmore, Pfeifer 
and Schulman, 2011). The degree to which 
workers have control over the technology 
can also shape their interactions with it. 
Attention needs to be given to how workers 
and machines coordinate their activities and 
work holistically as a team (Redden, Elliott and 
Barnes, 2014). 
3.2.2.5 Summary – Productivity and changing 
employment
The adoption of AI will present both potential 
opportunities and risks to the workforce. 
On one hand, AI may assist with tasks and 
workplace shortages, and on the other hand 
it may replace tasks. The debate over AI 
and the future of work is not simply one of 
conflicting interpretations and arguments, it 
is one deeply immersed in the organisational 
structures and politics of our institutions. 
Employees have needed to adapt not only 
to the increasing presence of AI systems 
and technologies in workplaces, but also 
to the various power struggles within their 
organisations regarding the opportunities and 
challenges of AI. These power struggles are 
often determined by whether CEOs, directors 
and managers take optimistic, sceptical or 
balanced standpoints when it comes to 
adopting AI systems and technologies. 
The question, then, is how businesses 
and industries will be led, organised and 
resourced in the age of AI, especially once 
it becomes clear that companies will need 
to adopt AI to remain competitive. Since no 
one organisational structure or management 
policy can accommodate the complexity 
of interpretations from optimists and 
sceptics, organisations will need guidance 
on how to make effective decisions about 
the automation of tasks and work roles. 
Individuals or groups who make decisions 
about work design such as, for example, 
managers, human resource personnel, 
consultants and IT staff, may benefit from 
specific education and training about 
effective work design.
 
While the potential for change is often 
discussed within a variety of industries, 
occupations in human centred, health and 
helping sectors – particularly psychology 
– are frequently portrayed as immune to 
automation (see for example, Frey and 
Osborne, 2013; Susskind and Susskind, 2015; 
Reese, 2018). However, recent developments 
in automated therapy technologies are 
already changing the job characteristics 
of the psychologist. 
A clinical psychologist is an expert in the 
analysis and understanding of the causes 
and consequences of human and animal 
behaviour. The job specification for a 
professional psychologist essentially specifies 
four tasks, whatever the area of specialisation 
(clinical, organisation, forensic, sport etc.). 
These are to assess the state of the client; to 
formulate hypotheses that account for causal 
relationships between observations and the 
behavioural, social, and economic outcomes 
that were the primary reason for the client 
contacting the professional; to propose an 
intervention in those causal relationships; and 
to evaluate the outcomes of said intervention. 
Each of these areas – assessment, formulation, 
intervention, and evaluation – may be 
influenced or even replaced by automated 
procedures in the following ways:
Assessment. Over 60 years ago, Meehl (1954) 
demonstrated that statistical aggregation 
of assessment (tests or observations) was 
virtually always superior to aggregation by 
the clinician. This demonstration has been 
successively supported (see for example 
Dawes, 1994). The development of computer-
aided tests has increasingly supplanted the 
provision of assessment by clinicians. The use 
of computerised assessment reduces the cost 
and time of assessment and may increase 
the accuracy of results (Kratochwill, Doll and 
Dickson, 1991; Nezami and Butcher, 2000). 
Computer based monitoring, including facial 
recognition, can be used to assess emotional 
changes in the client while being assessed, 
superior to many judgments made by 
clinicians. AI has been successfully developed 
to identify and recognise microexpressions 
– a task which otherwise involves advanced 
sensory and cognitive skills in addition to 
specialised training (Li et al., 2015). 
Formulation. The tacit knowledge or 
intuition traditionally regarded as necessary in 
the development of hypotheses of cause and 
effect can be seen as resulting from training 
in uncontrolled environments wherein there 
are uncertain relationships between cues 
and decisions. These uncertain relationships 
can be identified and the clinician trained to 
make more predictable links (Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009). Machines can also generalise 
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Box 14: Changing employment.  
A case study on AI and the impact on psychologists
to previously unseen cases and generate 
‘probably almost correct’ responses to novel 
patterns, superior to the human operator. It 
is conceivable, therefore, that AI systems can 
automate intuition (see for example Morrison, 
Innes, & Morrison, 2017).
Intervention. With the increasing dominance 
of cognitive behaviour therapy in psychology, 
the relationship between the therapist 
and the client – previously regarded as 
important – has been downplayed. As a 
result, the therapeutic technique has become 
somewhat divorced from the therapist-patient 
relationship. Conceivably, this renders certain 
aspects of the psychologist’s role – such as 
cognitive understanding required to identify 
and diagnose a psychological problem – 
susceptible to automation (see for example 
Innes & Bennett, 2010).
Evaluation. Evaluation of an intervention 
can be computer-based. This eliminates 
the unconscious biases often present when 
clinicians make judgments (see for example 
Lilienfeld et al., 2014).
The automation of assessment, formulation, 
intervention, and evaluation in clinical practice 
is in progress (Kamel Boulos et al., 2014; 
Innes and Morrison, 2017; Michie et al., 2017). 
Compared to human psychologists, AI systems 
can potentially perform these tasks with less 
bias, fewer computational and procedural 
errors and with no burn-out and fatigue.
However, if these aspects of psychology are 
subject to automation, many psychologists 
will still be required to develop psychological 
theory and methodology. Previously, the 
outcomes of computerised assessments were 
found to be useful only when utilised by a 
professional with adequate training (Nezami 
and Butcher, 2000). Psychologists of particular 
skill and insight may still be required. 
However, these will be a small proportion of 
those presently employed in Australia and 
New Zealand. 
This also creates implications for the 
education system. Psychology is the second 
largest undergraduate program in Australian 
universities. While not all students studying 
psychology wish to become professional 
psychologists, many of them do. Therefore, 
the implications for the future training of 
psychologists are significant (Kennedy and 
Innes, 2005; Innes and Bennett, 2010), not only 
at postgraduate but at undergraduate levels.
There are other views of the factors that will 
affect the development of AI in forms that 
will affect the delivery of human services 
(see for example Aoun, 2017) but they do not 
address the fact that the model adopted in 
psychology is based upon the development 
of a technologically compatible structure that 




Australia and New Zealand’s ageing 
population could present challenges to the 
overall supply of labour due to a decrease in 
workforce numbers (Brown and Guttmann, 
2017). While migration and increased 
female workforce participation has thus 
far counteracted the reduction in labour 
supply encountered, the overall proportion 
of the ageing population is anticipated to 
significantly accelerate. By 2044, it is expected 
that one in four Australians will be aged 65 
and over. The anticipated workforce reduction 
raises additional concerns including the 
capacity to provide public services and 
healthcare for an increasingly large portion 
of the population. However, AI technologies 
could potentially assist in replacing labour 
shortages. This is not a situation unique 
to Australia or New Zealand; the Japanese 
workforce has already encountered significant 
decline in workforce participation as result 
of a decreasing and ageing population 
(Schneider, Hong and Le, 2018). Japanese 
firms experiencing labour shortages, including 
the Japanese construction industry, have 
developed and adopted AI technologies with 
the view to counter these adverse effects. 
In this way, AI may provide opportunities 
to support declines in labour supply and 
productivity for some sectors. 
3.2.4 Changing centres 
of employment
Developments in digital technology 
have, in some instances, resulted in 
increased urbanisation and reductions in 
the populations of smaller cities (see for 
example Porter, 2017). Transformations in the 
workplace enabled by AI may make remote 
working more attractive and more feasible. 
Physical co-location of workers may not be 
required for many employment roles. Given 
Australia’s size, this fact may be particularly 
advantageous. People may choose to work 
far from the physical location (if any) of their 
workplace. Conversely, given technological 
developments and the use of AI systems, 
workplaces need not be located in the major 
cities in order to attract the most talented 
employees. This could have important 
implications for smaller centres and rural 
areas, leading to a renewed source of income 
and the reversal of population reductions. 
However, if these promises are to be realised, 
an appropriate high bandwidth infrastructure 
is required (see Chapter 2). 
3.3 Education, skills 
and training
In January 2018, the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation aired The AI Race (ABC, 2018) 
which presented data from a study into the 
risks to Australian jobs from AI-powered 
automation (AlphaBeta, 2017). Various jobs 
were explored from truck driving to law and 
few people felt well-prepared for the broad 
take-up of AI. Regardless of whether AI’s 
transformative opportunities and impacts 
are perceived or actual, it is important that 
citizens feel prepared and informed to live, 
work, and interact with AI technologies. One 
of the challenges is to identify exactly what 
this process of education and training at all 
levels will involve in terms of skills, abilities, 
competencies, behaviours and knowledge. 
The following sections explore these 
challenges. 
3.3.1 Agile and transferrable 
skills. What are the skills and 
knowledge we need to foster?
A recent UK publication provided a detailed 
analysis of how future employment is likely 
to change, and identified the implications of 
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these changes for skills (Bakhshi et al., 2017). 
While the analysis focused on the US and 
the UK, the report provided insights of value 
to countries across the globe. The analysis 
suggested, for example, that in education, 
healthcare, and the wider public sector, roles 
and jobs are likely to increase in number and 
importance. However, some low-skilled jobs, 
such as those in construction and agriculture, 
are likely to be impacted. 
The report identified the skills that are likely to 
be in greater demand in the future, including 
interpersonal skills, higher-order cognitive 
skills (such as originality and critical thinking) 
and learning strategies, namely the ability 
to set goals, ask appropriate questions, and 
take feedback into account as knowledge is 
applied meaningfully in a variety of contexts. 
The results confirmed the future importance 
of what are often referred to as 21st century 
skills, particularly interpersonal competencies 
– a finding that is consistent with those from 
other writers (see for example Tett, 2017) 
and reports (see for example the World 
Economic Forum and Boston Consulting 
Group’s 2015 report on 21st century skills, and 
a similar report by Trilling and Fadel, 2012). 
Additionally, as AI technologies deliver new 
scope for prediction, there is increased need 
for human judgement to determine the best 
ways in which to action AI powered prediction 
(Agrawal, 2018; Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb, 
2018).
Some scholars suggest that a more future 
proof and appropriate approach to education 
and training – especially in terms of preparing 
for an AI-enabled future – is to focus on the 
notion of an ‘interwoven intelligence’ as the 
basis of an intelligence-based curriculum 
(see for example Luckin, 2018). Interwoven 
intelligence refers not only to academic 
and social intelligence, but also ‘meta-
intelligence’, that is, the ability to develop 
an understanding of what knowledge is 
in different contexts. Currently, AI systems 
and technologies are limited to performing 
academic intelligence, but struggle when 
it comes to elements of meta-intelligence. 
As such, it may be useful to design and 
implement education systems based on a 
more ‘interwoven’ conception of intelligence.
3.3.2 The future of education
There are three core questions to consider 
in relation to AI’s impact on the future of 
education and how Australia and New 
Zealand can ensure that students are well 
equipped with the sort of skills that will be 
valuable in an AI-enabled world: firstly, how 
can AI systems and technologies be used to 
augment education and learning; secondly, 
how can students receive adequate guidance 
and support when it comes to developing 
skills in AI development; and finally, how can 
we educate people about AI, so that they 
can make informed decisions about how 
and when to interact with AI systems and 
technologies? 
There are several examples of AI systems that 
can teach well-defined subject areas, such as 
those that are routinely part of the science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) curriculum. These systems can help 
learners build an understanding of the 
core principles of STEM education. Some 
AI systems provide individualised tutoring 
by continually assessing student progress. 
There are companies developing culture-
learning and language-learning AI systems 
that specialise in experiential digital learning 
driven by virtual roleplay. Many of these 
technologies can be used by educators to 
augment and enhance a more traditional 
learning experience. If AI-based learning 
tools begin to displace some aspects of 
teaching, it will be important for teachers 
to focus on areas of knowledge acquisition 
and learning where AI is ineffective, such as 
meta-intelligence. 
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Box 15: AI for special educational needs
too dangerous or unpleasant for learners. 
For example, FearNot, a school-based 
intelligent virtual environment, presents 
bullying incidents in the form of a virtual 
drama. Learners, who have been victims of 
bullying, play the role of an invisible friend to 
a character in the drama who is bullied. The 
learner offers the character advice about how 
to behave between episodes in the drama 
and, in so doing, explores bullying issues and 
effective coping strategies. 
AI can also help EdTech applications be more 
flexible through, for example, deployment 
online, meaning that they can be available 
on personal and portable devices within, and 
beyond, formal educational settings. The way 
that AI enables technology to be personalised 
to the needs of a learner can also make it 
beneficial for learners with special educational 
needs. 
AI is being used by researchers at Athabasca 
University in Canada with students who 
have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). The goal of this work is to develop 
an AI-in-education system that detects 
ADHD earlier than current models, improves 
the quality of diagnosis of ADHD, educates 
instructors about methods that are effective 
for teaching students with ADHD, measures 
competency improvements and challenges 
of ADHD students and encourages ADHD 
students to study in an environment filled 
with anthropomorphic pedagogical agents. 
There are many potential benefits of applying 
AI to the education of special educational 
needs and disability students. For example, 
natural language processing to enable the 
development of voice activated interfaces 
can help students with physical disabilities 
who are restricted in their use of other input 
devices, such as keyboards. 
The combination of AI and other 
technologies, such as virtual and augmented 
reality, can help students with physical and 
learning disabilities to engage with virtual 
environments and take part in activities that 
would be difficult for them in the real-world. 
Virtual reality becomes ‘intelligent’ when it 
is augmented with AI technology. AI might 
be used simply to enhance the virtual world, 
giving it the ability to interact with, and 
respond to, the user’s actions in ways that 
feel more natural. Alternatively, AI might 
also be integrated into intelligent tutoring 
systems to provide intelligent support and 
guidance to ensure that the learner engages 
with the intended learning objectives without 
becoming confused or overwhelmed. 
Virtual pedagogical agents might also 
be included, acting as teachers, learning 
facilitators, or student peers in collaborative 
learning quests. These agents might provide 
alternative perspectives, ask questions, and 
give individualised feedback. In addition, 
intelligent synthetic characters in virtual 
worlds can play roles in settings that are 
The growth of AI development will depend 
on students with relevant post-secondary 
training in STEM, particularly mathematics. 
AI technologies may be used to support 
more engaging educational experiences by 
which to foster interest in STEM education 
(Rexford and Kirkland, 2018). Given that AI 
systems in the future may ‘learn’ to code parts 
of themselves, education in these areas may 
focus more on aspects of interaction design 
rather than writing computer code. STEM 
education across all levels could incorporate 
training on ethics, human rights and inclusive 
design to assist in the development of 
equitable AI technologies. 
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subjects. HASS education equips students 
with expertise in 21st century skills such as 
communication, creativity and the social 
implications of technological developments. 
Graduates with expertise in gender and race, 
for example, may provide guidance on how 
AI researchers can develop equitable and 
non-biased AI techniques and interfaces. 
HASS graduates may also provide insight 
on how AI technologies affect recreational 
and leisure time, as well as their potential 
for uptake in arts and cultural industries, 
including important areas of the creative 
and cultural economy such as galleries and 
museums, entertainment (including screen, 
cinema and videogame development) and 
sport. To ensure a workforce that is cognisant 
of the implications of AI technologies, 
incorporating specific HASS subjects such as 
ethics and human rights into AI education 
and training programs should provide 
graduates with important all-round skills and 
expertise for AI development, application 
and use. Equally, HASS students should be 
exposed to digital and data literacy programs. 
Indeed, an increasing number of researchers 
in the humanities and social sciences are 
working at the interface of technology and 
culture. Future AI developers will need to 
communicate with, and develop proficiency 
in, legal, ethical, and philosophical frameworks 
that ensure AI systems are accessible, 
unbiased, and socially accounted for. As noted 
elsewhere in this report, this will not entail 
a wholesale reframing of existing regulatory 
systems; but rather a process of applying 
existing ethical and legal frameworks to 
AI and adjusting those frameworks where 
necessary. 
The different roles and tasks that the future 
of AI will present may require a range of 
complimentary educational offerings, 
including interdisciplinary programs and 
programs that connect with industry. 
More broadly, if strengthening in AI 
development and the future workforce is to 
be bolstered, there will be a need to address 
clear gender disparities across STEM and 
humanities, arts and social sciences (HASS) 
education and participation. For example, 
women make up only 16 percent of Australia’s 
STEM fields (Office of the Chief Scientist, 
2016). Low rates of female participation 
in STEM fields could result in a deepening 
of gender inequalities as AI continues to 
emerge. Indeed, should STEM emerge as a 
preferenced knowledge and skill set, women 
may be prevented from accessing higher paid 
occupations requiring these skills. Initiatives 
aimed at encouraging and increasing gender 
diversity in STEM, such as Code like a Girl, Girls 
in STEM toolkit, Superstars of STEM and the 
Women in STEM decadal plan, are important 
advancements in this area and will play a 
crucial role in furthering the representation 
of women in AI development and 
application. Gender diversity is an important 
element of the design, development, and 
implementation of AI technologies to ensure 
inclusive design and equity of workforce 
representation. For example, a recently 
developed artificial heart was physically 
compatible for 86 percent of men but only 
20 percent of women; while smaller versions 
will subsequently be designed for women, 
inclusive design from the outset would 
have helped mitigate the issue (Huet, 2013). 
Effective inclusion of women in the AI industry 
will require increased female participation in 
conjunction with efforts to combat workplace 
discrimination. 
Additionally, there are similar patterns 
of gender inequality in AI-related HASS 
fields such as philosophy and ethics, and 
initiatives to increase female participation in 
HASS will be equally important. Alongside 
strengthening STEM training, there should 
be a focus on educating students in HASS 
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In 2017, the Australian National University 
announced a 10-year plan to drive expansion 
of its program in engineering and computer 
science, including the establishment of 
the Autonomy, Agency and Assurance (3A) 
Institute. The 3A Institute has initiated a 
research agenda to build a new body of 
knowledge for that will apply scientific 
principles and interdisciplinary practices 
through a pragmatic lens to consider 
the full spectrum of benefits and harms 
presented by technology for the betterment 
of humanity. Further, programs such as 
Swinburne University of Technology’s 
Factory of the Future provide examples of 
industry-based learning to practitioners, in 
this case, for the advanced manufacturing 
sector. Internationally, there has also been a 
recent surge in new ethics courses for AI and 
autonomous systems from academia and 
industry (Pretz, 2018; Singer, 2018). 
AI specialists often do not necessarily possess 
sector or industry specific knowledge in areas 
where AI can be applied (such as agriculture, 
energy, health and mining). Similarly, those in 
specific sectors do not necessarily have the 
technical knowledge to apply AI to their area. 
Education and training programs may help 
to address this gap by offering technology-
related subjects. MIT recently announced 
a US$1 billion investment in an AI college 
that equips students from a diverse range 
of disciplines such as chemistry, biology, 
physics, history, politics and linguistics to 
with the knowledge and expertise to apply 
AI and ML techniques to their disciplines. The 
college will also place an emphasis on ethical 
considerations relevant to AI (Vincent, 2018). 
As briefly mentioned in Section 2.4, university 
programs to bridge this gap are emerging, 
however, in order to be effective, there needs 
to be a cohesive and cogent approach across 
these initiatives. This is discussed in further 
detail as it applies to the research sector in 
Section 3.3.5.1.
To assist society in understanding AI 
technologies and applications, there will 
also be a need to develop and implement 
initiatives that provide all individuals with 
the opportunity to develop basic literacies in 
how AI systems and technologies function. 
This may involve establishing what AI can 
and cannot achieve, as well as what society 
can and should expect from AI. This will 
be important for ensuring not only that all 
citizens are able to take full advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by the broad take-
up of AI, but also that they understand the 
potential implications and risks associated 
with using AI systems (e.g. consenting to 
data collection). One possible means through 
which to achieve this educational benchmark 
will be public communication initiatives and 
also through ‘micro credentialing’, which refers 
to mini-qualifications obtained online through 
tertiary and job training institutions. 
3.3.3 Micro credentials
Micro-credentialing is a way of certifying 
learning outcomes within an institution 
through online education platforms. Massive 
open online courses (MOOCs) such as 
Coursera often use micro-credentials to 
demonstrate a student’s achievements with 
mini-qualifications in specific subject areas 
and capabilities. Given that micro-credentials 
are typically certified through online 
platforms, it is possible that AI systems and 
automation could play a role in their future. 
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous 
section, micro-credentials may be useful 
for people who require basic education 
and literacy in AI techniques and processes, 
so that they can effectively integrate AI 
technologies into their lives. 
For micro-credentials to work well and 
maintain their value, there needs to be 
a healthy ecosystem of use, where there 
are employers and networks looking for 
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competence-based skills, an easily updatable 
credentialing system, and students who want to 
gain the credentials. Without this ecosystem it 
is hard for the credentials to have an extended 
life. Blockchain technology offers support 
here. For example, Open Source University is 
using blockchain technology to enable the 
permanency of credentials and to ensure privacy 
and security. Future education platforms may 
provide virtual tokens as an incentive to increase 
learners’ motivation and reduce digital course 
dropout rates.
Micro-credentialing is also a way of certifying 
personalised learning and peer review to achieve 
an educational certification. For example, Digital 
Promise in the US has launched a scheme of 
micro-credentialing for educators to provide 
competency-based recognition of the skills 
they learn throughout their careers. Once an 
educator has selected the micro-credentials 
they want to earn, they collate the evidence 
required and submit it via an online platform. 
An expert reviewer or educator who has already 
earned the related micro-credential will review 
the evidence, and if successful, the educator will 
be awarded the micro-credential in the form of 
a digital badge (Figure 8) (Digital Promise, 2018). 
AI can be used to identify skill gaps for people 
in the employment market (e.g. IBM’s Watson 
Career Coach). Such AI systems can estimate 
the cost to retrain, overcome gaps and suggest 
learning pathways for individual development. 
Digital badges are granular, verifiable records 
of achievement and can be thought of as a 
micro-credential. They offer a mechanism for 
valuing skills gained outside formal learning 
contexts. Learning management systems such 
as Blackboard, Moodle and Canvas have piloted 
the use of badges in many disciplines and levels. 
Open Badges go one step further, allowing 
skills, interests and achievements to be verified 
by attaching information to the badge image 
file, hard-coding metadata for future access 
and review.
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Figure 8: An overview of the badge system process
Adapted from: West & Lockley, 2016.
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3.3.4 Vocational training and lifelong learning
companies such as Alibaba and Amazon 
make extensive use of AI to better understand 
consumer preferences and habits, as a way 
of streamlining productivity and targeting 
consumer tendencies. These sectors are 
The sectors currently most impacted by AI 
are, perhaps unsurprisingly, those where 
significant revenue has been invested 
in AI technologies. Arguably, the sector 
most benefitting from AI is retail. Platform 
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often premised on the need to process 
large amounts of data to identify patterns 
and relationships. Other examples include 
processing patient and treatment data for 
medical diagnosis, finding specific information 
from millions of documents in the legal 
profession, and recognising the identity of 
a person and their right to enter a country. 
Vocational education is generally not well 
financed and has not seen significant 
investment in AI technology. However, the 
Industry 4.0 Higher Apprenticeship Program 
is an initiative supported by the Australian 
Government through the Skilling Australia’s 
Fund, which seeks to train technicians to a 
higher skill level in the areas of the Internet 
of Things, automation and robotics, cloud 
computing, smart sensors and advanced 
algorithms. AI technology that is being 
developed for the school and university 
sector may in some cases be appropriate 
for vocational education. Examples include 
recommender systems such as ‘Filtered’, which 
is being used by companies for employee 
training to help make best use of existing 
company training materials, and specialist 
training such as that provided to the US 
armed forces by ‘Alelo’, which uses virtual 
roleplay simulations to teach aspects of 
culture, languages and interacting with locals 
(Alelo, 2018; Filtered, 2018). 
Schools, the vocational education and 
training (VET ) sector and universities should 
encourage broad-based skills and training 
beyond credentialing people for employment. 
Negotiation skills, creativity and critical 
thinking are human attributes that are resistant 
to automation and have the capacity to be 
cultivated. Education on ethics, social sciences 
and the humanities could be promoted with 
the view to strengthen democracy, develop 
ethical AI, and generate the new forms of 
governance that will be necessary to manage 
the impacts of automation on society, the 
economy and culture. 
3.3.5 Next generation 
of AI researchers
A report commissioned by the Australian 
Computer Society suggests that there are 
shortages of workers in all areas of IT in 
Australia. The report states that ‘demand for 
ICT workers is set to grow by almost 100,000 to 
758,700 workers by 2023’ but ‘with fewer 
than 5,000 domestic ICT graduates a year, the 
only way we’ll reach workforce targets is by 
importing labour, much as we’ve done for the 
past five years’ (Deloitte Access Economics, 
2018: 34; 3). Australian universities also export 
ICT education, with over 8,500 international 
ICT student completions in 2016. 
AI technologies are being used primarily by 
banks and security companies to tackle risk and 
to improve fraud identification and by online 
companies to better match products with 
clients. However, over the next few years, AI 
technologies are expected to be more widely 
implemented in all industries, and in particular 
in manufacturing, retail and healthcare. There 
is likely to be an increasing demand for AI 
researchers and developers to support the 
development of applied AI technology across 
industry, government, and society.
The growth of AI technologies may also 
prompt researchers in areas such as IT 
and mathematics to engage with those in 
philosophy, law, and public policy. A key 
ethical question – and one that will be 
explored below – may involve working 
towards greater transparency of AI systems 
whose decision-making processes are 
currently obscured.
3.3.5.1 Research across disciplines
AI technologies may lead to significant 
changes in research practice in academic and 
industrial contexts. These changes will have 
varied effects depending on the discipline 
and area of research.
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Many STEM researchers are using ML systems 
to perform repetitive identification tasks such 
as smoothing noisy astronomical pictures of 
galaxies, searching for the right sequence of 
reactions to synthesise small organic molecules 
(e.g. drug compounds), using AI systems in 
genetics research to predict how genes affect 
the functioning of nearby genes and using 
image processing algorithms to automate 
counting similar objects in a natural setting. 
There are examples of AI techniques creating 
new research fields within a discipline. The 
data intensive field of precision medicine 
is creating a demand for research into AI 
systems for ML, advanced optimisation and 
searching techniques (Hodson, 2016). ACOLA’s 
report, The Future of Precision Medicine in 
Australia, investigates this topic. 
In humanities and social science research (and 
also some strands of STEM), natural language 
processing tools and methods such as analysis 
of text or language will enable researchers to 
sift through maintenance records, interview 
transcripts or meticulous records of human 
observations. This is likely to affect academic 
labour in these areas and create new avenues 
of research. 
While artificial creativity may be a longer-
term goal, it could be used in areas such as 
industrial design, architecture, engineering 
and art. There are claims that AI is poor at 
performing creative labour in these areas (see 
for example Rexford and Kirkland, 2018), but 
AI technologies are improving in some areas 
of creative work, such as sonnet writing, art 
and fashion design (see for example Downey, 
Box 16: AI in health education
The lack of easy access to health data 
makes it difficult for university students 
to develop health specific skills in AI. 
Researchers at institutions with established 
research programs in areas such as linked 
health data may take advantage of existing 
projects and funding to gain access to 
valuable data, though this type of training 
remains inaccessible to most students. As a 
consequence, motivated students may move 
to other areas of AI application or graduate 
without adequate training. It is possible for 
students to gain experience using datasets 
from other countries, such as the US, which 
can be easily downloaded free or at modest 
cost. This leads to lost opportunities, as 
Australia and New Zealand would have gained 
if these students trained and published using 
local population datasets.
As noted in Section 3.3.2, there is also a 
potential lack of domain knowledge across 
sectors. Developing applications of AI in 
health requires a keen understanding of 
human health, population health, human 
behaviour and the regulatory environment. 
Higher education in AI and data science tends 
to be generic, with little intersection with 
health. Closing this gap may be possible by 
developing a range of degree programs that 
are more specific to health and by facilitating 
interactions between students and industry by, 
for example, taking advantage of institutions 
such as CSIRO, programs such as the Australian 
Cooperative Research Centres, Industrial 
Transformation Training Centres, and initiatives 
such as those supported through Innovation 
and Science Australia and, in New Zealand, 
by Callaghan Innovation, New Zealand’s 
innovation agency. Industry partnerships 
could be incorporated into vocational, 
bachelor, masters and doctoral programs.
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2016). Indeed, in 2018, the first AI generated 
painting sold at auction for US$432,500, 
almost 45 times more than its estimated value 
(Christie’s, 2018). 
AI technologies will have broader effects on 
basic research practices and processes, such 
as the use of AI systems to conduct literature 
searches. AI systems may be used to automate 
certain aspects of the publishing or peer-
review process (see DeVoss, 2017). 
3.3.5.2 Changing the training of researchers 
and developers
Future AI researchers and developers will 
need to respond to ethical, disciplinary, 
social and legal challenges in their research 
and development aims and outcomes. To 
investigate, design and build systems, AI 
researchers and developers will need to 
be equipped with the skills to work with 
other discipline experts from fields such as 
software engineering, human-computer 
interaction (or interaction design), information 
systems, business, psychology, economics, 
politics, industrial relations, human resource 
management, law, human rights and ethics. 
• Ethics. Researchers and developers from 
all areas will need to be aware of ethical 
and human rights frameworks to ensure 
future AI technologies are transparent 
to inspection, predictable to those they 
govern, protect human rights, are robust 
against manipulation, and deployed in 
a context where we know who takes 
responsibility. Many IT degrees do not 
provide students with an education in 
ethical considerations. 
• Interdisciplinarity. AI researchers and 
developers will need to work with other 
discipline experts to investigate, develop, 
design, and build effective AI systems. 
Software engineers, for example, may 
need to work with philosophers and law 
experts to familiarise themselves with the 
relevant ethical protocols, while HASS 
researchers may need to collaborate with 
AI developers to create effective tools and 
systems for their research needs. 
• Social impact. AI researchers and 
developers will need to consider the 
social impact of their work – such as the 
implementation of AI technologies in 
certain areas of society or within certain 
social groups. Crucially, this will involve 
an acknowledgement of cultural diversity 
– in that AI technologies will need to be 
developed with a wide range of end users 
in mind. It will be important for AI research 
and development teams to develop 
strategies for attracting a diversity of 
experts and practitioners. 
• Legal compliance. Researchers and 
developers from all areas will need to 
consider the various policies and legal 
frameworks that are being introduced to 
regulate the use and implementation of AI 
technologies. For example, the European 
Union’s new General Data Protection 
Regulation legislation article 15 grants 
the data subject the right to ‘meaningful 
information about the logic involved and 
the envisaged consequences of such 
processing for the data subject when 
automated decision making is used’. We 
will need to equip students with skills 
to detect poor, malicious or dubious AI 
systems. 
Future research priorities for AI should include 
a broad and balanced interdisciplinary 
portfolio of projects that consider the full 
spectrum of opportunities and challenges 
likely to face society and the sector.
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are augmenting our identities in more 
indirect ways as well, such as receiving 
Amazon recommendations, requesting 
Uber, getting information from virtual 
personal assistants and talking with chatbots. 
Furthermore, AI systems are increasingly able 
to mimic or perform human-like functions. 
Examples include the ability of AI systems 
to communicate and interact with humans 
in a quasi-human manner (Reeves and Nass, 
1996; Zhao, 2006), to enter into states like 
‘sleep’ to pair with and complement user 
schedules (Hsu et al., 2017), and to engage in 
sexual activities and relationships with human 
partners (Cheok, Levy and Karunanayaka, 
2016). These technologies may rapidly enter 
into people’s lives in some contexts, but 
encounter cultural resistance in others.
Additionally, the notion that AI may lead to 
a ‘dispensing of the body’ may carry political 
connotations for certain disadvantaged 
groups. A person with a disability, for example, 
may already have extensive experience 
dealing with technologies that augment their 
everyday bodily routines. As such, we need to 
avoid universalising ‘the body’ and ‘identity’ to 
consider a diversity of embodied experiences, 
including how race, disability and gender 
intersects with AI design.
3.4.1 Childhood development
The vulnerability of children requires 
consideration in the use and application of 
AI. The impact of AI-enabled technologies 
on children – including play, cognitive 
development, socialisation and identity 
formation – is the subject of much debate. 
As has been the case with major technological 
developments throughout history, this 
debate is often split between optimistic 
and sceptical positions. 
3.4 AI and transformations of identity
We live in a world where identities 
are technologically mediated to an 
unprecedented level and where the 
boundaries between digital and off-line 
worlds are becoming increasingly blurred. 
Today, identity intersects with life mediated 
by chatbots, softbots, touchscreens, 
virtual landscapes, location tagging and 
augmented realities. The impact of AI here 
must be considered in a broader context 
of interconnected technological, genetic 
and informational developments that are 
reconfiguring identity. 
AI and related digital technologies are 
transforming what ‘identity’ and ‘the body’ 
mean. In addition to organ development 
technologies, 3D printers have been used in 
research to print living human embryonic stem 
cells (Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh), blood 
vessels (German Fraunhofer Institute), human 
skin (Lothar Koch of the Laser Centre Hannover 
in Germany) and even sheets of cardiac tissue 
that can ‘beat’ like a real heart (Cabor Forgacs, 
University of Missouri in Columbia). In the 
light of these developments, some have 
claimed that growing bio-organs (by printing 
them) will eventually replace the need for 
donor organ transplants. Like 3D printing, 
developments in AI are part of this broader 
transformation of identity. Craig Venter, one 
of the leaders who mapped the first draft 
sequence of the human genome in 2000, 
has been at the forefront of the digitisation 
of synthetic life. In 2010, Venter and his team 
produced the first synthetic organism by 
transplanting synthetic DNA into a vacant 
bacterial cell. For Venter, developments in 
synthetic life are only in their infancy. 
While such developments point to 
physiological crossovers between 
technologies and humans, AI technologies 
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An example of a sceptical position is Sherry 
Turkle’s (2012) Alone Together, which compares 
play with traditional toys to play with digital 
pets such as Furbies and Tamagotchis. For 
Turkle, traditional forms of childhood play 
involve the child animating the toy – investing 
the object with imagination – to establish an 
emotional relationship. By contrast, robotic 
toys and AI devices appear to children as if 
already animated and full of intentions of their 
own. Children may be particularly vulnerable 
to these changes because, according to 
Turkle (2012), ‘children need to be with other 
people to develop mutuality and empathy: 
interacting with a robot cannot teach these 
skills’. Moreover, many toys are now part of the 
Internet of Things, meaning that they can be 
used to collect and analyse data on children’s 
play practices, thereby ‘enrolling’ children 
in data collection strategies without their 
informed consent or knowledge. 
However, many researchers argue that these 
sceptical accounts fail to acknowledge the 
complexities of childhood play, socialisation 
and identity formation in a digitised society. 
For example, Seth Giddings (2014) observes 
that children’s play often oscillates between 
online and offline game worlds; children 
may, for example, draw inspiration from an 
experience with an AI device for a scenario in 
a playground role-playing game, or vice versa. 
In this sense, children’s play is often messy and 
unpredictable, meaning that it can exceed 
or confound the data collection strategies 
employed by designers and manufacturers 
of AI-enabled toys. Furthermore, much 
of the scepticism in this area rests on the 
assumption that children exist in – and should 
be encouraged to remain in – an ‘innocent’ 
reality removed from the digital society 
inhabited by adults. Yet, children are now 
born into a digital, data-driven and AI-enabled 
society, and are likely to express interest in 
actively participating in this society by, for 
example, wanting to explore aspects of their 
identities through play with AI-enabled toys. 
Therefore, it is important that adult mediators 
and, where appropriate, children are educated 
about what these AI-enabled devices are 
capable of, how they can be productively 
integrated into a child’s life, and what 
measures can be implemented to safeguard 
children from potentially compromising 
scenarios, such as when an AI-enabled toys 
collect data without the child’s consent. 
3.4.2 The psychological impact 
of AI
The psychological impact of AI is treated as 
an increasingly important design imperative. 
In the past five years, researchers have 
developed design methods to support 
psychological wellbeing (Hassenzahl, 2010; 
Desmet and Pohlmeyer, 2013; Calvo and 
Peters, 2014). These design methods often 
build on existing psychological theories.
One such theory is self-determination theory 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000, 2017), which examines 
the factors that promote sustained motivation 
and wellbeing. The theory has gathered one 
of the largest bodies of empirical evidence 
in psychology and identifies a small set of 
basic psychological needs deemed essential 
to people’s self-motivation and psychological 
wellbeing. Furthermore, it has shown how 
environments that neglect or frustrate these 
needs are associated with illness and distress. 
These basic needs are autonomy (feeling 
agency, acting in accordance with one’s goals 
and values), competence (feeling able and 
effective), and relatedness (feeling connected 
to others; a sense of belonging).
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While the concept of autonomy can be 
complicated (see the discussion earlier in 
this chapter), an autonomous person is often 
seen as one that has a sense of willingness, 
endorsement or choice in acting (Ryan & 
Deci, 2017). This is not the same as doing 
things independently or being in control; 
rather it means acting autonomously and 
in accordance with personal goals and 
values. Individuals often relinquish control 
or embrace interdependence on their own 
volition. Within AI development, the vast 
majority of research has focused on the 
design of autonomous systems, particularly 
robots and vehicles, rather than on 
supporting autonomous humans (Baldassarre 
et al., 2014). Recently, however, the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) has developed a charter of ethical 
guidelines for the design of autonomous 
systems that privilege human autonomy and 
wellbeing (Chatila et al., 2017). As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, perhaps it will be 
necessary to move towards a model where 
the human-AI relationship is considered 
in more emergent terms.
Box 17: Evaluating discursive claims about AI
Attitudes to new technologies are often 
shaped by the way such technologies are 
discursively framed – that is, how they are 
presented in public discourses such as the 
news media. Consider, for example, the 
headline, ‘Stanford’s artificial intelligence 
is nearly as good as your dermatologist’ 
(Mukherjee, 2017). The associated story was 
that researchers at Stanford University had 
claimed to have developed an AI system that 
could detect whether a skin lesion is cancerous 
or not (Esteva et al., 2017). But the AI system 
they developed is a statistical ML model – a 
model performing a supervised learning task, 
which is to classify images of lesions based on 
labelled images of lesions that it has previously 
seen. This is a remarkable development, but 
it is not accurate to claim that their system is 
‘nearly as good as your dermatologist’.
The Stanford system is weak AI, meaning that it 
is good at a specific task or range of tasks. The 
problem with headlines like the above is that 
they suggest we already have statistical models
that have reached the benchmark of ‘general 
AI’ (defined in the introduction to this report). 
The Stanford system was trained with 
images from three datasets, including the 
International Skin Imaging Collaboration 
Archive. In this dataset, there are only two or 
three images of lesions on tanned or darker 
skin. Because the Stanford model was mainly 
trained with images of lesions from Caucasian 
people, it is unable to reliably classify lesions 
in people of diverse ethnic background. This 
example highlights the risk of researchers 
inadvertently not noticing, or reporting, 
deficiencies in their training data. If the 
training was conducted on a broader cohort 
dataset, it may have resulted in a system that 
was more inclusive.
The Stanford example is only as good as 
the data that it is trained on. The potential 
weakness of the system may be overlooked 
by the medical profession and healthcare 
policymakers, particularly in light of 
overreported claims. 
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3.5 Changing social interactions
Progress has been made, however, on the 
measurement of the quality of apps (such as 
the MARS scale in Australia (Stoyanov et al., 
2015) or on their certification. In the latter 
area, the US has led the way by allowing the 
Food and Drug Administration to approve 
mobile apps the same way they approve 
drugs (hence the name ‘prescription apps’) 
(Bilbrough, 2014; Boulos et al., 2014), and 
the NHS in the UK has a library of trusted 
digital tools, some which may have an AI 
component. 
The range of mobile apps in this area is 
broad; however, many of these apps may 
have only a small element of AI and often are 
mostly passive devices. Nevertheless, they 
are becoming increasingly intelligent and 
able to adapt to the needs of the consumers 
and interact in a more human form. Many 
solutions are devoted to helping consumers 
change behaviours and better manage 
chronic conditions, such as diabetes and 
heart disease. Apps often provide assistance 
or support to change dietary habits, to stop 
smoking or drinking and to increase physical 
activity. Many solutions include an element of 
monitoring and may include interaction with 
health providers, such as nurses, dieticians 
and mental health specialists (Palmier-Claus et 
al., 2012). An interesting opportunity offered 
by mobile apps is that consumers may be 
more likely to disclose information to an app 
rather than to a human (Lucas et al., 2014), 
opening the way for better informed services. 
Substantial innovation has taken place 
regarding applications of dialogue systems to 
mental health (Hoermann et al., 2017), which 
ranges from the design of virtual affective 
agents that can help patients with depression 
or autism (Luxton, 2015) to the delivery of 
interventions (Hoermann et al., 2017). 
In 2018, it was widely reported that a 
family in Portland, Oregon, had received a 
phone call from an acquaintance advising 
them to disconnect their Amazon Alexa 
device. The device had recorded private 
conversations in the family home and 
forwarded these, apparently randomly, to a 
person in the family’s contact list. Although 
the conversation recorded was mundane, 
commentators were quick to forecast the 
arrival of a dystopic world where chatbots 
spy on us and share our information without 
consent. This anecdote underscores the 
effects of AI technologies on social life – 
identity, relationships, communication and so 
on – as well as the relation between AI and 
privacy, explored further in Chapter 4. It also 
highlights the way in which public responses 
to AI can shape how it is received, used and 
developed, as discussed throughout this 
chapter in relation to optimistic and sceptical 
approaches to AI. 
3.5.1 Spoken and text-based 
dialogue systems
Spoken and text-based dialogue systems are 
often embedded in mobile smart apps for 
wellness and personal health management, 
an area that has seen a significant increase in 
activities over the past few years. However, 
not every mobile health app necessarily 
qualifies as an application of AI, since many 
apps do not have an intelligent component 
(such as the ability to adapt to the user, to 
learn from past behaviours or datasets, to 
interact as a human or to perform some form 
of reasoning). In addition, the evidence that 
these apps provide any health benefits is 




There is significant public and international 
scholarly debate surrounding the effects 
of AI technologies (such as automated 
assistants, chatbots and digital devices) on 
communication and social relationships. In 
Australia, New Zealand and in other parts of 
the Anglophone world, there is a tendency 
to regard such technologies as autonomous 
forces in society, which inevitably lead to 
certain social outcomes (Wajcman, 2002).
Discussions about ‘digital-device-distraction 
syndrome’ commonly exhibit this tendency 
as well. Digital-device-distraction syndrome 
often presumes that the presence of digital 
devices will invariably cause users to become 
more distracted and less attentive to elements 
of their surrounding environments (see for 
example Fritz, 2016; Nixon, 2017).
This ‘deterministic’ way of understanding the 
role of technology in society has, however, 
been the subject of sustained criticism in the 
social sciences (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999; 
Guy and Shove, 2000). Scholars working in the 
field of Science and Technology Studies have 
shown the significance of cultural factors in 
developing the design, implementation and 
use of various technologies.
This culturally informed account of 
technology can help us avoid discussing 
AI’s effect on social life in overly simplistic 
terms. For example, instead of attributing 
the phenomenon of distraction in the 
contemporary era to the use of digital devices 
alone, we should pay more attention to 
the various social forces that produce and 
privilege distracted modes of being in some 
social contexts (Hsu, 2014; Wajcman, 2008). 
Doing so will give us a better understanding 
of how people can moderate the amount of 
distraction in their lives, since distraction is as 
much of a social issue as it is a technical one.
3.5.3 The use of algorithms in the 
provision of social services
Algorithms have long been used in 
organisational life to allocate resources and 
services. But what makes their contemporary 
use in the digital world unique and potentially 
problematic is their ability to remain opaque 
and hidden. This partly refers to the difficulty 
of recognising when some algorithms in 
the digital world are switched on and active 
(Pasquale, 2015). It also refers to the ways in 
which the inner workings of digital algorithms 
are commonly difficult to understand (Beer, 
2009). As with any opaque or hidden decision-
making system, it is crucial to ensure that 
the user trusts the expertise that goes into 
said system. The Australian experience of 
automated debt recovery systems will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
This feature of algorithms in the digital age 
has led some researchers to explore how 
algorithms can be made more transparent to 
promote fairness and democratic values (e.g. 
Diakopoulos, 2016). One emerging approach 
is to understand how the opaqueness of 
algorithms stems from different sources. 
According to the work of Burrell (2016), 
algorithms can be concealed on a number 
of levels: as a result of institutional secrecy, 
technical illiteracy or the sheer scale and 
complexity of their operation.
These three sources of algorithmic 
opaqueness need to be considered in the use 
of predictive risk modelling in the provision of 
social services. It may be useful to make the 
operations of certain algorithms accessible to 
the public, such as the algorithms underlying 
Facebook. Knowledge and training about 
the technical workings of algorithms could 
be expanded and collaborative. A careful 
‘supervised’ ML approach, which some 
predictive risk modelling programs already 
employ (Gillingham, 2015), may be worth 
further pursuit.
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Ultimately, the algorithmic underpinnings 
of predictive risk modelling need to be 
transparent to the parties concerned. Perhaps 
more importantly, they also need to be held 
socially accountable, which is a complex 
issue in need of further implementation and 
elaboration (Ananny and Crawford, 2018). 
With social accountability, there are a range 
of questions to consider: which society, 
which culture, who decides what is socially 
acceptable within those societies and cultures 
and how can AI be deployed in a way that 
aligns with these expectations and social 
norms.
3.6 Conclusion 
In 2017, Brooks (2017) argued that discussions 
about AI’s impact on employment, society 
and identity are often unhelpfully skewed 
between overestimates and underestimates. 
He states, ‘AI has been overestimated again 
and again in the 1960s, in the 1980s, and 
I believe again now, but its prospects for 
the long term are also probably being 
underestimated. The question is: How long 
is the long term?’ (Brooks, 2017: n.p.). While it 
is difficult to say with certainty exactly how 
disruptive AI will be – to what extent it will 
replace low-wage jobs, transform high-skill 
occupations, reconfigure identity and displace 
traditional means of social communication – 
what can be said with certainty is that these 
changes, while rapidly emerging, will not 
arrive immediately. The opportunity remains 
for Australia to steer the development, 
adoption and use of AI and its potential 
impacts on society. Through proactive 
planning and responses, and measures 
that include broad education, industry and 
workforce responses and interdisciplinary 
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4.1 Introduction 
The development of AI technologies provides 
Australia with the opportunity to ensure that 
the benefits derived are fairly distributed. AI 
has the potential to benefit Australian society 
and advance human rights, including social 
security, health, economic and cultural rights. 
However, it also poses societal challenges 
and new forms of human rights violations, 
including new forms of discrimination. 
The State can ensure that everyone 
benefits from scientific advancement and 
its applications, but to do so means that 
governments must consider how to engage 
with the benefits of AI and also manage the 
related risks, including risks of increased 
inequality. Different groups are, and will be, 
affected by AI technologies differently. 
Some groups are particularly vulnerable to 
human rights abuses – especially when they 
are affected by decisions that are made, or 
informed by, AI-powered systems. 
This chapter examines issues of equity and 
human rights that arise from AI in relation 
to freedom from discrimination, the right 
to justice, the right to work and the right 
to security. The development of AI in 
keeping with the human rights framework 
is both in accordance with Australia’s legal 
obligations under international human rights 
law and necessary for the responsible and 
safe implementation of AI technologies. 
Underpinning human rights, however, 
are broader considerations in relation to 
accessibility, inclusiveness and equity. 
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Such principles have long been integral to 
societal standards within Australian culture. 
These foundations provide additional 
considerations for the development and use 
of AI technologies which do not entrench 
inequalities and instead provide benefit to 
all Australians. 
This chapter also considers what additional 
protections might be needed. It discusses 
the need for trust, inclusion and public 
communication. If AI is implemented and 
developed inclusively, with considerations of 
wellbeing and human rights at the centre, it 
can play a role in closing the gap in social and 
economic inequality. However, if developed 
and implemented poorly, AI could further 
widen this gap. 
The following discussion contains concepts 
which are not without contestation. Even 
concepts that are generally perceived to 
have universal acceptance, such as the 
application of human rights, have the 
potential to attract some criticism. The 
many varied experiences of each individual 
leads to a society that contains a plethora 
of perspectives and options. Discussion of 
AI technologies typically invokes disparate 
responses due to the emotive and uncertain 
nature of disruptive technologies. This chapter 
seeks to provide a framework of overarching 
basic considerations for the development 
of AI technologies that foster an inclusive 
and equitable society. A human rights 
approach is similar, but not identical, to an 
ethical approach (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018b: 17). The two approaches 
can be brought together, where human rights 
can provide the normative content that can 
be applied through an ethical framework to 
developing and deploying new technology 
while ensuring that any decisions on a 
human’s rights, privileges entitlements can 
be linked back to an accountable human 
decision-maker. While notions of ethics, equity 
and inclusivity are subject to interpretation, 
these principles underpin the Australian ethos 




Human rights are fundamental rights that 
should be enjoyed by all people. These rights 
embody the idea that all humans are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights. These inherent 
and inalienable standards apply across 
all aspects of human life, including those 
affected by new and emerging technologies 
such as AI. 
The international human rights framework 
is the foundation for assessing the human 
rights implications of AI (Figure 9). Since the 
advent of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) 70 years ago, this framework 
has proven robust and capable of adapting 
to changing circumstances and technologies. 
International human rights treaties rarely 
refer expressly to a particular domain, such 
as new technologies. The task is to apply 
existing human rights principles to countries 
in which AI is increasingly prevalent. 
While AI powered technologies present 
challenges in relation to human rights, AI may 
also be used to advance human rights and 
enhance accessibility, social inclusion, civic 
participation access to education and medical 
care. Beyond the more obvious applications 
of AI, even the right to intellectual property 
may be enhanced by AI systems such as 
plagiarism checkers. 
4.2.1 The right to equality and 
freedom from discrimination 
Equality and freedom from discrimination 
are fundamental human rights, designed to 
protect people from unfair treatment through 
either direct or indirect discrimination. 
Indirect discrimination includes any act or 
omission which may appear neutral but has 
the effect of producing inequity. 
The use of AI to assist in decision making has 
potential to advance human rights by enabling 
more informed decisions. There is potential to 
minimise direct and indirect discrimination by 
humans, who may act on their own prejudices. 
Algorithms can assist with identifying systemic 
bias and may present opportunities for better 
assessment of compliance with fundamental 
human rights (Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2018). Additionally, AI technologies 
may improve access to services and improve 
outcomes across a range of socio-economic 
indicators. Improvements may be through 
better systems or interventions in health or 
education, for example, or targeted programs 
and services for groups who experience 
vulnerability and disadvantage. Examples of AI 
assisted technology that is being developed or 
used to potentially minimise inequalities from 
around the globe include:
• Textio, an augmented writing platform, 
uses AI to analyse and monitor company 
position descriptions to provide alternative 
Figure 9: Overview of the international human rights framework























wording that engages passive candidates 
and eliminates unconscious gender bias 
language. One of the clients using this 
software has increased the proportion 
of hired female employees from 10 to 
57 percent over two years (Halloran, 2017)
• Microsoft are developing innovative and 
ethical computational techniques that 
draw on deeper contexts of sociology, 
history, science and technology. The 
collaborative research projects address 
the need for fairness, accountability, 
transparency and ethics (FATE) in AI 
technologies (Microsoft, 2018a)
• IBM Research project Science for Social 
Good is aimed at leveraging the power 
of AI to address global inequalities and 
threats identified by the United Nations. 
Of particular interest is IBM’s project 
investigating the automated identification 
and monitoring of hate speech online 
(IBM Research, 2018)
• Data for Black Lives is a diverse group of 
activists, organisers and mathematicians 
creating a network of data systems that 
seeks to provide data science supported 
solutions to black communities to ‘fight 
bias, build progressive movements and 
promote civic engagement’ (Data for 
Black Lives, 2018).
However, AI can also amplify discrimination, 
if the developed technology is misused– 
consciously or unconsciously. In addition, 
unequal access to new technologies, such 
as AI, may exacerbate inequalities, especially 
where access is affected by factors such as 
socio-economic status, disability, age or 
geographic location (O’Neil, 2016). Examples 
of applications of AI technologies with 
potentially discriminatory consequences 
include algorithms and tools that:
• target advertising of job opportunities on 
the basis of age, gender or some other 
characteristic such that, for example, 
people over a certain age never become 
aware of an employment opportunity 
(Angwin, Scheiber and Tobin, 2017)
• exclude applicants with mental illness 
(O’Neil, 2016: 4)
• lead police to target certain groups 
disproportionately, such as young 
people and people from culturally and 
linguistically diverse groups or minority 
groups (O’Mallon, 2017)
• entrench gender inequality, bias (Stern, 
2017) and stereotyping (Steele, 2018)
• direct police to lower socio-economic 
areas, entrenching or even exacerbating 
the cycle of imprisonment and recidivism 
(O’Neil, 2016: 87).
From the technologies currently available and 
in use, it is indicative that the capabilities of 
AI are presently limited to assisting humans in 
performing tasks and functions. Additionally, AI 
applications are in their early stages and have 
the potential to include developmental flaws. 
Risk assessment tools that are employed in the 
administration of justice may use algorithms 
based on undisclosed criteria, or variables 
that result in algorithmic bias when applied 
to large datasets. This has been demonstrated 
in the NSW Police’s risk assessment tool, 
‘Suspect Targeting Management Plan’, which 
sought to target repeat offenders and people 
police considered likely to commit future 
crime (Sentas and Pandolfini, 2017). Analysis 
of those targeted by police revealed that 
young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people were disproportionately targeted 
compared to other demographics (Sentas 
and Pandolfini, 2017: 1).
The transparency of the assessment criteria 
used in risk assessment tools will become 
increasingly important in determining the 
success of the aforementioned assistive 
AI technologies as will rigorous testing 
to minimise programmed bias. 
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Initiatives to minimise bias, increase 
transparency and fairness, and ensure privacy 
and human rights are not breached will need 
to be developed in parallel. The Australian 
Human Rights Commission is examining the 
challenges and opportunities for human 
rights of emerging technologies, and 
innovative ways to ensure human rights are 
prioritised in the design and governance of 
these technologies (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018a). In New Zealand, the 
Ministry of Social Development’s formation 
of the Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics 
framework (PHRaE) provides a set of tools 
that users of information can utilise to ensure 
initiatives don’t breach clients’ privacy or 
human rights (Sepuloni, 2018).
4.2.2 The right to equality before 
the law
AI is being used in criminal justice settings 
for a variety of purposes. For example, the 
COMPAS tool issued by some US court 
systems to help judges in determining 
questions about bail and sentencing. 
However, concerns have been raised about 
human rights implications of using AI in these 
settings. While human decisions also have 
the potential to contain bias, depending on 
how AI systems are developed and deployed, 
those tools can reduce, reflect or exacerbate 
bias (Angwin, Scheiber and Tobin, 2017). 
Researchers note that ‘bias in automated 
decision systems can arise as much from 
human choices on how to design or train 
the system as it can from human errors in 
judgment when interpreting or acting on the 
outputs’ (Reisman et al., 2018). While many 
researchers point to this risk of implicit or 
explicit bias in algorithmic decision making 
and machine learning (ML), humans can 
be equally biased as the AI replacing them. 
As a result, these structures of bias and 
discrimination can be replicated in training 
or programming the AI and in making 
final decisions involving human oversight. 
Biases founded on racial or other protected 
attributes in decision making may impinge on 
the right to a fair hearing. 
4.2.3 The right to privacy
Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides that no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with their privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on honour and reputation (‘International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 
1966: art 17).Technological developments 
present the opportunity to both enhance 
and challenge privacy and surveillance. 
For example, the use of AI in healthcare 
or AI enabled assistive technologies may 
provide vulnerable populations with greater 
autonomy, privacy and the reduced need for 
human intervention that could otherwise 
impact on their right to privacy. However, 
the right to privacy is becoming increasingly 
hard to protect due to the ease and power 
of collection, distribution and analysis of 
information – especially personal information 
– enabled by new AI technologies. In 
particular, AI offers new tools for surveillance 
technologies that may be deployed by 
government and non-government bodies. 
For example, AI-powered facial recognition 
technology is powerful technology that can 
have applications in identifying victims of 
child-sex trafficking, however if misused facial 
recognition can impinge on an individual’s 
privacy as well as a range of other human 
rights (de Hert and Christianen, 2013; 
Cannataci, 2018). This can include the right 
to hold opinions (‘International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights’, 1966: art 19); 
peaceful assembly (‘International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’, 1966: art 21); liberty 
and security of person, and protection from 
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arbitrary arrest (‘International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’, 1966: art 9); freedom 
of movement (‘International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights’, 1966: art 12); 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(‘International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, 1966: art 18); and equality before the 
law (‘International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’, 1966: arts 14, 26).
Broader concepts around AI and privacy 
and surveillance, beyond the human rights 
framework, are discussed in 4.5. 
4.2.4 The right to freedom 
of expression
Everyone has the right to hold opinions 
without interference and the right to freedom 
of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds (‘International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’, 1966: art 19). AI tools may 
be used to influence or manipulate social 
media newsfeeds (see for example, Bastos 
and Mercea, 2017; Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2017), advertising and 
search engine results (Birnbaum and Fung, 
2017). Such interference can significantly 
impede the enjoyment of this right, as 
freedom of expression includes the free 
exchange of ideas and information. 
4.2.5 The right to benefit from 
scientific progress
As stipulated by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, all persons have 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications (‘International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 
1966: art 15b). While scientific progress has 
demonstrated the potential for harmful and 
negative impacts, technological progress 
frequently results in myriad of opportunities. 
AI can provide many benefits to people – 
for example, it can improve the enjoyment 
of the human right to life and access to 
health (Cohn, 2017; Lonstein, 2018). Human 
rights law in Australia requires States to 
take appropriate steps to ensure that all 
sectors of the community benefit from these 
applications of AI.
Some AI technologies provide significant 
benefits to people with disability. For instance, 
AI could advance the rights of people with 
a disability and foster greater accessibility 
and inclusion through AI powered assistive 
technologies such as speech to text 
technology. However other AI technologies 
are currently inaccessible for people in this 
cohort (Senate Community Affairs References 
Committee, 2017). Similarly, while children 
and young people face fewer difficulties using 
technology, they are particularly vulnerable 
to the potential harm of new technology, 
such as a breach of privacy or exploitation, 
made possible by the use of social media 
platforms (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018b). 
Further, women’s economic and other 
opportunities may be compromised 
through the disparity in global access to 
technologies (United Nations Women, 2017).3 
To ensure that access to the benefits of AI 
technologies is universal and inclusive, tools 
and approaches need to be developed to 
address the issues new technologies raise 
for specific groups (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018b). 
3 For example, the report notes that the global internet 
user gender gap has grown from 11 percent in 2013 to 
12 percent in 2016. Over 1.7 billion women do not own 
mobile phones. Women are on average 14 percent less 
likely to own a mobile phone than men, which translates 
into 200 million fewer women than men owning mobile 
phones. When women do own mobile phones, they 
use them less frequently and intensively than men, 
especially mobile internet.
3 For example, the report notes that the global internet user gender gap has grown from 11 percent in 2013 to 12 percent 
in 2016. Over 1.7 billion women do not own mobile phones. Women are on average 14 percent less likely to own a mobile 
phone than men, which translates into 200 million fewer women than men owning mobile phones. When women do own 
mobile phones, they use them less frequently and intensively than men, especially mobile internet.
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4.2.6 The right to life
Every human being has the right to life 
(‘International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, 1966: art 6). Individual AI-powered 
technologies can themselves both harm 
and promote the right to life. For example, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as 
drones, can be used as lethal autonomous 
weapons, conversely they can also be used 
to transport vital medical supplies to hard-
to-reach places (Cohn, 2017). Additionally, AI 
can promote the right to life through more 
accurate and targeted use of machinery, such 
as in medical diagnostics.
4.2.7 The right to work
All people have the right to work, which 
includes the right to the opportunity to 
gain their living by work which they freely 
choose or accept (‘International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 
1966: art 6). The Australian robotics industry 
benefits our economy by employing almost 
50,000 people and generating revenue of 
A$12 billion (Australian Centre for Robotic 
Vision, 2018). Conversely, AI automation 
technologies have the potential to displace 
an estimated 3.5 million workers in Australia 
in coming years (AlphaBeta, 2017). Estimates 
of the impacts of AI on workforces across 
the globe vary widely. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, many claim that AI will not lead 
to mass unemployment, but rather that it 
will transform the tasks involved in work, 
create new roles and establish new skill sets. 
Some job types and socio-economic groups 
are more likely to be adversely affected 
through increased automation of tasks. The 
consequences of widespread automation are 
likely to be different for women and men, with 
implications for socio-economic equality and 
the global gender gap (Schwab, 2017).
4.2.8 The right to security
Given the many decisions that governments 
must make, there are efficiency gains in using 
AI in decision-making processes. Some of these 
decisions may be in areas which particularly 
concern vulnerable people, such as in 
determining eligibility for, or compliance with, 
government assistance programs. This creates 
risk that some of the limitations of AI (or of poorly 
designed AI systems) – especially algorithmic bias 
– could lead to infringements of human rights. 
For example, in the US in October 2013, the 
Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency 
(UIA) launched an automated information 
system, Michigan Integrated Data Automated 
System (MiDAS), to detect claimant fraud 
and pay unemployment insurance benefits 
to eligible claimants. The aim of MiDAS was 
to increase data accuracy, improve data 
security and privacy, reduce operating costs 
through automation, improve integration of 
organisational functions, and improve customer 
service (Office of the Auditor General, 2016).
Michigan state officials reported that during 
its 22 month operation, MiDAS had a 93 
percent error rate when its attempts to identify 
unemployment insurance fraud weren’t 
reviewed by humans. This resulted in over 
20,000 claimants being falsely accused of fraud 
and subjected to fines between US$10,000 and 
US$50,000 (Claburn, 2017a; Claburn 2017b; 
Egan, 2017). There are also reports that the 
system was insecure – between October 2016 
and January 2017, companies using MiDAS 
could reportedly see the names, social security 
numbers and wages of people whose payroll 
was managed by any of the 31 third-party 
vendors that worked with the UIA (Claburn, 
2017b). Automated decision systems are a 
likely outcome of the implementation and 
application of AI. It will therefore be important 
that the application of AI in social and 
economic decision-making does not infringe 
the right to social security in the future.
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The use of AI to create weapons introduces 
challenges to the right to security and the 
international humanitarian rules of war. 
Lethal autonomous weapons systems, such 
as drones and submarines or other weapons, 
can be programmed to act individually or 
in groups. These developments have raised 
serious concerns, leading to the establishment 
of a United Nations expert working group 
to consider the place of lethal autonomous 
weapons systems in the context of the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be ‘excessively 
injurious’ or to have ‘indiscriminate effects’. 
Similar concerns among non-governmental 
organisations has led to the establishment of 
a global coalition and the ‘campaign to stop 
killer robots’, which aims to ensure human 
control of weapons systems.
Discrimination and other human rights 
violations are not only unlawful – they also 
undermine public trust and can result in 
pre-emptory calls for regulation or reduced 
uptake of new technologies.
4.2.9 Protections needed – a 
human rights approach
Society must be aware of the both the 
risks and opportunities that AI and 
related technology pose to human rights. 
AI technologies present opportunities 
economically, socially and in the protection 
and fulfilment of human rights. Human rights 
protections can help build the community 
trust that will be needed to take these 
opportunities. 
It is important to ensure that human rights 
are adequately protected and promoted in 
the context of new technologies. However, 
there are likely to be a number of acceptable 
ways to ensure that those developing and 
deploying new technologies, including those 
incorporating AI, do so in a manner that 
respects, protects, and fulfils the human rights 
of affected people. 
4.2.10 Human rights in Australia
In order to adopt AI technologies in an 
equitable manner, it will be necessary to 
consider the values that are central to 
Australian society. Human rights provide a 
framework that could underpin the equitable 
implementation of AI, and Australia has 
ratified several major international human 
rights treaties.4 As a party to these treaties, 
Australia has agreed to respect, protect and 
fulfil the human rights obligations contained 
in them. There are a number of mechanisms 
in Australia which to some degree protect and 
promote human rights. 
Incorporation into domestic law
In order for international human rights law to 
have full legal effect in Australia, the relevant 
parliament or parliaments must incorporate 
the specific provisions of these laws into 
domestic law. Australia has incorporated 
some, but not all, of these international 
human rights treaty obligations into 
domestic legislation. 
Federal law prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, disability, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and some other 
grounds.5 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) protects 
primarily information privacy (‘Privacy Act
4 In addition to the UDHR, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) referred 
to above, these treaties include: International Convention 
on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 
195 (Entry into force 4 January 1969); Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
opened for signature 18 December 1979, 189 UNTS 1249 
(entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 13 
December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 
2008); United Nations Convention the Rights of the Child 
UN GA Res 44/25 (20 November 1989).
5 See, especially Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth), Age Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth); Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth). 
4 In addition to the UDHR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) referred to above, these treaties include: International Convention on 
the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (Entry into 
force 4 January 1969); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 
18 December 1979, 189 UNTS 1249 (entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, opened for signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008); United Nations 
Convention the Rights of the Child UN GA Res 44/25 (20 November 1989).
5 See, especially Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Australian Human Rights Commission 
Act 1986 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), Age Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth); Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
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1988 (Cth)’). There are also parallel state and 
territory laws that deal with discrimination 
and privacy. Two jurisdictions, Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory, have 
statutory bills of rights (Australian Capital 
Territory Legislative Assembly, 2004; Victorian 
Government, 2006).
Executive bodies
Australia has executive bodies that are 
responsible for promoting and protecting 
human rights. The Australian Human Rights 
Commission has primary responsibility in this 
area, including through a conciliation function 
(in respect of alleged breaches of federal 
human rights and anti-discrimination law), 
education and policy development (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, 1986 (Cth): 
s11). There are also specialist bodies with 
regulatory and broader functions in respect 
of specific rights. For example:
• the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner is responsible for privacy 
and freedom of information, and has 
regulatory functions regarding privacy 
(Australian Government, 2018h)
• the Office of the eSafety Commissioner is 
responsible for promoting online safety, 
with regulatory functions regarding 
cyberbullying and image-based abuse 
(Australian Government, 2018i)
• the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is the national 
competition and consumer law regulator 
(Australian Government, 2018b) and is 
currently investigating digital platforms 
and their impact on Australian journalism 
(Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, 2018). 
UN review processes 
The Australian Government reports on the 
nation’s compliance with human rights 
obligations through UN review processes. 
Some international bodies can hear 
complaints from a person in Australia alleging 
that the Australian Government is in breach 
of its obligations under one of its treaty 
commitments. In addition, the UN conducts 
its own investigations, and reports on human 
rights conditions in countries including 
Australia. These international processes 
generally make recommendations or findings 
that are not enforceable.
4.2.11 Opportunities for protection 
of human rights
The mechanisms discussed help guard 
against some of the potential adverse 
effects of AI technologies on the rights of 
citizens. However, there remain gaps in how 
this system promotes and protects human 
rights in the context of AI. For example, 
decisions that are wholly or partly informed 
by AI systems fall outside the scope of 
traditional forms of regulation for science and 
technology (Metcalf, Keller and Boyd, 2016; 
Conn, 2017; Vijayakumar, 2017). 
As noted previously, there are numerous 
examples of how decisions arising from AI 
systems can lead to infringements of human 
rights. Where information about algorithms, 
datasets and resultant decisions is not 
available or comprehensible, it is difficult to 
ensure accountability for affected people 
(Australian Human Rights Commission, 
2018b).
If a process of decision making is opaque, 
it can be difficult or even impossible to 
determine whether an impermissible 
consideration – such as one that is racially 
biased – has been taken into account 
(Australian Human Rights Commission, 
2018b). Decision-making systems that rely 
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on AI can be particularly susceptible to 
this problem. To ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights, the Australian Home 
Affairs Department has adopted a ‘golden rule’ 
process by which decisions that have adverse 
outcomes, such as visa refusals, will be 
determined by a human and not a machine.
Australia and other jurisdictions have started 
to grapple with these challenges, such as 
the recent announcements to develop a 
technology roadmap, standards framework 
and a national AI ethics framework to identify 
global opportunities and guide future 
investments (Australian Government, 2018c). 
The Australian Human Rights Commission is 
exploring the opportunities and challenges 
in relation to human rights and emerging 
technologies. Scheduled for release in 2019, 
the Australian Human Rights Commission 
report findings and recommendations 
seek to ensure the protection of human 
rights in Australia. In New Zealand, the 
Law Foundation’s Information Law and 
Policy Project [ILAPP] will develop law and 
policy around IT, data, information, artificial 
intelligence and cyber-security. The project 
brings together experts to examine challenges 
and opportunities in areas like global 
information, cyber-security, data exploitation, 
and technology-driven social change 
(The Law Foundation New Zealand, 2018).
Other jurisdictions and technology companies 
have begun to approach some of the 
challenges posed by AI technologies through 
initiatives and forms of governance and codes 
of practice. For example: 
• The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) harmonises data protection laws 
across the EU and includes provisions 
relating to the transfer or export of 
personal data outside the EU – something 
that will influence how AI can be used 
on transnational datasets (European 
Commission, 2018a). The GDPR also imposes 
restrictions on how decisions based on 
automated processes may be made where 
they have significant effects on an individual
• New York City’s Automated Decision 
making Task Force is examining the use of 
AI through the lens of equity, fairness and 
accountability and recommends redress 
options for people who are harmed by 
agency automated decisions (City of New 
York, 2018)
• The UK’s proposed ‘AI code’, to be 
developed across the public and private 
sectors, including the Centre for Data 
Ethics and Innovation, the AI Council and 
the Alan Turing Institute, could provide 
the basis for future statutory regulation 
(Artificial Intelligence Committee – House 
of Lords, 2017)
• The European Commission’s European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies has called for a common, 
international ethical and legal framework 
for the design, production, use and 
governance of AI, robotics and autonomous 
systems (European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies, 2018)
• Co-led initiatives by industry, NGO and 
academia to guide and frame AI ethical 
discussions include Open AI (Open AI, 2018) 
and the Partnership on AI (Partnership on 
AI, 2018). 
Australia has the opportunity to develop 
codes of practice, guidelines and frameworks 
that reflect Australian values and incorporate 
standards of equity, inclusion, and human 
rights. However, global cooperation and 
input will also be required to accommodate 
the inherent international nature of 
technological development.
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Co-regulatory and self-regulatory 
approaches 
In addition to ordinary legislation, self-
regulatory and co-regulatory approaches 
can promote and protect human rights in 
the context of new technologies. These 
approaches can include accreditation 
systems, professional codes of ethics and 
human rights-compliant design. These types 
of measures are generally led by industry 
participants and subject-matter experts. 
They may also influence the actions of 
manufacturers through the procurement 
process (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018b). 
An example of a self-regulatory approach 
is the proposed cross-sector ethical ‘AI 
code’ in the UK, which would require the 
establishment of ethical boards in companies 
or organisations that are developing or using 
AI (Artificial Intelligence Committee – House 
of Lords, 2017). 
Responsible innovation organisation
Gaps in regulation of aspects of AI 
technologies, especially AI-informed decision 
making, are a cause for concern as automated 
and AI-informed decision-making systems 
become more widespread. Discrimination is 
both more likely and of greater consequence 
for those already marginalised (Eubanks, 
2018b). Further, the often undisclosed 
algorithms employed in these systems (World 
Economic Forum, 2018b) are challenging the 
concepts of procedural fairness in decision 
making. It is essential that the public has trust 
in the systems and processes employed in the 
decisions that affect their lives. Discriminatory 
practices in AI may also prevent people from 
embracing the positive outcomes from AI-
informed ML. An independent body could 
be established to provide leadership in the 
responsible development of AI technologies. 
The potential for an independent body is 
discussed later in the chapter. 
4.3 Equity of access
The development and deployment of 
AI technologies in accordance with the 
human rights framework offers one way by 
which to ensure the safety of AI systems 
and guarantees Australia’s adherence to 
international obligations. However, to ensure 
that AI delivers benefit to the entire Australian 
community, the implementation of AI should 
be underpinned by broader principles of 
equity and inclusion. In this way, AI could 
be designed to reflect Australian values, 
including that of a ‘fair go’. 
4.3.1 Economic and social 
inequality
As discussed in Chapter 3, AI technologies 
are likely to alter the nature of employment. 
While these changes were outlined in detail, 
the following section addresses potential 
inequality resulting from employment 
changes. Indeed, a primary concern 
associated with the emergence of AI is the 
potential for it to lead to rising inequality. 
Inequality broadly refers to unequal 
outcomes, rights or opportunities. Economic 
inequality concerns the unequal distribution 
of economic resources between, and within, 
groups of individuals, firms, industries 
and economies. Social inequality refers to 
the unequal distribution of resources and 
opportunities through norms of allocation 
that engender specific patterns of socially 
defined categories, such as race, gender or 
sexual orientation. 
The World Economic Forum identified 
income and wealth inequality as the biggest 
global risk resulting from the adoption of AI 
technologies (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
While technological progress is one of several 
factors that affect inequality, concerns relate 
to the equitable distribution of benefits 
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derived from the development of AI.6 Given 
the uncertain nature of AI technologies and 
capabilities, there are divergent views on how 
AI will affect economic and social inequality. 
However, sharing the benefits of growth and 
equality of opportunity are important factors 
in ensuing social cohesion. This is as relevant 
for Australia and New Zealand as for all 
national economies.
4.3.1.1 State of inequality in Australia 
and New Zealand
The state of economic inequality in Australia 
is complicated and subject to interpretation. 
This reflects the complexities of inequality 
measurement and evaluation. From a national 
average perspective, income and wealth 
inequality have remained relatively constant 
over the past few decades (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017; Wilkins, 2017). According to the 
Gini coefficient, a common measure for income 
inequality, Australia ranks 24 and New Zealand 
29 of 38 OECD countries (OECD, 2018a). 
However, despite these averages, there 
are signs of rising economic inequality. 
For example, the top one and ten percent 
of income earners have commanded 
consistently higher shares of national income 
in Australia since 1980 (World Inequality 
Database - Australia, 2018). There is increasing 
wage growth for higher earners with higher 
levels of education, compared to middle 
and lower-income earners with lower levels 
of education (OECD, 2017a). Data reveals 
13 percent of Australians and 14 percent of 
New Zealanders from 0-17 years of age live 
below the poverty line (OECD, 2018c). These 
levels of inequality are more likely to affect 
particular groups of the population, such 
as Indigenous peoples and people with a 
disability. The increasing adoption of AI is
6 Other significant factors include economic performance, 
labour conditions and employment growth, education 
and training programs, minimum wage policies, taxation 
and redistribution policies, and trade and globalisation.
likely to affect these inequality distributions. 
If AI fulfils its projected economic impacts, it 
will certainly have structural effects on the 
Australian and New Zealand economies. The 
way in which the benefits are distributed will 
influence economic and social inequality 
outcomes.
4.3.1.2 Relationship between technology 
and economic inequality
Past experiences have demonstrated the 
disruptive force of technological and 
organisational innovations on the social 
and economic order (Schumpeter, 1975). 
Overall, technological progress has reduced 
inequality by lifting productivity, expanding 
the demand for labour, and increasing income, 
wealth and quality of life (Mokyr, Vickers 
and Ziebarth, 2015). However, this progress 
was not immediate and often required more 
than 50 years for economies to adjust and 
widely diffuse its applications (Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2005: 3-5). Therefore, the short-run 
disruptions of transformational technologies 
have caused profound structural changes 
to labour markets and economic activity. 
These initial decades have typically required 
significant labour transitions and have 
contributed to widening short-run inequalities 
(Bruckner, LaFleur and Pitterl, 2017). Similar 
to other general purpose technologies, such 
as electricity and personal computers, the 
impacts of AI are likely to be a continuation of 
this ‘short-term pain for long-term gain’ trend. 
These new technologies improve productivity 
for industries, populations and individuals to 
varying extents, which skews the distribution 
of benefits to those with the skills to make 
productive use of them (Milanovic, 2016). As a 
result, wage premiums are earned by those with 
the skills that complement these technological 
6 Other significant factors include economic performance, labour conditions and employment growth, education and training 
programs, minimum wage policies, taxation and redistribution policies, and trade and globalisation.
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changes, which can cause or exacerbate 
economic inequality. Additionally, as the 
share of income shifts from labour to capital, 
tax collection also becomes more difficult for 
governments, which can strain public revenues 
(Abbott and Bogenschneider, 2017). 
4.3.1.3 Risks of AI to economic inequality
AI represents a potential departure from 
other general purpose technologies due 
to the scope of capabilities, the speed 
of development and the scale of impact. 
Unlike traditional technologies, AI has the 
capacity to perform non-routine tasks that 
would otherwise require human cognition. 
Technological automation has traditionally 
occurred in areas of routine and manual labour 
because these tasks are relatively simple to 
codify. AI expands the scope of automation to 
include cognitive and non-routine tasks. The 
multi-use capabilities of AI techniques have 
developed rapidly over the past two decades, 
and development continues to accelerate 
(Shoham et al., 2017). This positions the 
economic impact of AI to be one of the most 
significant in the history of general purpose 
technologies (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2016). 
Therefore, the implications of AI on inequality 
should be examined according to the degree 
of structural changes in the economy. Among 
the most important is the impact that AI will 
have on labour demand.
Inequality from automation, the 
increasing skills divide and employment 
polarisation
There is the potential for new class division 
as a result of integrating AI into economic 
systems (Harari, 2017). Such a divide could 
emerge between people who are able to 
adapt to new techno-social transformations 
and those who might be left behind. New 
forms of exploitation, class disparities, and 
social exclusion could develop. Inequalities of 
wages emerge as the demand for labour skills 
that complement new technologies increase 
and attract wage premiums. For example, 
skills that are non-routine and cognitive, 
such as abstract thinking in ML development, 
benefit from advances in AI due to strong 
complementarities between routine and 
cognitive tasks (Autor, 2015). This raises the 
productivity and demand for workers with 
complementary skills to technology, thus 
driving up their wages. 
However, typically these skills, and subsequent 
wage premiums, disproportionately favour 
the highly educated. This is problematic for 
inequality because jobs demanded by AI are 
likely to require higher skills and different 
mindsets, which could be difficult for many 
workers to develop. For example, it has been 
suggested that 36 percent of all jobs across 
all industries will require complex problem-
solving skills by 2020, compared to 4 percent 
of jobs where basic physical abilities are a 
core requirement (World Economic Forum, 
2016). Indeed, AI technologies are more likely 
to replace, rather than augment, routine tasks. 
Such tasks are disproportionately found in 
low-skilled to middle-skilled occupations with 
lower levels of education (Frey and Osborne, 
2017). Therefore, these low-skilled and 
middle-skilled jobs, which are already missing 
out on the wage premium, are also more 
exposed to AI-enabled labour automation and 
shifts in skill demands (Bakhshi et al., 2017). 
The effect of this increasing displacement 
of low-skilled and medium-skilled labour is 
referred to as ‘employment polarisation’. This is 
where labour supply becomes concentrated 
at either ends of the skill spectrum, which 
can obstruct upward social mobility (Santos, 
2016). If employment polarisation worsens, 
there will be fewer opportunities for people 
to climb the ‘skill ladder’, as the middle-skilled 
rung is weakened or shifted. Not all workers 
will have the training, skills or safety-nets 
to successfully transition into the new jobs 
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created by AI. Additionally, in some instances, 
it will not be economically efficient to 
replace certain low skilled, low paid workers 
with AI given the costs associated with the 
technology. These factors can also result in 
the widening of income inequality. Strategies 
in response to workforce changes should 
therefore include helping displaced workers 
to train and acquire new skills. Upskilling will 
be necessary to ensure that some groups of 
people, lacking in the right education and 
special skill sets, are not disadvantaged by 
technological developments. 
Young people from low socio-economic 
backgrounds, as well as those from rural 
and remote areas, are more likely to 
choose vocational courses rather than 
university education, and are more likely to 
end up performing routine low-skill jobs 
(Tomaszewski, Perales and Xiang, 2017). 
Even if enrolled in university, women and 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
are less likely to study STEM subjects. There 
is therefore a need for continued investment 
in providing equitable access to quality 
education to avoid the marginalisation of 
people from disadvantaged backgrounds in 
future labour markets. 
In some occupations, it is likely that humans 
will work with smart machines, rather than be 
replaced by machines; automation of routine 
tasks will allow professionals to undertake 
more complex cognitive and creative tasks. 
Intelligent, creative, and emotional skills are 
still considered non-replaceable by machines, 
and therefore secure in the wake of the digital 
revolution. Non-routine, uniquely human 
skills that focus on care, creativity and human 
consciousness will continue to be essential 
within the workforce. By combining technical 
and interpersonal tasks in occupations, these 
people may become the ‘new artisans’ (Katz 
and Margo, 2014) of the new age. Future 
workers who are able to use these skills and 
deliver specialised services based on these 
skills are likely to remain competitive in the 
job market. 
Opportunities for future work
Workforce issues do not pertain to a scarcity 
of work, but to the distribution of work 
among the population (Autor, 2015). In 
addition to labour market risks, there are 
opportunities to reduce economic and social 
inequality through the reimagining of the 
future of work. Paid work is becoming a less 
reliable and useful method for distributing 
wealth (Dunlop, 2016); a situation that will be 
further enhanced as technology continues to 
improve. AI could be used to redistribute work 
across the population, and therefore redress 
disparities in unemployment (Spencer, 2018). 
AI and automation afford new possibilities 
to extend creative activities in work. In this 
regard, less and better work can become a 
reality with the use of AI technologies (Srnicek 
and Williams, 2016). 
Looking to the service sector as an example 
of future opportunities, in countries such 
as the US and Australia it has become the 
largest section of the labour market. The 
service sector includes banking, finance, 
tourism, hospitality, healthcare and social 
services. Technological changes that have 
generated new methods of service delivery 
and rising household incomes have aided this 
expansion. Some predictions indicate that 
the service sector will continue to play an 
important role in the economy and there is 
potential that, as with previous technological 
developments, the sector will have the 
capacity to absorb displaced workers as new 
occupations are created. 
4.3.1.4 Increasing marginalisation 
The use of models and algorithms has 
the potential to further contribute to the 
marginalisation of already vulnerable 
population groups. Unjust outcomes 
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can be produced as a result of human 
decisions regarding both model design and 
implementation. 
Bias can also occur in contexts wherein 
statistical models are used with the aim of 
reducing the influence of bias in human 
decision makers. For example, statistical 
recidivism models aim to reduce the influence 
of bias (whether explicit or implicit) of judges 
in the sentencing of crimes. However, these 
models often reproduce and disguise bias 
(see Angwin, Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016; 
Austin, 2006; Kehl et al., 2017; Labrecque, 
Smith, Lovins, & Latessa, 2014; Lum & Isaac, 
2016; Prince & Butters, 2014; Vrieze & Grove, 
2010). Data used in these models are typically 
obtained from questionnaires completed 
by perpetrators and often include details 
about upbringing, family, social connections, 
geographical location and proximity to other 
offenders. This is data that should be irrelevant 
to a perpetrator’s sentencing. Nevertheless, 
these data are used to generate a recidivism 
score for sentencing decisions, which 
influences the outcome in a way it should not, 
and for minority groups often results in a high 
recidivism score. Statistical models can also 
be used for hiring to help reduce unconscious 
bias, however further marginalisation can 
occur when statistical models are used to 
inform hiring (and sometimes firing) decisions 
(Barocas & Selbst, 2016a; Hu & Chen, 2017). 
Statistical models are typically used for hiring 
and firing for lower paid jobs, whereas hiring 
(and firing decisions) are often made on the 
basis of personal judgment in higher paid 
jobs. This therefore generates the situation 
in which people from already marginalised 
groups in society can be further marginalised 
by statistical models. 
Statistical models have been previously used 
to inform decisions in important arenas, 
such as the use of credit scores by financial 
institutions. However, the statistical models 
used by AI systems may differ as a result of 
widespread application areas, leading to 
limited capacity for explainability and reduced 
oversight. 
4.3.1.5 Social implications of rising inequality
In Australia, it has been estimated that 
automation could add A$2.2 trillion to annual 
income by 2030 (Marin-Guzman and Bailey, 
2017). However, if trends continue, the 
majority of these gains will not be returned in 
the form of increased wages and conditions. 
If economic inequality were to rise due to 
the effects of AI, the growth of AI could be 
inhibited and the risks of social fragmentation 
could increase. In scenarios where workers 
are displaced by AI, and they do not receive 
adequate transition support or subsistence 
compensation, those affected could oppose 
AI developments (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2018: 
3). If a large part of the population does 
not economically benefit from the growth 
of AI, it is rational that they would defend 
their economic position. This rejection of 
modernity could compromise social and 
economic development. As a result, similar to 
the case with other disruptive technologies, 
AI could be less likely to be adopted and 
diffused throughout the economy, which 
would hamper economic growth and fuel 
political discontent. 
Workers who are more likely to be adversely 
affected by AI are also more likely to 
experience inequality due to lower levels 
of education. It is therefore critical for the 
benefits of AI to be distributed equitably. 
Unless this is achieved, AI threatens to 
perpetuate entrenched disadvantages, which 
is harmful economically and socially.
4.3.1.6 Mitigating the rise of inequality
Public institutions play an important role in 
determining the market structures affecting 
economic distribution. This role requires that 
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innovation is encouraged, while ensuring 
the equitable distribution of benefits. In the 
context of AI and inequality, policymakers 
have a range of mechanisms they can call 
upon, such as:
• Taxation and redistribution: Applying 
effective tax and redistribution systems 
to ensure that the surpluses earned by 
innovators and investors help to support 
those inadvertently impacted by AI. This is 
typically performed through progressive 
taxation and transfers, which provides 
workers with subsistence compensation 
during periods of employment transition
• Infrastructure: Effective digital 
infrastructure that helps to diffuse AI 
equitably, such as 5G mobile networks 
and standards that foster open-data 
sharing. Infrastructure, such as internet 
connectivity and access to digital devices, 
provides the backbone for the diffusion 
of AI. In a country as large and dispersed 
as Australia, ensuring equitable access to 
critical infrastructure affects the extent of 
benefits that AI provides, particularly for 
rural and remote populations
• Antitrust policies: Regulating anti-
competitive behaviours by ensuring 
that companies do not stifle market 
competition and exhibit ‘rent-seeking’ 
behaviours that adversely affect innovation 
and the consumer
• Intellectual property rights: Creating 
incentives for companies to innovate by 
granting patents, but also ensuring that 
these exclusive rights do not unfairly block 
barriers to market entry
• Education and training: Investing in the 
development of high-demand skills for 
youth and targeted worker transition 
programs to assist people whose jobs 
have been displaced by AI. Recent work 
suggests that, while STEM skills will 
be important for those developing AI, 
HASS skills will be equally important 
for the larger group of people in other 
occupations in an AI-enhanced world (see 
for example Royal Bank of Canada, 2018: 
12). As such, educational programs should 
ensure that students receive an adequate 
combination of training from both HASS 
and STEM disciplines
• Minimum wage: Helping to tackle poverty 
and alleviate precarity as a result of casual, 
part-time, and ‘gig-based’ employment
• Public research: In parallel with effective 
antitrust policies, public research can 
help reduce the scope for monopolies 
that capture large portions of innovation 
returns. Innovations that are funded by 
public expenditure can be owned by the 
State and achieve market returns that 
contribute to public revenue, such as the 
CSIRO Wi-Fi patent (CSIRO, 2015b).
Given the rapid development of AI and 
automation, public policy and administration 
will require mechanisms for responding to 
the new risks and opportunities associated 
with AI and automation. Within the public 
sector, there exists scope for decision making 
by data-driven AI systems which should 
be implemented with care with respect to 
algorithmic fairness. Across government and 
non-government agencies, large, multiple 
databases are matched and mined to produce 
new understanding of service users and 
activities (Gillingham and Graham, 2016: 135). 
The provision of social services driven by 
data-powered algorithmic decisions can pose 
challenges for already vulnerable populations 
(McClure, Sinclair and Aird, 2015: 128).
AI-powered technologies represent potential 
for significant widespread benefit. To 
capitalise on these benefits and ensure 
equitable outcomes, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the limitations and uncertainty 
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associated with AI technologies (O’Neil, 
2016: 208). The use of these technologies can 
reinforce prejudice and inequality resulting 
from the simplification of complex issues. 
Ensuring procedural fairness and digital 
inclusion will require that the economic 
progress enabled by AI developments is 
shared equally.
Universal basic income
Should AI result in the displacement of 
workers, a redistribution of the economic 
gains derived from AI technologies could 
be considered to ensure social equity. A 
universal basic income could provide this 
method of wealth redistribution. The universal 
basic income has been suggested as one 
means to provide economic security at a 
time of economic uncertainty and as a way 
of providing an economic floor as workers 
experiment with new forms of income 
generation in the so-called ‘gig-economy’ 
(Mays, Marston and Tomlinson, 2016). A 
universal basic income is an unconditional 
regular payment. 
It has been suggested that a universal 
basic income could be implemented in 
a developmental process, which focuses 
on the ‘basic’ component of the income, 
rather than the ‘universal’ (Quiggin, 2017). 
This could be achieved through the initial 
introduction of a full universal basic income 
payment to selected, vulnerable populations. 
Subsequently, payment recipients could 
gradually increase until full universality is 
achieved. The estimated cost of everyone 
in Australia receiving a full basic income is 
around 5-10 percent of GDP (Quiggin, 2017). 
Integrating the universal basic income with 
the tax system may allow for a cheaper 
model of universal basic income. There are 
industries and countries experimenting with 
initiatives that reduce working hours but 
do not reduce income. These initiatives will 
serve as significant platforms for evaluation. 
Given that part-time and low-paid workers 
are predominantly female, a reduced working 
week with an adequate income could enable 
a more gender-equal distribution of wage 
work (Rubery, 2018). 
4.3.1.7 Summary – equity of access
The use of AI technologies presents 
opportunities for future societal benefit. 
Developmental decisions will shape the way 
in which AI delivers these benefits. This is 
highlighted by Schwab (2017: 174): 
‘Neither technology nor the disruption 
that comes with it is an exogenous 
force over which humans have no 
control. All of us are responsible for 
guiding its evolution, in the decisions 
we make on a daily basis as citizens, 
consumers and investors. We should 
grasp the opportunity we have to 
shape the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
and direct it toward a future that 
reflects our common objectives 
and values.’ 
Societies have regularly adapted to industrial 
and labour transformations from previous 
general purpose technologies (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995). Therefore, consideration 
should instead be given to the types of 
new skills and jobs demanded by AI, how 
to equip people with these skills, and the 
implications on inequality if the labour market 
is slow, or fails, to transition to meet these 
new economic demands. A comprehensive 
and continual understanding of the changes 
taking place in the labour market, now 
and into the future, will be important for 
developing appropriate policy responses 
to deal with these changes. Public policies 
will play an important role for ensuring 
that the benefits of AI are not unreasonably 
concentrated or reinforce existing inequalities. 
While the developments of AI must be 
nurtured to help realise its potential, it should 
not be done by creating an unequal society. 
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The future direction of AI will be determined 
by human action within broader political and 
social frameworks. With collective vision, AI 
could facilitate a society that has increased 
leisure time in which ‘familial, community, and 
creative development can flourish and replace 
our current society’s incessant production and 
overwork’ (Stubbs, 2017: 709). 
4.3.2 Indigenous peoples
AI is, to an increasing extent, a part of the 
everyday lives of some Māori and Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In 
Australia, for example, Aboriginal technology 
entrepreneur Mikaela Jade is using augmented 
and mixed reality technologies to tell stories 
on country in Indigenous communities 
(Powell, 2018). In Aotearoa New Zealand, AI is 
being used for language revitalisation. Tribal 
radio stations Te Hiku Media are creating 
language tools that will enable speech 
recognition and natural language processing 
of Te Reo Māori (Collins, 2018). 
It has been suggested that AI might be a 
less confronting notion from an Indigenous 
standpoint than it is from a western 
perspective (Black, 2018). Indigenous 
legal customs are determined by a sacred 
relationship between people and nature. This 
relationship shapes how people carry out 
their responsibilities and gain rights (Black, 
2011). Therefore, the notion that there can 
exist a non-human decision-making system 
that knows us, possibly better than we know 
ourselves, is familiar to Indigenous peoples. 
To realise the potential benefits of AI for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
and Māori, it is necessary to consider the 
unique challenges and opportunities posed 
by AI systems across community groups. 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
and Māori are among the most disadvantaged 
in Australia and New Zealand, carrying the 
heaviest burden of disease, over-incarceration 
and broad-spectrum inequality. This is 
directly related to histories of colonisation 
and dispossession, as well as ongoing 
integrational impacts of social, cultural and 
political marginalisation.
AI decision-making systems have the potential 
to exacerbate these existing inequalities, 
if not developed with considerations 
of diverse Indigenous populations. For 
example, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
and Māori children and their families are 
disproportionately affected by the use 
of potentially biased algorithms in child 
protection. In New Zealand, more than half 
of children in state care are Māori even 
though they comprise only one-quarter of 
the child population (Office of the Children’s 
Commissioner, 2015). In Australia, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander are nearly seven 
times as likely to be in state care as non-
Indigenous children (Australian Government, 
2017). The complex relationships between 
structural inequalities, ethnicity, patterns 
of system contact and system bias are still 
poorly understood (Keddell and Davie, 
2018). Marked spatial differences in child 
protection substantiations relative to 
notifications suggests system bias is one of 
several explanatory factors at work. There 
are other signs of bias. For example, the 
overrepresentation of Māori children increases 
at each decision point within the child 
protection system, with 40 percent of children 
notified being Māori, increasing to 60 percent 
by the time decisions to remove children 
into foster care are made (Keddell and Davie, 
2018). The following discussion considers the 
potential for AI technologies to contribute to 
inequality experienced by Indigenous people. 
Concerns specific to Indigenous people in 
relation to the collection and use of data will 
be discussed in Chapter 7.
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AI technologies should be developed to 
safeguard against the entrenchment of such 
inequalities. Indeed, inclusive AI technologies 
may provide opportunities to address existing 
inequalities.
Harnessing the potential of AI for Indigenous 
peoples in Australia and Aotearoa New 
Zealand should be closely aligned with 
Indigenous leadership and Indigenous 
governance on the processes of how, when 
and in what circumstances these technologies 
are applied. It therefore follows that an 
important issue for Indigenous peoples is the 
extent to which AI impacts on their right to 
self-determination. 
4.3.2.1 Self-determination
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples affirms the right to 
self-determination (article 3) and extends 
this right to self-government and autonomy 
in relation to internal and local affairs (article 
4). In Australia, self-determination refers 
to inclusions in decision making for those 
affected by government decisions, and 
independent, territorial sovereignty (Ford, 
2012). Self-determination with respect to 
AI may comprise Indigenous involvement 
in the design, use and implementation of 
AI technologies. Indigenous consultation is 
particularly important given that Indigenous 
peoples may have different priorities and 
needs associated with the use of AI. These 
requirements can be overlooked in systems 
and technologies that are solely focused on 
achieving efficient outcomes for the broader 
population. 
This can be understood with reference to an 
example from New Zealand. Economists in 
New Zealand used large government datasets 
to develop a predictive algorithm for early 
intervention in child protection cases (Oak, 
2016). An ethical review found that Māori 
people were disproportionally represented 
in the risk group. As a result, there was a risk 
that Māori people or communities might 
be subject to hyper-vigilance, including the 
removal of Māori children not at risk. Even 
if such a model were found to succeed in 
creating social benefits for the community 
(in this instance by mitigating child abuse), 
a Maori-centred approach should involve 
Māori at all stages ‘from design to the follow-
up of whānau [family/political unit] and the 
evaluation of the programme’ (Blank et al., 
2015: 10). 
Where AI systems have not involved 
community input, some Indigenous people 
may prefer to opt out. However, the capacity 
to opt out may be limited when people could 
encounter disadvantages as result of this 
decision. For example, when AI systems are 
linked with public services associated with the 
delivery of healthcare or social and economic 
wellbeing, opting out of such a system may 
mean losing access to these services. 
4.3.2.2 Digital inclusion
AI may be used in ways that may have benefit 
for Indigenous communities. For example, 
researchers are working with Google to build 
AI models that preserve Indigenous languages 
(Biggs, 2018). However, the extent to which 
people benefit from AI is dependent on the 
capacity to access digital technologies. Factors 
that could affect a person’s capacity to use the 
digital systems and services underpinning AI 
include access limitations, costs associated 
with access and digital literacy abilities. 
Measures of digital inclusion, such as the 
Australian Digital Inclusion Index, suggest 
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people access the internet less than the 
general population. While measures of digital 
inclusion have received criticism because, 
for example, a greater proportion of needs 
may be met through the examination of the 
way in which people use the internet rather 
115
than who uses the internet, such metrics 
continue to provide a basis for understanding 
population differences in access (Borg & 
Smith, 2018: 378). Although the number of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
who access the internet (in non-remote areas) 
is increasing, differences in internet access 
and use remain; these differences have the 
potential to affect the extent to which AI 
services may be used. For example, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people in non-
remote areas are significantly more likely to 
use mobile-only internet services (Thomas 
et al., 2017). This restricts internet access to 
locations with mobile reception and requires 
the capacity to pay for mobile internet 
services. Regardless of available infrastructure, 
internet use can vary according to the social 
norms and choices of particular groups. In 
New Zealand, the Digital Economy and Digital 
Inclusion Ministerial Advisory Group seeks to 
reduce the digital divide. The 20/20 Trust is 
another New Zealand initiative which provides 
digital literacy programs. 
It is likely that services will increasingly be 
provided online as more people access the 
internet. Those who remain without internet 
access (or with intermittent access) will 
experience difficulties as face-to-face services 
are removed or reduced. People excluded 
from accessing online services are most likely 
to be vulnerable and in need of social support 
services. However, the application and use of 
AI technologies have the potential to assist 
some people in accessing online services. 
Opportunities exist for AI to resolve access 
barriers related to digital skills, language or 
disability. For example, chatbots may be used 
in ways that overcome barriers associated 
with digital skills and abilities.
4.3.2.3 Summary – Indigenous peoples
As AI is developed, it is important to consider 
how Indigenous knowledge systems might 
inform their deployment, as well as how the 
governmental and philosophical implications 
are conceived. AI technologies may enable 
more appropriate services for Indigenous 
peoples, including services in language, or 
which accommodate group needs and norms 
in ways that those designed for the majority 
cannot. The decisions made as a result of 
ML may impact on individuals’ agency. AI 
might be responsive to group norms in 
ways that existing technologies are not or 
generate supra-state governance through 
their decision-making abilities (Bratton, 2015). 
Much of the debate on the social and ethical 
implications of AI has been concerned with 
the quality of data and design. These issues 
will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.3.3 AI and inclusion
Emerging technologies can provide 
opportunities for greater inclusion and 
demonstrate potential to enhance the lives 
of people with a disability, older people, 
children, and others who experience social 
disadvantage. For example, technology may 
be able to replace the use of guide dogs, and 
development is underway for autonomous 
wheelchairs (Scudellari, 2017). To ensure 
a fair Australian society, everyone should 
be provided with opportunities for access 
and inclusion in addition to the freedom 
to opt-out of instances of social inclusion. 
However, there are challenges associated 
with AI technologies. Consideration should 
be given to the regulatory framework 
governing AI, its implications for the rule 
of law, and the inclusion of subconscious 
biases in data. While AI holds promises 
of life enhancing technology for those 
who might be considered disadvantaged, 
algorithmic bias could also reinforce certain 
disadvantages. The design of AI should be 
shaped by decisions associated with our 
desires for the future of society. AI systems 
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should be developed to incorporate diverse 
human factors to ensure the benefits of AI are 
equitably distributed. 
Inclusive design seeks to accommodate 
and involve those experiencing difference, 
disability or disadvantage (Center for Inclusive 
Design and Environmental Access, 2011). 
Although inclusive design is most commonly 
considered in the built environment, it is also 
considered in ICT, teaching and learning, 
service provision, written documents and in 
policy development (Centre for Excellence 
in Universal Design, 2018). Incorporation of 
inclusive design considerations during the 
development of relevant policies and AI 
technologies could address issues on trust, 
ethics and regulation. Public consultation in 
the development of inclusive AI design may 
help foster trust in the technology.
4.3.3.1 Defining AI and social disability
The social model of disability is the 
internationally recognised way to view 
and address disability. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities sets the standard for approaches 
to disability. People with disability should 
not be seen as objects of charity, medical 
treatment and social protection. Rather, they 
should be regarded as subjects with agency, 
rights and obligations, capable of claiming 
those rights and autonomy, and navigate 
and participate in the world based on free 
and informed consent. The responsibility 
for inclusion does not lie with the individual 
with a disability but relates to the design of 
the environment. 
4.3.3.2 Inclusive inputs
Big data underpins the functioning of AI 
systems. To date, concerns regarding big data 
have focused on the risks of inclusion – the 
threats arising from the collection, analysis 
Box 18: Universal design 
in practice
Can AI be racist? This is a question asked 
in a Microsoft inclusive design team blog 
post (Chou, Murillo and Ibars, 2017). 
Microsoft and other software developers 
have been following inclusive design 
principles in the development of their 
software for some time. They found that 
by designing for the broadest possible 
number of users, they have created 
more accessible, convenient and useable 
programs and apps. 
Microsoft states that its first inclusive 
design principle is to recognise exclusion 
and identify bias. They describe five 
biases: association, dataset, interaction, 
automation and confirmation bias. 
Microsoft has recognised that by 
identifying who is excluded rather than 
trying to include everyone has made 
the task easier. A similar approach was 
developed some ten years ago by the 
Inclusive Design Team at the Engineering 
Design Centre, University of Cambridge 
in the UK.
The inclusive design team, through the 
development of their inclusive design 
toolkit and their exclusion calculator, 
used population demographics and other 
factors to ascertain how many people 
will be left out of a design based on a 
particular level of ability such as seeing, 
hearing, lifting or grasping (Cardoso et al., 
2007). For example, making something 
useable for people with poor grip 
strength (e.g. a lever handle) makes it 
easier for everyone – it does not exclude 
people with good grip strength.
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making (Australian Government, 2018j). 
Concerns about representation and exclusion 
are as inherent in technology as they are in 
traditional conceptions of political participation. 
The reverse is also true; when data are 
collected, people with disabilities, culturally 
and linguistically diverse groups, women, 
and people who identify as LGBQTI, are at 
risk of being discriminated against (Danks 
and London, 2017; Knight, 2017). Recent 
exposure of the bias in COMPAS and PredPol 
demonstrates this. The proliferation of 
artificially intelligent female personal assistants 
entrenches gender bias (Stern, 2017), 
facial recognition threatens culturally and 
linguistically diverse groups (Bowles, 2016; 
Lohr, 2018; Shah, 2018), and chatbots can learn 
antisemitism, racism and misogyny in a single 
day (Mason, 2016). Some researchers caution 
that it may be impossible to create fairness 
and equality in algorithms (Miconi, 2017). As 
human creations, they are inevitably biased. 
There is the risk of ‘automating the exact 
same biases these programs are supposed to 
eliminate’ (Lum, 2017). This bias has resulted 
in the refusal of parole and disproportionate 
prison sentencing of culturally and 
linguistically diverse groups, the over-policing 
of neighbourhoods with large populations 
of  culturally and linguistically diverse groups, 
the arrest of a Palestinian man over an 
incorrect Facebook auto-translation and the 
overrepresentation of Indigenous people on 
the NSW suspect targeting management plan 
(O’Mallon, 2017). 
Research demonstrates the opportunity to 
include data outliers through the training of 
AI with messy data. The initial outcomes are 
encouraging, with AI taking longer in the 
initial processing phase but producing richer 
and more varied results. Additional work is 
being undertaken to change the shape of the 
bell curve to allow AI programs to read and 
understand the outliers as part of the dataset. 
and use of personal information. However, 
there is also the risk of an individual’s data 
not being collected, or if collected, that it is 
dismissed as an outlier. The elderly, people 
with disability, or those who experience 
disadvantage, may be prevented from owning 
or engaging with the technology responsible 
for producing such data. This technology may 
be inaccessible or have prohibitive costs. Costs 
associated with technology are significant 
given the high poverty and unemployment 
rates affecting, for instance, people with 
disability (OECD, 2009; Australian Government, 
2011). The subsequent outputs produced by 
AI systems using this incomplete data may 
have limited applicability to those users not 
represented within the initial dataset. This may 
be of particular importance for AI outputs that 
support medical or legal decisions. 
People with disability are less likely to access 
the internet than people without disability. 
Only 60 percent of people with disability have 
home internet access, and they are 20 percent 
less likely to own smart-devices, home 
broadband, and a range of technology that is 
essential to the creation of data and the use 
of AI technologies (Australian Government, 
2014a). Elderly Australians use the internet 
50 percent less frequently than their younger 
counterparts and 98 percent of this internet 
use is within the home, creating less useable 
data (Anderson, 2015b, 2015a; Australian 
Government, 2016). An estimated one million 
Australians over 65 have never accessed the 
internet (Anderson, 2015b, 2015a; Australian 
Government, 2016). This means that the vast 
array of individual data is not collected.
This has significant economic consequences 
for the use of AI and big data in targeted 
advertisements, and trade and hiring decisions. 
There are also potential political problems 
resulting from the exclusion of minority 
representation in data, particularly when 
government uses data in political decision 
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Box 19: AI and disability
In 2015, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
reported that 18 percent of the Australian 
population identify as having a disability. 
It is generally agreed upon that the global 
rate of people with a disability is increasing 
due to age, new diseases and conflicts. 
AI presents unique opportunities and 
challenges for people with a disability. 
The development of appropriate policy 
and legislative frameworks could help to 
deliver benefits and protections to people 
with a disability. In conjunction with policy 
frameworks, the integration of AI technology 
could serve to decrease the unemployment 
rate for people with a disability; develop a 
more inclusive education system; promote 
access to existing and new media content, 
information and print publications; increase 
accessibility to consumer goods, computer 
and telecommunication technologies for all; 
and result in a more inclusive society.
Different disability groups present distinct 
needs and requirements with accessibility 
of information and technology. For example, 
people with a disability, particularly those 
who are blind or vision impaired, are not able 
to adopt computing and internet-related 
technologies at the same rate as the able-
bodied population (Hollier, 2007). However, 
some AI-powered technologies, such as 
image recognition, are adopted at a faster 
rate by people with a disability. Over the 
next decade, it is likely that AI will provide 
significant opportunities for engagement and 
independence, particularly in the areas of 
mobility, home automation and information 
access. However, the design of user 
interfaces must support the relevant assistive 
technology used by people with a disability. 
Often, commercial technologies can 
unintentionally include barriers to use. This 
has largely resulted from a lack of awareness, 
limited regard for accessibility and concerns 
about additional costs. In the consumer 
sector, touch screen technology can be a 
major barrier for people with a disability. 
However, mobile technology provides an 
example of the successful incorporation of 
inclusive design for disability requirements. 
Apple, Microsoft and Google have included 
accessibility and assistive technology into 
their operating systems. 
AI-powered technologies that deliver data 
and respond to commands may constitute 
a form of assistive technology. AI provides 
support in a similar way to popular assistive 
technology software. For example, a screen 
reader may provide content to a person 
who is blind (Hennig, 2016). However, unlike 
assistive technology solutions, AI provides 
always-on real-time connectivity, which 
ensures that people can quickly and easily 
obtain assistance and support. Use of AI may 
improve quality of life and facilitate social 
and economic participation (Domingo, 2012). 
For example, self-driving car technology was 
used in conjunction with eye tracking and 
brain electrical activity sensors to develop 
self-driving wheelchairs and via the cognitive 
assistance project for visual impairment, 
vision-impaired users can see what is around 
them in context (Baker, 2014; IBM, 2015; 
Malewar, 2018).
While AI may provide benefits to people 
with disabilities, there are also possible risks 
of exclusion. These concerns pertain to 
interoperability, accessibility support, 
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identification and configuration, privacy, 
and security and safety (Hollier and Abou-
Zahra, 2018). For example, AI has been 
largely developed without consideration for 
the needs of people who are blind or vision 
impaired (Maguire, 2018). While there is 
design of AI technology specifically for vision 
impaired users, mainstream AI applications are 
largely developed separately (Maguire, 2018). 
As such, design considerations pertain to the 
use of systems by those with accessibility 
issues. An example of this includes the use 
of facial recognition and related biometric 
algorithms in airports, which may exclude 
blind people as their eyes may not be visible 
or not able to focus on facial technology. 
Accessible tools should be provided within 
industries responsible for the development 
of AI technologies. This will ensure that 
people with a disability will have equal 
opportunities in both the development and 
use of AI technology. Accessibility must be 
incorporated at each stage of the product life-
cycle, not just at the end of the process. As a 
component of this, it is important to provide 
training and education on accessibility in 
education programs targeted at product 
management, design, development and 
marketing. 
Accessibility is often considered to only 
benefit those with a disability. However, in 
practice, accessibility benefits a large fraction 
the community. For example, increasing text 
size on web pages up to 400 percent benefits 
people who have difficulty with small text and 
are not legally blind. Multimedia captions help 
those with English as a second language who 
find it easier to understand the written word.
For people with a disability to enjoy the 
benefits provided by AI devices along with 
protections relating to privacy and security, 
it is necessary to have effective legislative 
support and technical standards. Article 9 
of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) 
states: ‘To enable persons with disabilities 
to live independently and participate fully 
in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to ensure to persons 
with disabilities access, on an equal basis 
with others, to the physical environment, 
to transportation, to information and 
communications, including information and 
communications technologies and systems, 
and to other facilities and services open or 
provided to the public, both in urban and 
in rural areas’ (United Nations, 2006). As a 
signatory to the UNCRPD, Australia has some 
policies but lacks specific disability-based 
legislation addressing ICT requirements for 
people with a disability. Issues of privacy, 
security or interoperability relating to AI 
present specific concerns to people with 
a disability. Australian policy or legislative 
framework does not account for these 
concerns. For example, technologies may 
be used by human support agents to obtain 
information on an individual with a disability 
without their knowledge. This could include 
financial information, personal habits, and 
other information that the user accidentally 
revealed. 
Policies and legislative frameworks should 
be amended to provide greater support for 
people with a disability. Additionally, federal 
and state governments could provide private 
sector incentives to encourage accessible 
design of products and services. This 
approach could particularly incentivise small 




Every design decision has the potential to 
include or exclude people. Understanding 
user diversity will result in maximised 
inclusion. Users vary in capabilities, needs 
and aspirations with differences in ability, 
language, culture, gender, age and other 
forms of human difference. While the 
concepts of accessibility, inclusive design and 
universal design are often intertwined, the 
goal is always the same – that is the human 
right to universal access. While the underlying 
principles of universal and inclusive design are 
virtually identical, the difference is a matter of 
perspective and source (May, 2018). Inclusive 
design seeks to expand the range and 
diversity of end users recognising that one 
size doesn’t fit all. This notion is particularly 
suited to technological advancement. 
Fundamental principles in inclusive design 
include: 
• recognising diversity and uniqueness
• inclusive processes and tools
• broader beneficial impact. 
It is important to incorporate a diversity of 
insights and voices in the design process. 
To achieve this participation, design and 
development tools must be accessible. 
Inclusive accommodation throughout the 
design process will ensure that the entire 
spectrum of users reap the benefits of the 
technology, and the inputs, processes, 
outputs and governance are inclusive and 
universal. In addition, attention to inclusive 
design will provide autonomy and dignity for 
people with disability and those who may 
otherwise experience exclusion. 
4.3.3.4 Inclusive outputs 
To ensure that AI outputs accommodate a 
wide variety of users and more users derive 
benefits, diversity should be recognised in 
both datasets and AI design. Recent debate 
over the emergence of My Health Record 
has shown that not only does the system 
risk marginalisation of people with disability, 
drug users, and sex workers, but the output 
itself – the self-managed health record – is 
largely inaccessible to people with disabilities, 
who perhaps could benefit most from the 
technology (Inclusion Australia, 2018).
There are many successful examples of 
inclusive AI; and many more examples 
where inclusively-designed AI challenges 
preconceived notions of violations of privacy 
and perpetuated prejudice. For example, AI 
can provide people with disabilities greater 
privacy. 
• the use of AI in the design of an 
intelligent cognitive orthosis for people 
with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease 
minimises the encroachment of a full-time 
care team into the personal life of a person 
with these conditions. This would provide 
dignity, autonomy and privacy to people 
with dementia and Alzheimer’s (Mihailidis, 
Fernie and Barbenel, 2001; Mihailidis, 
Barbenel and Fernie, 2004)
• prototypes that provide for the monitoring 
of the onset of psychosis in people with 
schizophrenia promise greater autonomy 
and reduced intrusion into an individual’s 
private life (Corcoran et al., 2018)
• speech recognition programs that identify 
non-standard speech allow for people 
with a spectrum of disability to access 
applications and technologies previously 
unavailable (Kewley-Port, 1999; Breakstone, 
2017)
• Google’s DeepMind creates closed 
captions and audio descriptions with 
greater accuracy than a person employed 
to do those tasks, at a markedly lower cost, 
increasing the access people with hearing 
and vision impairments have to media 
(Vinyals et al., 2017)
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• Facebook is collecting data from its 
disabled-identifying users to address the 
issue of cleaned, absorbable datasets
• Microsoft has invested US$25 million in the 
development of accessible AI.
While these examples provide immediate 
benefits to people with disability, AI that is 
capable of lip-reading, non-standard speech 
recognition, and self-driving cars will benefit 
all businesses and people. While simple text 
on a webpage, lifts at train stations or an 
electric toothbrush may have been designed 
for disability, they benefit us all.
To ensure inclusive practice, it is necessary 
to address:
1. industry benchmarks and modelling
2. funding support for incubation, 
testing and piloting the resources and 
methodology in Australia and New 
Zealand, given our specific challenges 
including geographical reach, diverse 
populations and the Indigenous 
experience
3. a governance framework that combines 
technical understanding, community and 
industry
4.3.3.5 Governance and regulation
AI that is not inclusive, accessible, or universal 
poses potential threats to the democratic 
system and the rule of law. Democracy is 
predicated on a citizen’s right to be freely 
informed and make political choices. Biased 
AI can produce social fragmentation, and 
the issue of reduced privacy, increased 
surveillance and targeted advertising all 
threaten this democratic principle of free 
and informed choice. The use of big data and 
various other inputs that exclude, marginalise, 
or pathologise minorities has significant 
legal ramifications. The use of big data 
underpinning AI is problematic with regards 
to the right to privacy and risks perpetuating 
imbalanced power structures. Consideration 
could be given to ethical and inclusive use of 
AI and data within the Age, Sex, Disability and 
Racial Discrimination Acts. Such regulatory 
considerations may include the erasure 
of data generated by people with social 
disabilities.
Achieving inclusiveness in AI is contingent 
on the establishment of governance 
and a regulatory framework. Inclusive 
design principles with oversight to ensure 
compliance will address many of the issues 
raised for those experiencing disadvantage 
Box 20: Connected and 
automated vehicles
Automated vehicles present 
opportunities for inclusive design. 
Trials of driverless vehicles are being 
conducted with the aim of eliminating 
human drivers. Some of the technology 
is already available in newer model cars, 
such as automatic braking and assisted 
parking. It is claimed that road accidents 
will reduce significantly with the removal 
of human error. Autonomous vehicles 
have the potential to provide point-to-
point transportation for people unable 
to hold a driver’s licence. However, there 
must be attention to design to ensure 
the inclusive potential of autonomous 
vehicles. For example, visually impaired 
people may not be able to use touch 
screens. Voice activation is a problem 
for people who are non-verbal or 
hearing impaired. There is the question 
of addressing use of wheelchairs 
and baby strollers. Inclusive design 
principles can help with development 
of autonomous vehicles. 
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4.3.3.6 Summary – AI and inclusion
AI presents both challenges and 
opportunities. AI holds the promise of 
life-enhancing technologies that have the 
potential to broadly benefit the community. 
If programmed with inclusion, decisions 
made by AI systems could contain less bias 
than human decisions. The implications of 
exclusivity in the inputs, design, outputs, 
and regulatory framework have significant 
implications for the ability of people to use 
and disability and will benefit the entire 
community. Methods of inclusive design can 
be refined by using technology to design 
for one extreme experience at a time and 
then including the next. It’s an and rather 
than or model. While a number of inclusive 
design tool kits exist, none is unique to the 
Australasian situation, where geographic 
and population demographics, including 
our Indigenous populations, pose unique 
challenges and opportunities. 
Box 21: Case study: Using AI technologies to predict criminality
Research claims to have found evidence 
that criminality can be predicted from facial 
features. Xiaolin Wu and Xi Zhang (2016) 
describe how they trained a model to be able 
to distinguish photos of criminals from photos 
of non-criminals with a high level of accuracy.
However, Wu and Zhang’s results can be 
interpreted differently depending on what 
assumptions are presented and what 
questions are posed. The authors make 
the assumption, contrary to overwhelming 
evidence (see for example Bobo & Thompson, 
2006), that there is no bias in the criminal 
justice system. Consequently, Wu and Zhang 
assume that the criminals whose photos they 
used as training data are a representative 
sample of criminals in the wider population 
(including those who have never been caught 
or convicted for their crimes). The question 
posed by Wu and Zhang is whether there 
is a correlation between facial features and 
criminality. Given their assumption, the results 
suggest that there is such a correlation.
However, if the initial assumption was that 
there is no relationship between facial 
features and any putative criminality trait, 
then in place of this question, one might 
instead be interested in whether there is bias 
in the criminal justice system. In that case, 
Wu and Zhang’s results could be presented as 
evidence that there is indeed such bias – that 
is, the criminal justice system is biased against 
people with certain facial features. This 
hypothesis would also explain the difference 
between the photos of convicted criminals 
and the photos of people from the general 
population. The authors did not consider this 
alternative possibility. Indeed, they appear to 
be saying that while humans may be prone to 
bias, ML systems are not.
However, it is clear that the data on which 
this system was trained had ample scope for 
human bias to enter at many points, from the 
initial arrest to the conviction of each person 
whose photograph appears in the dataset. 
Deploying a system like this in the real world 
could have detrimental consequences. 
Human biases can infect the data on which 
‘neutral’ statistical models train. This results in 
the model being biased and, in this example, 
potentially amplify the biases already present 
in the criminal justice system. Such false 
positives could have ethically unacceptable 
results, such as unwarranted scrutiny of 
people who have done nothing wrong, or 
worse, arrests of innocent people.
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and benefit from this technology. To ensure 
collective and public benefit from AI 
technology, it is necessary to prioritise the 
potential for public good. Consideration 
should be given to issues of fairness, equity 
of access and broadly distributed economic 
wellbeing. Consulting widely is a key aspect of 
the inclusive design process. Some specialised 
technological functions have the potential to 
be broadly applied, providing wide benefit. 
4.3.4 Profiling 
AI technologies collect and use large 
amounts of data to generate predictions 
and results. Known as profiling, this use of AI 
enables online interfaces such as Google to 
individually tailor search suggestions (using 
predictive analytics) and answers to search 
queries (using prescriptive analytics). The use 
of profiling could enhance and accelerate 
decision-making processes through the use 
of aggregated datasets; such datasets are 
too large and complicated to be processed 
via traditional methods. However, profiling 
has important implications in relation to 
ethics, human rights, and discrimination. As 
discussed with reference to COMPAS, the use 
of profiling has the potential to adversely 
affect people, particularly those in minority 
groups. Design decisions with respect to the 
use of data and profiled information should 
be carefully considered. 
The wellbeing of people should be prioritised 
in the consideration of profiling design 
consequences. Organisations responsible for 
the introduction of new profiling systems 
powered by AI technologies should evaluate 
the impact of these systems and make 
informed production decisions. 
4.4 Informed citizens 
To ensure that all Australians can equally 
participate in public life and engage with 
AI technologies on a consenting basis, it 
is essential that Australians are informed 
about its uses and capabilities. Equipping the 
community with an appreciation of AI systems 
is necessary in order to avoid individual 
exploitation. This is particularly pertinent 
given the power and knowledge imbalances 
between those who develop AI and those 
who use AI. While it may be difficult to 
explain the complete workings of AI systems, 
transparency could involve informing people 
about the use of AI and its applications. 
The exercise of individual freedoms and 
participation in public life are predicated 
on privacy and freedom from surveillance. 
Important considerations exist in relation 
to AI and collected data, discrimination and 
consent.
The advent of the internet has made 
information more freely accessible, providing 
opportunities to increase knowledge, public 
communication and engagement. The scope 
and content of public discourse will be further 
affected by AI-powered technologies. AI can 
be used to help people find information, make 
friends, navigate cities, determine whom to 
hire and fire, predict epidemics, diagnose 
medical conditions and identify and track 
criminals. Until recently, decision making in 
these domains was the exclusive purview of 
humans. Our epistemic, ethical, and political 
capacities enable us to engage in such 
activities and – in the ideal case – explain our 
decisions to the people they affect. 
The human capacity to make and explain 
decisions is a critical component of 
democracies. This is only possible in a social 
and political environment in which people 
have adequate access to the reasons that 
bear on their choices. In addition, one of the 
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presuppositions of democratic deliberation 
is that citizens have access to enough of the 
same information and truths that they share 
common ground on which to debate policies, 
institutions and other arrangements.
Given the potential for AI to increasingly 
determine how people acquire and circulate 
information, it is necessary to consider the 
way in which these systems work, the capacity 
for these systems to be explained, and how 
these systems can or have been misused. The 
increasing use of online media has brought 
into focus the problems of ‘filter bubbles’ 
(Pariser, 2011), ‘echo chambers’ (Nguyen, 2018) 
and group polarisation (Sunstein, 2017). 
4.4.1 Explainability in AI
The algorithms underlying AI are 
sophisticated, but their workings are often 
difficult to decipher and explain to people 
without a strong mathematical background. 
The workings of recent developments, such as 
Google’s TensorFlow, are opaque even to their 
designers (Lewis-Kraus, 2016). This type of AI is 
built on artificial neural networks that respond 
holistically to a very large number of variables 
based on very large training datasets. 
AI can embed human biases and systematic 
errors in the algorithms and data trained with 
it (Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan, 2017). 
When training data are not made publicly 
accessible, it can be difficult to understand 
or explain how errors arise. An example of 
incorrect outputs generated by AI-powered 
TensorFlow is demonstrated by Google 
Translate. In this case, repeated instances of 
the word ‘dog’ from several input languages 
including Hawaiian, Maori, and Yoruba was 
translated into English as: ‘Doomsday Clock is 
three minutes at twelve We are experiencing 
characters and a dramatic developments 
in the world, which indicate that we are 
increasingly approaching the end times and 
Jesus’ return’ (Christian, 2018). In instances 
of AI unsupervised learning it is, in principle, 
impossible to assess outputs for accuracy or 
reliability (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 
2008). However, we often apply a double 
standard, requiring a much higher level of 
transparency for AI than for human decision 
makers. 
While the underlying algorithmic process 
may not always be explainable, the ethical 
adoption of AI requires consideration 
of transparency. For instance, it may be 
important to notify the public in instances 
where they are interacting with AI and also 
be informed in an accessible manner when 
their data is being collected and how it will 
be used. Notifying individuals about the use 
of AI systems is important to ensure their 
capacity to appeal in instances of grievance. 
In addition to allowing for recourse, providing 
the public with an understandable and 
accessible introduction to AI will be especially 
important in establishing trust in AI during 
the initial adoption stages. AI technologies 
are likely to advance and change over time, 
however, establishing public confidence and 
knowledge around initial AI systems will aid 
in the continued support for future systems. 
Explainability in AI with respect to regulatory 
systems is discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.4.2 Public communication and 
dissemination of information
Establishing public trust in AI technologies 
is not only equitable, but will ensure greater 
uptake of technologies that have the potential 
to deliver significant benefits. To generate 
public trust in AI technologies, a multi-
faceted approach will be required and will 
need to involve developing standards that 
are informed by ethical principles, and which 
subsequently underpin regulation and policy 
(Winfield, 2016).
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processes ‘enable more informed citizens 
to collectively decide their shared values 
and acceptable trade-offs in public interests 
through a process of fair, inclusive and 
respectful reasoning with each other’ (Molster 
et al., 2012: 83). This approach has been 
used in Australia to successfully underpin 
public policy development on biobanking 
and associated research in Western Australia 
(Molster et al., 2012: 88). 
Inclusive community engagement is an 
important consideration in the framing of 
consultation and deliberation on AI. People 
with disability, culturally and linguistically 
diverse groups, women, and people who 
identify as LGBQTI, experience limited 
representation within public discourse. To 
ensure these people are not further excluded 
from participation in the public sphere, 
deliberative processes should involve inclusive 
representation. 
In general, technology that is subject to 
regulatory frameworks helps build public 
trust (Winfield, 2016). The development of 
these frameworks should include community 
input and be reflective of people’s values and 
interests. Failure to incorporate community 
views may result in lessened support for the 
use of AI technologies. 
4.4.3 Democracy, information 
and AI
AI increasingly determines how people 
acquire information. Many get their news 
from Twitter and Facebook, both of which 
are underpinned by algorithms. In addition, 
people search for information and translate 
texts using Google’s tools, which also relies on 
AI infrastructure and algorithms.
The technologies described have the 
potential to produce negative consequences 
as a result of a combination of negligence 
and malicious interference. While public 
Public concern with the emergence of AI 
technologies has been well documented 
(Winfield, 2016). In some cases, these 
concerns have been exacerbated by 
sensationalised publications in the news 
and popular media. However, legitimate 
considerations exist in relation to the 
impact of AI technologies on employment 
and privacy (Winfield, 2016). Given that 
AI technologies are likely to have broad-
ranging societal impact, it is important to 
both address these concerns and develop 
frameworks that reflect community values. 
In Europe, there has been a recent decline 
in positive public perceptions towards 
autonomous systems (Winfield, 2016). 
Community engagement and consultation 
on the adoption of AI-powered technologies 
is likely to foster greater public support for 
this emerging technology. For example, 
increased exposure to, and engagement 
with, autonomous systems tends to increase 
favourable attitudes towards this technology 
(Winfield, 2016). 
A process of public consultation was 
undertaken during development of Europe’s 
digital single market strategy (European 
Commission, 2017). The aim of this strategy 
is to ensure that society and the economy 
benefits from the use of digital data. 
Stakeholders involved in the consultation 
process included industry representatives, 
self-employed people and members of the 
public (European Commission, 2017). 
Furthering the concept of public consultation, 
processes of deliberative democracy may 
provide a useful framework for navigating 
the diverse community interests and values 
associated with AI technologies. Deliberative 
democracy has been proposed in instances 
where there are divergent ethical perspectives 
and competing public interests (Molster et 
al., 2012). Rather than a top down approach 
of community engagement, deliberative 
126
query they might want to run. The same 
predictive searches conducted in another 
place and at another time by an account with 
a different history and social graph will yield 
different results.7 For example, a search for the 
query ‘cafe’ returns results for cafés nearest to 
the user; the top results will be different in 
Amsterdam from in Abuja. 
In cases like this, Google suggests questions 
and then answers to those very questions, 
thereby closing the loop on the first stage 
of human reasoning. If reasoning is the 
process of asking and answering questions, 
then the interaction between predictive 
and prescriptive analytics can largely bypass 
the individual’s contribution to reasoning, 
supplying both a question and its answer. 
YouTube uses AI-powered predictive 
modelling to find patterns in individual and 
group preferences, then recommends clips 
(Newton, 2017). The vast majority of video 
selection on YouTube is driven by algorithmic 
recommendations rather than search or 
linking. Predictive modelling risks providing 
people with only select information. Some 
platforms may tailor this information in line 
with specific viewpoints, biased information 
or even bizarre and violent content (Lewis, 
2018). Indeed, suggested queries that contain 
bias or produce discriminatory results can 
further entrench prejudicial beliefs.
Even if only a portion of the population 
is influenced in the ways described, our 
democratic institutions may be adversely 
impacted. People may find themselves in 
disagreement about what should be common 
knowledge. Each side will be able to point 
to their own sources of information as 
supporting evidence. Determining
7 Depending on a user’s profile, the content of search 
results can be subject to change, as in the case of 
Google’s personalised search, which can ‘customize 
search results for you based upon 180 days of search 
activity linked to an anonymous cookie in your browser’ 
(Google, 2009). 
misinformation campaigns are not new, a 
significant proportion of the population could 
be misinformed or disinformed as a result 
of AI systems, and it would be very difficult 
to trace, track and address the causes. For 
example, platforms could be hijacked and 
websites, social media accounts and links 
could be created and inserted. Indeed, there 
is evidence that this has already happened 
in connection with the Brexit referendum 
(Booth et al., 2017; Sabbagh, 2018), the 2016 
US Presidential election (Smith, D., 2018) and 
other high-stakes processes.
These concerns are exacerbated when the 
training data and code these platforms use 
are not released for inspection and correction. 
However, even if training data and code 
were to be released, the personalisation of 
newsfeeds and search results makes it difficult 
to reproduce the processes that led to the 
information outcome (Alfano, Carter and 
Cheong, 2018). This in turn means that it is 
difficult or even impossible to diagnose and 
correct these processes. 
For example, Google creates suggestions 
either by aggregating other users’ data or 
by personalising for each user based on 
their location, search history or other data. 
In addition to the individual’s own record of 
engagement, others’ records can be used to 
profile that individual. Engagement, in this 
context, refers to all recorded aspects of a 
user’s individual online behaviour. To the 
extent that a record of engagement – even 
in depersonalised aggregated form – is more 
similar to that of one set of users than to 
another, an individual is likely to be profiled 
among the former. For example, predictive 
analytics suggest, based on a user’s profile 
and the initial text string they enter, which 
7 Depending on a user’s profile, the content of search results can be subject to change, as in the case of Google’s personalised 
search, which can ‘customize search results for you based upon 180 days of search activity linked to an anonymous cookie in 
your browser’ (Google, 2009). 
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largely from sources that support particular 
viewpoints. Indeed, over 10 percent of US 
information consumers receive information 
only, or largely, from sources that promote 
fake news (Guess, Nyhan and Reifler, 2018). 
Confirmation bias may also explain the 
selective sourcing of information (Nickerson, 
1998). Confirmation bias refers to the positive 
predisposition towards information that 
supports our beliefs, and a disinclination 
towards information that is contrary or 
undermines these beliefs. 
Fake news in Australia
In 2017, the Senate established the 
Select Committee on the Future of Public 
Interest Journalism with the view to 
better understanding the challenges and 
opportunities associated with journalism 
in a digital society (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2018). The Committee reviewed 
the significance of fake news with respect 
to contemporary media and journalism. It 
examined the roles of prominent online 
platforms, such as Google and Facebook, 
in facilitating the spread of fake news. 
However, aware of the importance of reliable 
and trustworthy news, these platforms are 
currently undertaking initiatives to combat 
the spread of fake news. For example, Google 
is using algorithms to identify reliable or 
unreliable content, as well as to pinpoint 
misleading advertising content. Likewise, 
Facebook is using algorithms to reduce fake 
news and fake user profiles. Algorithms are 
not partially well suited to these applications, 
however, and it is unfeasible for large 
companies like Facebook to have people fact-
checking significant portions of information. 
As a result of international concerns about 
the impact of fake news on democratic 
processes, legislation will be introduced into 
Australian parliament in order to prevent 
this occurrence. 
which sources are problematic will be 
difficult or impossible, both because the 
AI that recommends the sources is difficult 
or impossible to explain and because 
the training data and code are treated as 
confidential.
A combination of several approaches, 
including potentially regulating 
microtargeting, may help in remedying 
these concerns. Legislative frameworks 
could be developed with the view to require 
search engine platforms and social media 
corporations to reveal both their datasets 
and the AI algorithms and infrastructures. 
A Google initiative takes steps in this 
direction. As with traditional print media, 
online platforms could be made liable for 
dissemination of information, news and 
content. Intra-industry and government 
research should be undertaken with respect 
to the explainability gap in AI. Australia and 
New Zealand could consider following the 
EU in upholding a legal right to explanation. 
Indeed, the opportunity exists to go further 
than the EU in enforcing this right.
4.4.4 Fake news
AI technologies may be used to circulate false 
information and news reports via the internet. 
Referred to as fake news, it is designed to 
influence public opinion and behaviours. 
Fake news is often presented in a format that 
mimics the authority of legitimate and trusted 
news sites. While AI technologies are used to 
generate and spread fake news, they can also 
be used to combat fake news stories. 
While the full extent of the influence of 
fake news is ill-understood, it appears to be 
attributable to a number of independent and 
interacting factors, including echo chamber 
effects, biased assimilation of information and 
confirmation bias. Echo chambers describe 
the way some people consume information 
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4.4.5 Nudges 
‘Nudges’ – a concept derived from behavioural 
economics – can be designed to make people 
more receptive to testimony. Nudges are 
designed to use positive reinforcement and 
suggestions to influence the context in which 
people form beliefs, make informed decisions 
and act in certain ways (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009). For example, people are more receptive 
to the testimony of others who are perceived 
to have similar values (Levy, 2017a). Nudges 
can be designed to take this into account 
and may involve, for example, ensuring that 
messages are promoted by people across 
the political spectrum. There is evidence 
to indicate that such nudges are effective. 
For example, corrections of false claims are 
effective when they come from sources that 
share the ideology of the receiver (Nyhan 
and Reifler, 2013). Exposing people to a wider 
array of opinions may also make them more 
receptive to alternative information. 
Nudging is controversial because it can be 
seen to circumvent our individual reasoning 
and thereby affect autonomy (see Levy, 
2017b for an overview of these concerns and 
a response to them). Regardless of whether 
nudges do respect autonomy, they may be 
perceived to disrespect it or be otherwise 
unacceptably manipulative. Therefore, 
any attempt to increase public trust in, or 
acceptance of, AI must consider a possible 
perverse effect: there is a risk that people will 
perceive the measures designed to increase 
trust as themselves untrustworthy. To avoid 
a possible backfire, any such measures must 
be designed transparently, in ways that are 
sensitive to public attitudes.
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The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner has 
identified two significant privacy risks from 
data analytics related to AI and automated 
decision making: lack of transparency and 
meaningful accountability. The Commissioner 
notes that:
‘… systems may appear objective and 
yet be subject to in-built bias leading 
to discrimination. Many algorithmic 
assessment tools operate as ‘black 
boxes’ without transparency. This 
lack of transparency is compounded 
when private commercial interests 
claim trade secrecy over proprietary 
algorithms so that even the agencies 
using the tools may have little 
understanding over how they operate.’
Accountability for decisions made using AI 
raises complexities as some decision-making 
techniques are more amenable to explanation 
than others. The result is an emerging 
field of ‘explainable AI’, where methods for 
explanation capability are being developed 
(The AI Forum of New Zealand, 2018).
4.5.2 Surveillance
Increased perception of surveillance might 
affect people’s behaviour; people alter 
the way they think and act even when 
faced with only the possibility of being 
under surveillance. This can include people 
avoiding talking or writing about sensitive 
or controversial issues, which not only has 
a ‘corrosive effect on intellectual curiosity 
and free speech’ but inhibits the kind of 
democratic discussion necessary for a free 
society (Munn, 2016).
4.5 Privacy and surveillance
4.5.1 Privacy and AI
In general, Australians and New Zealanders 
have good internet and related technology 
uptake. To enable this for AI use, trust is a 
key issue: for AI to succeed in the private 
sphere, people ‘need to know that their 
privacy is respected and maintained’ (Kelly, 
2018). A survey by the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner in 2017 found 
Australians are concerned about their privacy. 
The results demonstrate that 69 percent 
of Australians were more concerned about 
their privacy than five years ago. Further, 83 
percent believe there are more privacy risks 
dealing with an online organisation than an 
offline one, 79 percent are uncomfortable 
with a business sharing their personal 
information and 58 percent have decided 
not to share with an organisation because 
of privacy concerns (Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, 2016a). A survey 
commissioned by the New Zealand Privacy 
Commissioner had similar findings (UMR 
Research, 2018). Nevertheless, a recent survey 
by Samsung found that despite concerns 
over data security, 38 percent of New Zealand 
respondents agreed they would feel more 
secure if they used smart technology to 
monitor their home.
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The rise of corporate data surveillance, 
including embedded tracking in computing 
and smart devices, raises new privacy and 
surveillance issues. In 2016, the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner and 
24 other privacy enforcement authorities 
across the world evaluated ‘Internet of Things’ 
devices, finding that 71 percent of devices did 
not provide a privacy policy that adequately 
explained how personal information was 
being collected and managed (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, 2016b). 
Devices that allow or facilitate the pervasive 
collection of personal information mean that 
companies can increasingly use aggregate 
surveillance data to profile, predict and 
manipulate customer behaviour. AI which 
supports this predictive analysis will increase 
the scope and availability of tools to evaluate 
Box 22: Intelligence law reforms in New Zealand
In the 2018 New Zealand survey on individual 
privacy, 62 percent of New Zealanders said 
they trust government organisations with 
their personal information, while only around 
a third of New Zealanders trusted private 
companies with that same information. Public 
discourse on privacy and security has led 
to significant reforms of intelligence laws in 
New Zealand. The Intelligence and Security Act 
2017 contained the most significant reforms 
of intelligence agencies in New Zealand’s 
history including increased transparency of 
surveillance practices and the operation of 
intelligence agencies. The reforms may in part 
explain the greater levels of public comfort 
with government surveillance and the shift in 
public discourse from scrutiny of government 
actions to scrutiny of corporate information 
collection and surveillance. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The use of AI technologies presents 
challenges to the equity, health and cohesion 
of Australian society. Existing inequalities 
could be exacerbated by the use of AI 
systems and, indeed, new inequalities could 
be generated. Additional concerns relate to 
discrimination, accessibility, privacy, consent 
and democracy. If developed without 
adequate safeguards, the implementation 
of AI could undermine Australian and New 
Zealand values and human rights. Conversely, 
responsible design and development could 
ensure that AI systems reflect and reinforce 
the Australian ethos of a ‘fair go’ and freedom 
of opportunity. 
Human rights provide a framework by 
which to approach the safe and ethical 
implementation of AI technologies. Broader 
considerations, underpinning both the 
human rights framework and representative 
of Australian and New Zealand values, 
pertain to inclusion and equity. Community 
engagement and consultation are essential 
for the development of inclusive AI and public 
communication is required to ensure that 
people have the capacity to make informed 
decisions. Developing AI technologies with 
these considerations at the forefront of 
design and implementation would ensure 
that AI benefits every sector of the Australian 
and New Zealand population and advances 
human rights.
and ‘correct’ individuals into their 
preferred course of action, which 
may be to increase profit and for the 
benefit of corporate interests rather 
than for a societal ‘good’.
Private sector predictive data 
analytics increasingly provide 
support for government agency 
functions, including law enforcement, 
healthcare and public policy. In these 
situations, personal information 
collected with the surveillance power 
of the state can be used to inform 
those privately developed analytical 
tools. Privacy experts warn that these 
new practices need to be monitored 
closely and, where appropriate, 
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5.1 Emerging responses to AI
The rapid development of AI in diverse fields 
has prompted a range of regulatory and ethical 
responses. This section sets out examples 
of developments in four areas: algorithmic 
transparency, development of the right to 
erasure, algorithmic impact assessments, 
and new or emerging ethical standards.
Algorithmic transparency
Algorithmic transparency means having 
visibility over the inputs and decision-making 
processes of tools relying on algorithms, 
programming or AI, or being able to explain 
the rules and calculations used by AI if these 
are challenged. The UK House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee 
recommended transparency for government 
use of algorithms on the basis that the ‘right 
to explanation’ is a key part of accountability. 
The Committee recommended the default 
position be to publish explanations of the 
way algorithms work when the algorithms in 
question affect people’s rights and liberties. 
The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner 
has recommended that new measures be 
included in the Privacy Bill to better safeguard 
the interests of people, including a new 
privacy principle setting the high-level 
expectations of fair practice and requiring 
algorithmic transparency in appropriate cases. 
Further, a review of algorithms embedded in 
policies that deliver public benefit has also 
been undertaken, suggesting how the use of 
algorithms can be improved for both fairness 
and transparency and providing a reminder 
of the need to take care in their use (Stats 
NZ, 2018). These are essential first steps in 
ensuring the trust and the social license that 
is required for governments to begin thinking 
about AI is established.
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Providing people with a right to erasure shifts 
the decision-making onus from agencies, 
who are incentivised to collect and retain 
information, to people who can then exert 
control over their own information. However, 
not all people have the skills, knowledge 
or motivation to take control of their 
information.
The right to erasure may affect the 
development of AI systems using individual 
information in machine learning (ML) and 
algorithmic development and training. It 
remains unclear whether the right to erasure, 
or the related right to data portability, will 
create obligations on an AI developer to 
delete personal information from the AI 
training database, or to what extent the 
intellectual property in the AI is linked to, or 
reliant on, that personal information. Further, 
while the data may be removed from the 
training data set, it may still be present in the 
AI model thus requiring a new data set and 
subsequent training phase for the model. 
The right to erasure 
The right to erasure is provided for to a certain 
extent through the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and Convention 108. 
The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner 
recommended a new privacy principle on 
the right to erasure of personal information, 
recognising that:
‘the current rights and protections 
available to New Zealanders are 
gradually weakening as technology 
develops. In particular, the requirement 
in principle 9 for information to be 
kept no longer than is necessary is 
rendered meaningless in the context 
of advanced algorithms and artificial 
intelligence. For example, the thirst of 
artificial intelligence systems for data 
will mean that agencies will want to 
keep all of the data that is available for 
increasing periods of time.’
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guidelines and declarations have emerged in 
the past decade, along with establishment 
of ethical advisory boards in public, private, 
academic and technical communities. These 
include the Global Initiative for Ethical 
Considerations in Artificial Intelligence and 
Autonomous Systems and the Asilomar AI 
Principles, a set of 23 principles that focus on 
research, ethics and values, and longer-term 
issues such as capability caution, common 
good and recursive self-improvement 
(Future of Life Institute, 2017; IEEE Standards 
Association, 2018). 
Other initiatives include those that are 
multi-lateral (Council of Europe), multi-
stakeholder, by regulators (such as data 
protection authorities) and calls for action 
by individual governments. In the UK, for 
example, the House of Lords recommended 
the government introduce a statutory code 
of practice for the use of personal information 
in political campaigns, applicable to political 
parties and campaigns, online platforms, 
analytics organisations and others engaged 
with such processes. The committee also 
announced it would produce draft guidance 
quickly in order for the code to be fully 
operational before the next UK general 
election.
New ethical principles have emerged in 
the private sector. In 2018, the New York 
Times reported that thousands of Google 
employees were protesting the use of 
AI by Google to assist the Pentagon in 
interpreting video images that could be used 
to improve accuracy of drone strikes (Shane 
and Wakabayashi, 2018). Google responded 
by issuing a new set of principles to guide 
its design, development and deployment 
of AI. This included AI applications that 
Google would not pursue, such as weapons, 
surveillance technologies and technologies 
that cause harm (Pichai, 2018).
Algorithmic impact assessment
In Australia and New Zealand, a tool for 
identifying and managing privacy risks is 
the privacy impact assessment. Building on 
this concept, AI researchers have developed 
a practical framework for an algorithmic 
impact assessment (AIA), similar to impact 
assessment frameworks already used in data 
protection, privacy and human rights policy 
domains. They note that ‘AIAs will not solve 
all of the problems that automated decision 
systems might raise, but they do provide an 
important mechanism to inform the public 
and to engage policymakers and researchers 
in productive conversation’ (Reisman et al., 
2018). In New Zealand, a digital service design 
standard also provides guidance for anyone 
who designs or provides government services, 
to support the provision of public services, 
which are easily accessible, integrated, 
inclusive and trusted (New Zealand 
Government, 2018a).
AI stocktakes
The UK House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee report on 
algorithms in decision making contains 
recommendations to ensure oversight of 
ML-driven algorithms, including producing, 
publishing and maintaining a list of where 
algorithms with significant impacts are being 
used within central government. Similar 
work is being done in New Zealand, with a 
stocktake of algorithms in the public sector 
completed in 2018 (Stats NZ, 2018). 
Legal and professional ethical 
frameworks
Concerns about the human rights implications 
of AI have led to calls for legal and 
professional ethical frameworks that apply 
to both the government and private sectors 
to govern the application and design of AI 
technologies. Statements of ethical principles, 
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forming. In September 2017, for example, the 
United Nations announced it would open 
a new office in the Netherlands to monitor 
the development of robotics and AI. The 
partnership initiative launched a working 
group on AI, labour and the economy, which 
has proposed developing:
1. a rating standard that measures an 
organisation’s adherence to good AI 
ethical and compliance standards in 
order to promote awareness and improve 
practices
2. case studies to share insights on how 
organisations are dealing with a range of 
issues such as workforce displacement, 
the use of AI in employee vetting, ethics 
and transparency, and policies
3. an AI Readiness framework to help 
communities accelerate their ability to 
leverage AI technologies to minimise 
inequality of access to, or adoption of, AI 
technology.
In 2018, the Australian Human Rights 
Commission launched a three-year project 
to explore the opportunities for new 
technologies to protect and promote human 
rights and freedoms. The project is examining 
the challenges and opportunities for human 
rights of emerging technologies, and 
innovative ways to ensure human rights are 
prioritised in the design and governance of 
these technologies. The project is exploring 
issues such as bias, big data, inclusive 
technology and the intersection between 
technology, free speech and democracy. An 
issues paper was released in July 2018 starting 
a public consultation that will inform the 
Commission’s work. 
However, human rights advocates have 
criticised the principles, saying they do not 
go far enough, while calling for increased 
multi-stakeholder approaches (Eckersley, 
2018). The Toronto Declaration is a recent 
example of a multi-stakeholder agreement on 
the human rights approach to ML systems, 
including AI. The Declaration focuses on the 
rights to equality and non-discrimination and 
accountability for human rights violations 
that arise from AI. The Declaration signatories 
emphasise that while the ethics discourse is 
gaining ground, ethics cannot replace the 
centrality of universal, binding and actionable 
human rights law and standards, which 
exist within a well-developed framework 
for remediating harms from human rights 
violations (Amnesty International and Access 
Now, 2018).
Some of the common features of these 
various ethical initiatives are that:
• AI should be developed for the common 
good to benefit humanity
• AI should operate on principles of fairness 
and intelligibility
• AI users should uphold the data and 
privacy rights of individuals and 
communities
• AI should be available to all (reflecting the 
right to benefit from scientific advances) 
including the education to enable benefits 
to accrue equally to all 
• AI should never be able to operate 
autonomously to hurt, destroy or 
deceive humans.
At the same time as these new ethical norms 
are developing, new collaborations are 
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Explainability and AI
Until recently, the ‘explainability’ of computer-
system outputs was generally not an issue. 
Computers were programmed to run in 
accordance with a set of rules. If necessary, 
the basis on which decisions were made 
could be explained. However, decisions made 
by more advanced AI may not be readily 
explainable. Because decisions are being 
made by reviewing vast sets of data, and not 
on the basis of actual intelligent reasoning, 
the reason for the decision may not be 
explainable to humans. This means that if 
the decision is suboptimal or wrong– and it 
may be wrong if the data are flawed – then 
an individual affected by the decision has no 
way of determining this or effectively seeking 
review and redress.
Instances of poor data – or poor AI design 
– leading to wrong AI decisions have 
already occurred (Calo, 2017; Turchin 
and Denkenberger, 2018). For example, a 
translation engine associated the role of 
engineer with being male and a policing 
tool disproportionally targeted minority 
communities.
In short, AI does not always get it right. If the 
data processed by AI are incorrect, incomplete 
or biased, then the decision it makes (the 
output) may also be incorrect. This is true also 
for the algorithms that process it. Much of the 
data that AI is using has arisen from humans, 
and so inevitably bears the imprint of the 
inherent biases of the people who created it.
Traditionally, society has implemented 
processes for allowing important decisions to 
be reviewed. For example, almost any decision 
made by government, such as an application 
5.2 Regulation and regulatory frameworks
AI is already being used to make data-based 
decisions in a variety of fields – insurance 
vetting, loan applications; even sentencing 
decisions. These decisions will need to be 
evaluated with respect to society’s desire 
to have important decisions be transparent, 
explainable and reviewable. 
AI presents legal and ethical issues within two 
broad categories:
• responsibility for decisions made by AI 
systems
• issues arising from AI systems working in 
combination with an increasingly digital 
world.
Given the vast amount of work and 
specialised expertise needed to formulate 
sustainable AI policies across diverse policy 
domains, governments should not approach 
the challenge in isolation. Academic and 
industry stakeholders undertaking AI research 
and development in multidisciplinary areas 
possess expertise needed by governments to 
inform policy initiatives.
The output of AI
One category of legal and ethical issues 
arising from AI covers questions of 
responsibility and ownership that arise from 
what AI produces – its ‘output’. In particular:
• When an AI makes a decision, it may not 
be transparent, explainable or reviewable 
in the way that decisions made by a 
human are. How do we respond to this? 
• When AI makes a decision, who is 
responsible for the decision? 
• Conversely, when AI creates property, who 
owns it?
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personal injury legislation administered by 
the Accident Compensation Corporation, 
may provide a framework for legislating the 
responsibility of AI decisions. 
At their present stage of evolution, most AI 
systems would be considered to be simply 
‘tools’, in the sense that they are controlled 
by humans. This aligns with traditional 
legal principles: if there is any liability it is 
attributable to the controller.8 However, as 
AI use develops, and the idea of a ‘controller’ 
becomes increasingly irrelevant, this analysis 
will become more difficult. In the long term, 
when an increasing number of decisions 
are made by AI systems independently of 
humans, it is unclear who is responsible when 
something goes wrong and whether there 
should be regulation attributing responsibility 
for AI-based decisions. 
The ownership of AI
An AI system can produce a variety of 
tangible and intangible outputs that can 
be characterised as property. Today, this 
mainly comprises intellectual property, such 
as copyright, and confidential information. 
However, as AI is increasingly used in 
combination with robotics and automation, 
AI will create tangible property as well. 
Legally, property can only be owned by a legal 
entity.9 As with liability for decisions, ownership 
of property arising from AI is likely to be 
attributed to the legal entity that ‘controls’ it. 
However, this analysis starts to break down 
as AI systems begin to act independently. 
Consideration should be given to regulatory 
frameworks for ownership rights and 
obligations in instances where property arises 
from AI systems independently of humans.
8 See for example, the Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts (UN) article 
12, which states that a person (whether natural or legal 
entity) on whose behalf a computer was programmed 
should ultimately be responsible for any message 
generated by the machine.
9 Copyright Act 1968 ss 32 and 35.
10 .
for a building permit or court decisions, 
including sentencing, can be reviewed by 
individuals affected by the decision. For 
reviews of this nature to be effective, the 
reasoning behind the decision must be 
explainable. This is the premise for legal 
rules relating to the transparency of decision 
making. AI can present a ‘black box’ problem. 
Increasingly, as datasets get bigger and 
processes more complex, it simply will not 
be possible to explain the reasoning behind 
an AI’s decision, thereby compromising the 
ability to review decisions. In instances when 
important decisions are made on the basis 
of large datasets, consideration should be 
given to ensuring the accuracy of data and 
public confidence in the data. Data-quality 
regulations may facilitate data accuracy 
and trust. Given that AI-powered decisions 
are not capable of explanation or review, 
consideration should be given to the way in 
which this may be negotiated in society and 
by regulatory frameworks. 
The responsibility of AI decisions
AI-powered systems can make decisions 
independently of humans. As the dissociation 
between the creator or operator of the 
system and the decisions being made by 
it becomes more pronounced, it will be 
increasingly difficult to allocate responsibility 
for those decisions to a particular entity. 
This means that when the decision has 
consequences that give rise to issues of 
responsibility – most notably, questions of 
legal liability – our traditional legal concepts, 
which require someone to be ‘at fault’, are 
no longer effective. ‘No fault’ schemes, such 
as New Zealand’s no fault compensation for 
8 See for example, the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (UN) article 12, which 
states that a person (whether natural or legal entity) on whose behalf a computer was programmed should ultimately 
be responsible for any message generated by the machine.
9 Copyright Act 1968 ss 32 and 35.
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quasi monopolies. Consideration should be 
given to the capacity, power and resources 
required by institutions (such as ASIC, 
the ACCC and APRA) to respond to these 
concerns. AI systems have the potential to 
perform roles that traditionally have required 
specific qualifications, certification or training; 
for example, legal advice or healthcare. 
Decisions should be made as to whether AI 
systems be allowed to perform these kinds of 
roles if they achieve a level of ‘competence’. 
The monopoly risk derives from the potential 
for a small number of operators in a market 
to have the resources to adopt AI systems 
on an immense scale, thereby eliminating 
smaller players and reducing competition. It is 
important to consider the way in which public 
institutions, and the underpinning democratic 
principles, are protected. To achieve this, it 
may be necessary to imbue these institutions 
with additional power and responsibility. 
Human rights and AI
Another category of legal and ethical issues 
arising from AI relates to the concern about 
how increasingly powerful and pervasive 
AI will interact with society and individuals, 
and the effect it may have on our human 
rights. Regulatory frameworks should be 
underpinned by consideration for human 
rights, as outlined in Chapter 4. 
Cybersecurity and AI
AI adds two nuances to general cybersecurity 
risk. There is significant potential for AI to be 
used maliciously to power more effective and 
damaging cybersecurity attacks. For example, 
‘spear phishing’ is a type of cybersecurity 
attack involving an email that is specifically 
tailored to an individual or organisation, often 
using AI (Martinez, 2017). Specificity is what 
gives this type of attack its power, and that is 
achieved through AI. In addition, AI systems 
themselves are susceptible to cybersecurity 
attacks. This is true of all IT systems, but as 
AI becomes more integral to the making of 
significant decisions, this becomes a greater 
danger. For example, an AI-powered driverless 
car can be fooled by subtle alterations of 
road signs (Gitlin, 2017). It is also possible to 
develop AIs that force other AI systems into 
making incorrect classifications or decisions 
(Artificial Intelligence Committee - House 
of Lords, 2017). Consideration should be 
given to regulatory frameworks that seek to 
mitigate the risk of AI being used to breach 
systems and to protect critical AI systems from 
cybersecurity attacks. 
Institutions 
While AI can deliver benefits to society, it 
can also create societal risks because of its 
ability to disrupt existing norms. For example, 
AI-powered technologies have, to some 
degree, been involved in the displacement 
of workers from jobs, distorting financial 
markets, curating newsfeeds and creating 
Box 23: The ‘existential threat’ 
issue
While there is great difference of opinion 
on how significant the risk is, most 
commentators agree that to some degree 
uncontrolled super AI could, in the 
future, present a threat to our existence. 
One prominent response has been to 
attempt to ‘design in’ morality (Wallach 
and Allen, 2008). However, existential 
risk is considered to be well beyond the 
timeframe of this report. 
Considerations relevant to 
government response
Society and government should consider how 
best to deal with the opportunities and risks 
presented by AI. It is likely that regulation 
will provide an effective framework to 
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to avoid conflicts through fragmentation 
and to maximise efficiency. Economically, 
regulatory coordination will ensure that AI is 
welfare enhancing, rather than aggravating 
existing global economic inequalities. This 
will ensure broad social and political support 
of AI regulatory frameworks (Korinek and 
Stiglitz, 2018).
To date, such a regulatory framework has yet 
to be formulated at a national, regional or 
international level. AI policies are developed 
by largely uncoordinated efforts of various 
academic and industry groupings as well as 
by government initiatives. The regulatory 
purviews of the agencies involved in the 
process are not clearly defined and issues of 
regulatory architecture design have not yet 
been addressed. As a result, AI applications 
are sporadically regulated. While greater 
regulation will be required for the application 
of AI within industry sectors, industry should 
also take proactive steps to ensure safe 
implementation and readiness for AI systems. 
The establishment of a new 
intergovernmental organisation may serve 
as a forum for coordination to support 
national policymakers in the development 
of AI policies and frameworks. This could 
ensure internationally consistent AI policy 
approaches via the direct engagement of 
governments in policy debates prior to 
the adoption of national positions. Such 
an organisation should complement, 
and collaborate with, the diverse array of 
non-governmental entities involved in AI 
research and development, so that common 
approaches are informed by broad expertise. 
An opportunity for Australia and New Zealand 
is that intergovernmental organisations are 
often hosted by countries considered as 
neutral. Australia and New Zealand are good 
candidates for such a role given their relatively 
small size and their amicable relationships 
with other countries. 
navigate the emergence of AI technologies. 
Equally important will be education, thought 
leadership and guidance, and government 
management. The most effective regulatory 
frameworks are likely to emerge as a result 
of an educated community and an informed 
discussion. 
Future regulatory strategies could unite 
government and non-government parties 
and consist of a dynamically changing mix of 
strategies and indirect, flexible and sensitive 
steering processes. Society depends on large 
technological firms to drive technological 
innovation. Collaboration between 
government and industry could result in 
mutually beneficial outcomes. However, many 
of the legal and ethical issues discussed above 
will only be effective if a global approach is 
taken. Governments should consider strategic 
priorities in the field of international law and 
AI and partake in international institutions, 
initiatives and development of standards. 
5.2.1 A global approach 
to regulating AI
AI has global impact and, as such, the 
regulation of AI will transcend national 
boundaries. International laws and norms 
relate to areas affected by AI, such as 
international trade law and human rights 
conventions. To address AI-related policy 
challenges, collaboration among different 
constituencies within nation states and 
internationally will be necessary. Policy 
approaches should be multidisciplinary 
and extend beyond traditional, distinct 
policy domains. 
Internationally-coordinated policy action 
will be necessary to ensure the authority 
and legitimacy of the emerging body of 
law governing AI. Policy initiatives must 
be coordinated in consistent domestic 
and international regulatory frameworks 
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early 2018. The Privacy Commissioner noted 
in his submission on that Bill that:
‘the [information privacy principles] 
do not directly – or arguably very 
effectively – address the particular 
risks and issues created by automated 
decision-making processes. Nor do they 
require specific mitigations such as 
algorithmic transparency.’
5.2.3 Effects of GDPR
Industry-specific laws and regulations will be 
relevant to AI’s deployment in Australia and 
New Zealand, especially in more regulated 
industries such as finance, healthcare 
and insurance. However, overseas privacy 
regulations, namely the new EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), are likely to 
have one of the largest impacts and restraints 
on the use of AI in Australia and New Zealand. 
Data has been described as the fuel for AI 
and to understand the relevance of privacy 
laws and regulations, such as the GDPR, it 
is necessary to firstly understand the data-
centric aspects of AI. Using specific algorithms 
or rules, AI systems collect, sort and break 
down datasets to analyse them and make 
forecasts and decisions (UK Government 
Office for Science, 2016). As a technology that 
collects, processes and develops data, which 
may include personal data, privacy legislation 
will be relevant to AI’s application and use. 
The GDPR governs the collection and 
processing of personal data which is defined 
in Article 4(1) of the GDPR as:
‘any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable natural 
person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier such as 
a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or 
5.2.2 Regulation and the right 
to privacy 
The theoretical and regulatory framework 
for the right to information privacy is well 
settled in Australia and New Zealand. Privacy 
laws regulate in a technology neutral manner, 
with standards for collection, use, storage and 
deletion of personal information applying 
regardless of the nature of technology that 
collects and uses personal information. In 
general, information privacy laws in Australia 
and New Zealand have stood the test of time. 
In New Zealand, there is no general legislative 
framework established to directly govern or 
regulate AI or algorithmic tools including 
automated decision making (Edwards, 2018), 
although the Privacy Commissioner and the 
Government Chief Data Steward have jointly 
developed six key principles to support 
safe and effective data analytics (NZ Privacy 
Commissioner, 2018). Aspects of the current 
regulatory framework do apply to AI in New 
Zealand, including the information privacy 
principles of the Privacy Act 1993 and other 
human rights obligations that apply to private 
and State actions involving the personal 
information of individuals. 
Regulation should not be undertaken either 
too quickly or at a stage too late; rather it 
should keep pace with the field and emerging 
norms. With AI, there are challenges and 
opportunities for regulatory frameworks. 
Some of these challenges were previously 
presented with the emergence of other new 
technologies. Lessons can be learned from 
experiences with transparency reporting and 
regulating copyright with illegal file sharing 
online as well as the recently-proposed EU 
Copyright Directive.
All laws require regular review to ensure 
they reflect societal values and remain clear. 
In New Zealand, reform of the Privacy Act is 
underway, with a Privacy Bill introduced in 
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The use of AI and ML are likely to present a 
major challenge for compliance with privacy 
regimes, such as the GDPR. Such regimes 
are focused on transparency of processes 
and systems of datasets containing personal 
data. However, it is often difficult to obtain 
this transparency and to fully understand 
how AI systems work and the full extent 
of their decision-making capabilities. The 
potential risk of AI systems ‘going rogue’ and 
‘the robots taking over’ is another concern, 
perhaps fuelled by science fiction rather 
than reality. However, these are some of the 
reasons why AI is an area that requires more 
onerous requirements and oversight under 
various regulatory frameworks. The regulatory 
implications and impacts of AI are discussed 
further below. 
To lessen the impact and reach of the 
GDPR and other regulations governing 
personal data use, entities may consider it 
prudent to minimise or completely remove 
the processing of personal data from AI’s 
capabilities; for example, pseudonymising or 
de-identifying data before it is inputted into 
AI systems. However, this may not always be 
practicable. Furthermore, de-identification 
(such as removing a person’s name) will not 
be a viable solution if AI’s functionalities 
are sophisticated enough to combine and 
re-identify datasets or reasonably ascertain 
the identity of a person based on one or a 
combination of datasets. 
With this regulatory framework in place, 
it will be important for affected entities 
to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational compliance measures. The 
penalties are severe for non-compliance 
– the GDPR includes fines of up to €20 
million or 4 percent of annual worldwide 
turnover (whichever is higher), for certain 
contraventions. Moreover, where an AI system 
causes a breach involving personal data 
there are legal obligations to report under 
to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of 
that natural person.’
In broad terms, the GDPR may apply to an 
entity not incorporated in the European Union 
(EU) where that entity:
• has an establishment in the EU (e.g. a 
branch office)
• processes personal data of individuals who 
are in the EU where such processing is 
related to the offering of goods or services 
to those individuals; or
• processes personal data of individuals 
who are in the EU where such processing 
is related to monitoring the behaviour of 
those individuals as far as their behaviour 
takes place in the EU.
As such, the GDPR has an expanded extra-
territorial reach that extends to countries such 
as Australia and New Zealand. Importantly, 
entities do not need to have a physical 
presence in the EU to fall within the ambit of 
the GDPR. Moreover, Australian businesses of 
any size may need to comply with the GDPR, 
as opposed to the limited exemptions from 
the Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) for certain 
small businesses that have an annual turnover 
of A$3 million or less. 
While the GDPR shares a number of 
requirements with other privacy laws, such 
as the Australian Privacy Act, the GDPR 
introduces a number of new requirements 
that are likely to have a significant compliance 
impact for entities who are captured by 
the new regulation. For example, the GDPR 
introduces increased accountability and 
transparency regarding the processing of 
personal data and enhanced data subject 
rights (such as the right ‘to be forgotten’ and 
the right of data portability). It also introduces 
a new definition of consent. 
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or her or similarly significantly affects him or 
her’. In other words, an individual cannot be 
subject to a decision that is made without any 
human involvement. While some exceptions 
apply, entities using automated decision 
making are required to implement suitable 
measures to safeguard the individual’s rights 
and freedoms and legitimate interests. This 
includes a series of rights under Recital 71 of 
the GDPR in relation to profiling; including the 
right to an explanation of a specific decision 
and the right to challenge the decision. 
Additional restrictions apply where decisions 
are made based on specific categories of 
personal data (e.g. personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions or 
religious or philosophical beliefs).
Furthermore, Articles 13(2)(f ) and 14(2)
(g) of the GDPR require data controllers 
who use personal data to make automated 
decisions to notify people about the 
existence of automated decision making, 
including profiling and ‘meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as 
well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data 
subject’. The difficulties of complying with 
these obligations when using AI has been 
extensively reported. The complexity of AI 
and their associated technologies may make 
it difficult to understand how decisions and 
profiling are being undertaken by AI systems 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
2016).
Among other factors, Australian and New 
Zealand entities should identify any wholly-
automated decisions that they undertake 
using AI and consider whether it is possible 
to change the process so that there is 
meaningful human involvement (e.g. have a 
sufficiently qualified and skilled person review 
the machine’s decision) or ensure that they 
can satisfy one of the available exceptions 
under the GDPR. A data protection impact 
both the GDPR and Australia’s new notifiable 
data breach regime. Data breaches, whether 
caused by humans or machines, can adversely 
affect the public perception of an entity. 
The GDPR is expected to affect how entities 
manage and process personal data, regardless 
of whether they are impacted by the GDPR. 
Compliance with regulations such as the 
GDPR could set the benchmark for personal 
data processing and compliance within 
Australia and New Zealand. 
5.2.4 Regulatory implications for 
the use of AI by transnational 
corporations
There are several regulatory implications 
involved in the use of AI by corporations, 
whether they be transnational or not. A 
corporation that is not transnational could still 
be subject to an overseas regulation such as 
the GDPR. 
One of the frequently cited benefits of AI and 
ML is its capacity to learn and make decisions 
without any human involvement. AI can also 
be used to profile people. Article 4(4) of the 
GDPR describes profiling as: 
‘any form of automated processing of 
personal data consisting of the use 
of personal data to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to a natural 
person, in particular to analyse or 
predict aspects concerning that 
natural person’s performance at work, 
economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, interests, reliability, 
behaviour, location or movements.’
Automated decision making and profiling is 
subject to restriction and increased oversight 
under the GDPR. Subject to some exemptions, 
under Article 22 of the GDPR, people have the 
right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing and profiling 
if it ‘produces legal effects concerning him 
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legislation is likely to apply to banks, utilities 
and telecommunication companies, but may 
be extended beyond these sectors.
Data quality and security
AI systems do not simply process data, they 
also create new datasets, which may include 
the generation of data based on personal 
information. Entities using AI will need to 
audit and assess the accuracy and quality of 
those datasets. Where the datasets include 
any personal data, entities will need to 
ensure compliance with applicable privacy 
legislation and associated privacy principles, 
such as APP 10 under the Australian Privacy 
Act. Under APP 10 entities governed by the 
Australian Privacy Act must take such steps (if 
any) as are reasonable in the circumstances to 
ensure that the personal information that they 
collect, use or disclose is accurate, up-to-date 
and complete. A broadly similar principle is 
included in Article 5 of the GDPR.
People who collect and use data have a 
custodianship role, especially where that 
data contains confidential or personal 
information. Under the Australian Privacy 
Act entities must take reasonable steps to 
protect personal information from misuse, 
interference and loss, as well as unauthorised 
access, modification or disclosure. Reasonable 
steps in the context of AI might include 
implementing systems with information and 
communication technology security (Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
2015) and regular testing of the AI system’s 
security controls and systems. 
Consent
The GDPR stipulates that consent will be 
required for AI systems to collect personal 
data on behalf of an entity. This may 
pose challenges. While AI systems can 
accommodate a ‘tick a box’ approach to 
consent (that is, they can work out whether 
or not someone has ticked the ‘I agree’ box), 
assessment may also be required. Article 35(1) 
of the GDPR requires that where a type of 
processing – and in particular where using 
new technologies – is likely to result in a high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of a person, 
a data protection impact assessment must 
be carried out. In particular, Article 35(3) 
of the GDPR expressly requires that a data 
protection impact assessment is undertaken 
when carrying out a ‘systematic and extensive 
evaluation of personal aspects relating to 
natural persons which is based on automated 
processing, including profiling, and on which 
decisions are based that produce legal effects 
concerning the natural person or similarly 
significantly affect the natural person.’
Data ownership and rights
Data has become a valuable commodity. 
AI’s data-generating capabilities present 
commercial opportunities for the use of data. 
However, many laws do not recognise data 
itself as a form of property that can be owned 
and sold. Data can only be truly owned where 
it constitutes intellectual property, such as 
copyright or a trade secret. However, there 
are difficulties with data constituting a work 
protected by copyright due to the absence of 
a human author. 
Despite this, people still have rights 
associated with certain datasets; for example, 
personal data, confidential information or 
where there exists a statutory right (e.g. 
a right to access data under freedom of 
information laws). These rights are derived 
from a combination of contract, common law 
and statute. The GDPR includes enhanced 
rights, including data portability rights. In 
Australia, legislative agenda contains the new 
‘consumer data right’, which permits certain 
consumers open access to specific types of 
data, including data held or generated by 
AI systems. Under this proposed legislation, 
the consumer would have a greater ability 
to access certain data concerning them. The 
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they may struggle to comply with the specific 
consent requirements under the GDPR. The 
GDPR requires consent to be freely given, 
specific, informed and an unambiguous 
indication of the data subject’s wishes. 
While AI systems may be intelligent in many 
respects, they may lack sufficient emotional 
intelligence to recognise the emotions 
and intentions of humans. It may therefore 
be more difficult for AI systems to discern 
whether or not consent is free or represents 
an unambiguous indication of someone’s 
wishes.
Intellectual property
There are a number of regulatory issues 
associated with the protection of AI systems 
and their outputs. There is a question as 
to whether AI computer-implemented 
algorithms meet the high thresholds of 
being novel and containing an inventive 
step to be eligible for patent protection. 
At least in Australia, courts have confirmed 
that mere ideas, methods of calculation, 
systems or plans, and certain computer-
implemented business methods, are not 
patentable subject matter. For AI, this means 
that automating individual processes may 
not be sufficient to constitute a manner of 
manufacture or patentable subject matter 
unless the automation is an invention in 
itself. The concept of ‘computer implemented 
inventions’ is under currently under 
consideration by an expanded panel of the 
Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court of 
Australia, 2018). 
Secondly, there is a question as to whether 
any data or works produced by AI systems 
constitute an original work protected by 
copyright. Under the Australian Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth), copyright does not protect data 
alone, but rather the way it is collected and 
put together. Compilations of data can be 
protected under copyright law, but only if 
they pass the originality test. Under Australian 
law, copyright does not exist in a work that 
is made by a machine and is effectively 
authorless – a human author is required.
Competition law 
Concerns have been raised about the 
market power that technologies such as AI 
can provide. AI can use algorithm-pricing 
systems to gather and leverage vast datasets. 
In the right market conditions, such pricing 
algorithms may be used to engage in, and 
sustain, collusion or other anti-competitive 
practices that are prohibited at law (Sims, 
2017). The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission has noted:
‘…a profit maximising algorithm will work 
out the oligopolistic pricing game and, being 
logical and less prone to flights of fancy, stick 
to it… [I]f similar algorithms are deployed by 
competing companies, an anti-competitive 
equilibrium may be achieved…’ (Sims, 2017)
Questions of risk and liability
AI creates a liability conundrum (see section 
5.3). While some AI systems are often seen 
as acting autonomously and independently, 
they are not human. In such a scenario, who 
should be liable when an AI system causes 
an accident or other liability: should it be the 
programmers, manufacturers and developers 
of the specific AI system or someone else? The 
conundrum also arises from the complexity of 
AI systems and the interdependency between 
their different components, parts and layers 
(European Commission, 2018d). Australia and 
New Zealand are yet to establish meaningful 
precedents to address the appropriate 
allocation of risk and liability between the 
various actors involved in the development 
and deployment of AI systems. 
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broadly focused on comparing AI systems’ 
cognitive and behavioural abilities to human 
and rational behaviour (Russell and Norvig, 
2003; Calo, 2017).
Although the absence of a universally agreed-
upon definition has not hampered AI research, 
a consistent understanding and definition of 
the concept of AI and its associated functions 
is necessary for adequate regulation. In cases 
of personal injury or property damage, it is 
unclear whether the AI system involved or 
the people responsible for the AI design or 
distribution should be held liable.
It is necessary to consider that AI does not 
know, think, foresee, care or behave in the 
anthropomorphic sense; rather it applies 
what could be best described as machine 
logic. That is, the system identifies outputs 
based on a set of predefined parameters and 
probability thresholds through a process that is 
fundamentally different from human thinking. 
Furthermore, this type of machine reasoning 
always implies a certain probability of error, 
where the error tends to occur in – from a 
human perspective – unexpected ways. These 
errors can arise from different sources. Two 
examples follow. 
A machine was tasked to distinguish between 
pictures of wolves and huskies (Ribeiro et al. in 
their Husky vs. Wolf experiment) (Ribeiro, Singh 
and Guestrin, 2016). To do so, the system was 
trained with 10 wolf and 10 husky pictures. 
All wolf pictures had snow in the background, 
while none of the husky pictures did. Since snow is 
a common element in the wolf pictures and is 
not present in the husky pictures, the system 
regarded snow as a classifier for wolves. The 
result is that the system predicts huskies in 
pictures with snow as wolves and vice versa. 
There is potential to cheat or actively 
manipulate a facial-recognition system 
(Sharif et al., 2016). Facial recognition systems 
usually use neural networks to recognise 
5.3 Liability 
Policy discussions are increasingly focused on 
framing responses to AI and liability in both a 
civil and a military context. However, there is 
uncertainty about the appropriate principles 
and methodologies to achieve regulatory 
change (Petit, 2017). Given the developmental 
stages of AI technology, it would be difficult 
to advance specific regulatory proposals in 
relation to AI liability. There is a lack of clarity 
about AI and its associated functions and 
distinct features. This means that the key 
parameters that could serve as benchmarks 
for regulation are, at best, ill-defined. Given 
this, premature action on AI legal liability is 
not advised. The development of precise and 
universally accepted definitions both in law, 
and AI, should precede concrete regulatory 
proposals.
In the longer term, questions arise as to 
when, why and to what extent, AI and smart 
robotic systems might be recognised as 
persons under the law, including assuming 
civil and criminal liability either with others 
or even alone. Presently, under Australian law, 
individual humans are natural persons, but 
some other entities are legal persons, either 
generally (e.g. a company registered under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) or for more 
limited purposes (e.g. a partnership is deemed 
to be a person for the purposes of Part XIC of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
on telecommunications access arrangements). 
5.3.1 Conceptual ambiguity in legal 
and AI research
Legal discussions of AI typically lack definition 
of AI technology. This is unsurprising, given 
the lack of consensus among AI researchers on 
a universal definition of AI technologies. 
Generally, there is an assumption that AI 
systems mimic certain aspects of human 
cognition, and approaches to defining AI have 
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Box 24: Liability and autonomous vehicles 
The complexities of AI liability can be 
illustrated with autonomous vehicles. Vehicle 
regulation in Australia is a complex amalgam 
of rules, standards and norms, including road 
rules, driver licensing, vehicle type approval 
and insurance (Dent, 2018). 
Establishing civil liability requires that one or 
more persons are identified as owing a duty 
of care. This may be difficult in relation to AI 
and smart robotic systems (Gerstner, 1993). It 
is likely that identification of persons owing a 
duty of care will become significantly harder 
at each successive level of vehicle automation. 
As autonomous vehicles become legalised 
(National Transport Commission, 2018: 68) and 
legal provisions are developed, recourse to 
negligent actions may become less common. 
Within Australian consumer law, firmware 
is considered as software in the defective 
goods context (Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd v APS 
Satellite Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 15). As such, 
AI systems supplied as vehicle firmware are 
likely to be treated as goods. Within this 
context, the actual or deemed manufacturer 
would be liable for safety defects relating 
to AI vehicle firmware. However, the more 
technical and restrictive definition of goods 
still used in many state and territory sale of 
goods legislation means that software is not 
treated as goods unless deemed merged with 
the goods (Gammasonics Institute for Medical 
Research Pty Ltd v Comrad Medical Systems 
Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 267). This places AI 
systems in a legal grey area. Until legislative 
changes are made it is unclear the extent to 
which provision of cloud or other remote AI 
systems might be treated as services under 
this heading.
The future applicability of Australian law with 
respect to AI may also be limited under the 
‘state of the art’ defence – the defence that 
the defect could not have been discovered at 
the time the manufacturer supplied the goods 
because there was insufficient scientific or 
technical knowledge at that time (Merck Sharp 
& Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] 
FCAFC 128).
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The use of autonomous vehicles also presents 
considerations for criminal liability. Under 
the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic 1949 to 
which Australia and New Zealand are party, 
motor vehicles must have a driver and drivers 
must be able to control their vehicles at all 
times. Under the current road rules, excepting 
special statutory provision for vehicle trials, 
engagement of vehicles with conditional 
automation or greater would be a criminal 
offence in so far as the (human) driver must 
have proper control of the vehicle while 
driving (e.g. r297, Road Rules 2014 (NSW)). 
Conversely, without the development 
of legislation, other road rules could 
hypothetically cease to operate if high levels 
of automation were engaged. For example, 
if a fully autonomous vehicle stops because 
of a machine-unidentifiable hazard on an 
intersection, there could potentially be 
no criminal liability for obstruction of that 
intersection (Tranter, 2016). 
In order to accommodate AI and smart 
robotic systems under Australian consumer 
law, it is necessary to clarify the application of 
the categories of goods and services. Further 
to this, it would be necessary to redefine 
acceptable quality with respect to consumer 
guarantees provided for by Australian 
consumer law and restrict the scope of the 
‘state of the art’ defence.
AI personhood and accompanying rights must 
not be drafted or implemented in such a way 
as to detract from human rights and human 
dignity. Until AI and smart robotic systems can 
both uphold civic rights and responsibilities 
and be appropriately deterred, punished or 
rehabilitated for criminal law purposes, the 
individuals and existing legal entities that 
design, build, distribute and use them must 
be held completely responsible for them by 
analogy to rules on children or potentially 
dangerous animals (c.f. Hallevy, 2013). In 
short, designers, manufacturers, distributors 
and users should never be allowed to evade 
liability by simply saying ‘the robot did it’.
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Box 25: Case study: Algorithmic based decisions in the legal profession
a heart’, or ‘deal with the unexpected, 
quirky or unique individual that may require 
appeals to a sense of justice?’ (Simpson, 
2016). To ensure a balanced decision making 
process, the development of algorithms in 
legal decision making should focus on the 
optimal combination of AI and humans (Lippe, 
Katz and Jackson, 2015; Guihot, Matthew and 
Suzor, 2017). AI should not be expected to 
make reliable, definitive legal decisions that 
entail the exercise of discretionary judgments; 
resolution of ‘conflicting arguments’, or 
‘ambiguous and contradictory evidence’ 
(Schild, 1992; Zeleznikow, 2000); or the 
interpretation of facts or data (Oskamp and 
Tragter, 1997; Zeleznikow, 2000). Rather, the 
use of algorithms in legal decision making 
could be limited to applications that better 
inform human decisions (Schild, 1992; Oskamp 
and Tragter, 1997; Zeleznikow, 2000). For 
example, Article 22 of the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation creates a new right for 
people ‘not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including 
profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly 
affects him or her’(European Commission, 
2016; Guihot, Matthew and Suzor, 2017). The 
implication, at least in Europe, is that humans 
must somehow be involved in decision 
making, although how effective this is 
likely to be, remains to be seen.
While consistency in legal decision making 
does sound like an admirable goal, it may be 
problematic should it lead to standardisation 
(Hall, 2005). Standardisation in automated 
legal decision-making processes has been 
seen to have a regulatory effect on people 
involved in the decision-making process, 
10 Consider for example, Amanda Schaffer, ‘Robots That Teach Each Other’ (2016) 119 MIT Technology Review 48, where Schaffer 
explains data sharing goals to improve robot ability; Will Knight, ‘Shared Robot Knowledge’ (2016) 119 MIT Technology Review 
25, 26.
Potential exists for the application of AI-based 
decision making within the legal justice 
system. AI should be capable of sophisticated 
legal reasoning given the structure and 
context of legal argument (Bench-Capon and 
Prakken, 2006). The application of AI to legal 
decision making may improve transparency, 
consistency and avoid the potential for 
ideological bias (Bench-Capon & Prakken, 
2006; Cooper, 2011; Guihot, Matthew, & Suzor, 
2017; Hall, 2005). However, the risks associated 
with automated decision making include the 
incapacity of algorithms to ‘exercise discretion 
and make situational value judgments’ (Schild, 
1992; Leith, 1998; Broadbent et al., 2011; 
Lippe, Katz and Jackson, 2015; Simpson, 
2016; Guihot, Matthew and Suzor, 2017). AI 
is not known to have strengths in exercising 
discretion, induction or intuition, all of which 
may be required to varying degrees in legal 
decision making (Guihot et al., 2017; Hall, 
2005). AI is unlikely to have the capacity 
to make value judgments or to appraise 
and evaluate the social repercussions of 
the decision (Hall, 2005; Sunstein, 2001). 
AI may be objective, since it potentially 
lacks predisposition or ideological bias, 
but legal decision making ought to involve 
some normative inputs of which AI is 
incapable, such as evaluating the absurdity 
of an interpretation (Cooper, 2011). Public 
regulators should be alert to the spectrum of 
risks posed by specific applications of AI and 
adopt targeted strategies in their regulatory 
approach in order to address the risks 
identified.
Mechanising decision making through 
algorithms raises questions about what could 
be lost: to what extent ‘an algorithm can have 
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including those who are required to 
implement the decision (Oskamp and 
Tragter, 1997).
The design of the appeal process should 
begin with the careful and considered 
design of the decision-making process 
itself. Developers and regulators require 
a deeper understanding of the social 
and ethical contextual framework and 
the users’ needs of the decision-making 
system (Oskamp and Tragter, 1997). 
Concerns for the development of systems 
with deep contextual understanding will 
become more pressing where AI systems 
share information with each other to 
improve their own process.10 It is best 
to avoid establishing a new centralised 
authority to deal with challenges to 
automated decision-making processes. 
Given the potential for the rapid uptake 
of AI with broad applications, a new, 
centralised authority would soon find 
itself in a situation where it was required 
to be a ministry for a wide variety of 
departments.
Regulators adopting algorithmic 
decision-making processes should 
have a clear path for internal challenge 
or human review. If Australian and 
New Zealand regulators take a similar 
approach to the EU by requiring human 
involvement in decision making, this 
would both significantly reduce the risks 
discussed above and preclude the need 
for radically new mechanisms to facilitate 
challenges to algorithmic decisions of AI. 
The decision would be made by human 
relying on a range of inputs, only one of 
which would be the algorithmic system. 
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patterns in big datasets; specifically, to identify 
differences between millions of faces. In an 
experiment, a pair of glasses with a colourful 
frame was used to interfere with the system’s 
pattern recognition. It did not just block the 
view to crucial parts of the faces but, due 
to the colourful frame, gave the system the 
impression of some misleading patterns. In 
this way, the facial-recognition system made 
mistakes despite claiming a high confidence.
Another frequently discussed but poorly 
defined concept used in the context of AI 
liability is the black box attribute of certain 
ML-based AI systems. There are two types 
of AI: ‘black box’, of which there is little 
knowledge about the inner workings, and 
transparent systems, which are reasonably 
explainable. Central to any form of legal 
liability, is the foreseeability requirement; 
this pertains to whether or not the action 
involves some sort of mental element. To 
hold an individual responsible for harm 
requires that the individual can anticipate 
that harm as it is not possible to intend 
for, or be negligent about, that which 
cannot be foreseen. Black box systems yield 
results that may be unforeseeable, whereas 
transparent systems can be deemed to 
foreseeably lead to an outcome that may 
be undesired. Contemplating ways in which 
AI systems could potentially be held liable 
without conceptual clarity on this attribute 
is problematic, as it crucially affects the 
foreseeability requirement. Intuitively, one 
would assume that while foreseeability cannot 
be given in the case of black box systems, 
it should not be a major problem if we are 
working with a transparent system, where we 
can comprehend the system’s every move.
Further complexities arise because the notion of 
transparency is itself subject to considerable 
conceptual ambiguity. Three distinct 
model properties are used to facilitate ex 
ante transparency; namely simulatability, 
decomposability, and algorithmic transparency 
(Lipton, 2018). In simulatability we assume 
that a person can reflect the whole ML model 
at once. In decomposability, each part of the 
ML model (input, parameter, and calculation) 
admits an intuitive explanation. And finally, 
in algorithmic transparency we require a full 
understanding of the learning algorithm 
itself, i.e., we expect to fully understand and 
reconstruct each and every step it makes. This 
analysis suggests that each of these notions 
of transparency may well require different 
levels of expertise in order to establish 
foreseeability. Additionally, these cases must 
be distinguished from ex post transparency 
and interpretability, that is, when we are able 
to understand how the system has achieved 
a given output, for example, or to seek 
explanation for an unforeseen, and from an ex 
ante perspective perhaps, even unforeseeable, 
outcome. This does not mean that we can 
fully back-trace every step the ML model 
did. A final aspect regarding transparency 
is that there is always a trade-off between AI 
performance and transparency. Transparent 
models usually have much simpler structures 
than black-box models. 
Discussion of these conceptual ambiguities 
provides an indication of the problems in 
devising policy initiatives on AI liability. 
Lawyers may have to accept that foreseeability 
– the primary benchmark for imposing liability 
– needs to be replaced in the context of AI, or 
face a different set of unexpected challenges. 
The law will need to be adapted to the 
changing realities of our AI-driven world; our 
guiding principles should be the core societal 
values we intend to preserve. The design 
of AI-related policies, whether for liability 
or in any other area, will require a broader 
perspective, accounting for multidisciplinary 
imperatives in collaboration with multiple 
stakeholders. 
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5.3.2 Ability to appeal algorithmic 
decisions
Decisions generated by AI technologies are 
dependent on the use of algorithms. The use 
of AI decision making has a broad range of 
applications in public and private sectors. 
For example, algorithmic-based decisions 
may be used to determine health treatments, 
the outcome of loan applications or the 
granting of bail applications. The case study 
below examines the potential use of AI in 
the legal justice system. The Commonwealth 
practice guide on Automated Assistance in 
Administrative Decision-Making highlights 
the importance of accuracy, accountability 
and transparency in algorithmic decision 
processes. Important considerations also 
include algorithmic fairness (Zou and 
Schiebinger, 2018). Individuals subject to 
algorithmic-based decisions may wish to 
review or appeal the decision. Developing 
clear frameworks would facilitate this appeal 
process. 
To allow people to appeal algorithmic 
decisions, it is necessary that they are 
informed when algorithmic decision making 
has occurred. This information should be 
accompanied by a basic explanation of the 
way in which the algorithm works and what 
factors were considered. Presently, due 
to the process of deep learning, it can be 
difficult to identify which information was 
used in the algorithmic decision-making 
process. With current legal decision making, 
transparency is of paramount concern and 
a significant feature of review and appeal 
processes. Concerns for transparency 
of the algorithmic evaluation or lack 
thereof will become increasingly critical if 
decision making with legal ramifications 
is automated by algorithms. However, 
advances in technological processes indicate 
(Castelvecchi, 2016) that this will not long 
remain a barrier to algorithmic transparency. 
People should be provided with a clear and 
simple pathway for appeal. For example, 
in accordance with section 495A of the 
Migration Act 495A, automated computer-
based decisions may be appealed via the 
same process of challenging decisions made 
by the Minister. As the use of AI decision 
making is likely to become increasingly 
common, a standardised appeal process 
within public and private sectors would be 
useful. 
5.4 Independent body 
The regulatory issues and implications 
related to the use of AI by transnational 
corporations and other entities are complex 
and varied. As disruptive technologies such 
as AI become more prevalent, we are likely 
to see increased regulation. Governance and 
regulatory mechanisms could be assisted 
by an independent body that could be 
established to identify key areas for regulation 
and response. For example, a similar body, 
the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, regulates the communications 
sector with the view to maximise economic 
and social benefits for both the community 
and industry.
An independent body could constitute a 
collaborative space where STEM and HASS 
disciplines could determine how the demands 
of personal, community and national 
interests may change rapidly as a result of AI 
adoption. In addition, the independent body 
could assess the way in which governance 
could be structured to avoid being left 
behind technological and social changes. 
Interdisciplinary work undertaken by the body 
could draw on the social sciences to assess 
how political systems can adjust, anticipate 
and manage inevitable future change. A clear 
national direction, which integrates planning, 
regulation and innovation, could help 
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ensure that AI is developed in a manner that 
specifically addresses national needs. 
In New Zealand, the Artificial Intelligence 
Forum of New Zealand (AIFNZ) is an industry-
led body that includes representatives 
from academia and government. It largely 
focuses on enabling the implementation and 
development of AI in New Zealand. The AIFNZ 
seeks to raise awareness and capabilities of 
AI and contributes to the social and political 
debate on AI’s broader implications for 
society. It is a member of the Partnership on 
AI – an international industry consortium 
established to study and formulate best 
practices on AI technologies, to advance 
the public’s understanding of AI, and to 
serve as an open platform for discussion and 
engagement about AI and its influences. 
An independent body in Australia could 
contribute to shaping both domestic and 
international AI policies. There may be a 
need for an independent body to provide 
institutional leadership on the development 
and deployment of AI in Australia – 
promoting what the Australian Human Rights 
Commission has described as ‘responsible 
innovation’ (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018b). Such a body could play 
an oversight role in the design, development 
and use of AI and associated technologies that 
would help protect human rights in Australia 
and at the same time foster technological 
innovation. Such an organisation would be a 
forum for collaboration and be independently 
led, drawing together stakeholders from 
government, industry, the public, and 
academia, uniting both HASS and STEM 
disciplines. Its roles and functions could 
include rule making, monitoring, enforcement 
and dispute resolution. The organisation 
could establish a new governance model that 
covers the various stakeholders’ interests and 
relationships, encompassing a framework 
that harnesses the private sector’s insight 
and influence, while also protecting human 
rights (Elmi and Davis, 2018). Additionally, the 
body could provide direction and support for 
governance mechanisms, conduct research 
for the development of technology and 
policy, and facilitate research partnerships and 
initiatives. Given this, consideration should be 
given to: 
• the establishment of a government-
supported AI institute, tasked with further 
researching legal, ethical and other issues 
arising from AI
• out of that initiative, the government 
facilitating the development of an 
overarching set of values and principles to 
guide the response to AI issues
• on the basis of those values and principles, 
overseeing the creation of guidelines 
and frameworks for the development 
of regulations that can be provided 
to relevant departments, sectors and 
industries
• where appropriate, encouraging industry-
specific regulations tailored to the specific 
issues that AI applications are creating.
There are a number of existing bodies 
in Australia that could be expanded to 
incorporate these functions. For instance, 
Data61 already has a significant role in data 
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innovation, builds collaborative partnerships 
and networks between government, industry 
and academia, conducts research to inform 
decision making, and develops new products 
and platforms. Standards Australia could also 
play a role. In addition to developing national 
technical standards, Standards Australia 
currently acts as Australia’s representative 
at international standards fora, such as the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) and 
International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC). Forming international agreement on the 
definition and standards of AI technologies 
could occur through the ISO and IEC. Indeed, 
ISO/IEC WD 22989 Artificial Intelligence – 
Concepts and Terminology is in development 
and Standards Australia has already initiated 
national AI projects.
An independent body could be well placed to 
examine the way in which governments and 
industry can adjust, anticipate and manage 
change resulting from AI to the benefit 
of society. Establishing this independent 
body would enable Australia to provide 
global leadership in AI governance models 
and potentially initiate global governance 
measures. 
5.4.1 A national framework
The safe, responsible and strategic 
implementation of AI will require a clear 
national framework or strategy that 
examines the range of ethical, legal and 
social barriers to, and risks associated with, 
AI; allows areas of major opportunity to be 
established; and directs development to 
maximise the economic and social benefits 
of AI. The national framework would 
articulate the interests of society, uphold safe 
implementation, be transparent and promote 
wellbeing. It should review the progress of 
similar international initiatives to determine 
potential outcomes from their investments 
to identify the potential opportunities and 
challenges on the horizon. Key actions could 
include:
1. Educational platforms and frameworks 
that are able to foster public 
understanding and awareness of AI 
2. Guidelines and advice for procurement, 
especially for public sector and small 
and medium enterprises, which informs 
them of the importance of technological 
systems and how they interact with social 
systems and legal frameworks
3. Enhanced and responsive governance and 
regulatory mechanisms to deal with issues 
arising from cyber-physical systems and AI 
through existing arbiters and institutions
4. Integrated interdisciplinary design and 
development requirements for AI and 
cyber-physical systems that have positive 
social impacts
5. Investment in the core science of AI and 
translational research, as well as in AI skills.
The independent body could be tasked to 
provide leadership in relation to these actions 
and principles. This central body would 
support a critical mass of skills and could 
provide oversight in relation to the design, 
development and use of AI technologies, 
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6.1 Introduction
Data are essential to the development and 
operation of AI technologies. AI and machine 
learning (ML) require large datasets to learn 
from and generate outputs, and skilled 
practitioners need data to develop the AI 
itself. Advances in core fields of data-driven 
AI, including ML, image processing, predictive 
analytics and automation are seeing the 
complexity and capability of systems change 
at an exponential rate, with computers now 
able to more rapidly solve complex problems, 
often using self-generated strategies and with 
little instruction or guidance from humans. 
The field of data science and informatics is 
continuing to grow, with increasing demand 
for skilled data science experts, engineers and 
cybersecurity expertise at an all-time high. 
As the costs associated with the collection, 
storage and analysis of data reduces, a rapid 
change is occurring in the exploration and 
uptake of digital technologies and data has 
become an increasingly valuable commodity. 
Australia and New Zealand’s public and 
private sectors are increasingly premised 
on the collection, control, and use of data 
– often personal and sensitive – between 
people and organisations or between people 
and governments. For industries, the ability 
to access a broader base of information 
to support decision making, understand 
patterns and anticipate needs will also 
enable new levels of efficiency, coordination 
and production, offering new economic 
opportunities and outcomes. Platform 
companies such as Google and Facebook rely 
on these data to generate revenue in various 
ways, while governments can analyse data 
to better understand citizens’ concerns and 
needs. Much of these data are not provided by 
people per se, but rather generated through 
various internet-enabled technologies and 
services, such as smart technologies and 
services in homes, workplaces, cities and 
governments that produce continuous 
streams of data. 
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AI’s data-generating capabilities present 
commercial opportunities for the use and 
leverage of that data. Big data has attracted 
global attention through datasets offering 
new insights on patterns and trends that were 
previously intractable. If used appropriately, 
the new technologies using big data could 
generate new potentials, however at the 
same time, big data can have significant 
methodological and ethical limitations, social 
and political implications and epistemological 
challenges (Crawford, Miltner and Gray, 
2014). For example, algorithmic decision-
making tools raise concerns of bias and 
discrimination, while AI systems capable 
of deriving personal information from 
multiple datasets point to technical and legal 
challenges regarding tracing the ‘provenance’ 
of data. Developments in our ability to 
rapidly collect, analyse and safely share data 
between people and organisations – without 
compromising individual privacy – will 
support the development of such AI-enabled, 
targeted services, by enabling organisations 
to understand our particular needs and 
characteristics, from observing our data. 
Policies that affect data collection and sharing 
inevitably affect the development of AI. 
In Australia, policy discussions have been 
focused on bolstering data innovation – in 
which data, including personal information, 
is treated as a tradeable asset to stimulate 
growth in digital economies (Productivity 
Commission, 2016: 47) at the potential 
expense of data protection and privacy. Key 
issues facing data protection and privacy 
include governance and regulation of 
aggregated data, which involves protecting 
aggregated datasets from ‘de-anonymisation’ 
by AI systems; data sovereignty, which 
refers to the storage and security of national 
datasets; and data integrity and portability, 
which relate to an individual’s right to obtain, 
reuse or delete personal data. Data protection 
and data innovation need not be considered 
mutually exclusive goals; enhanced consumer 
156
protections on the collection and control 
of data may have the flow-on effect of 
stimulating competitive digital economies 
and innovation.
6.2 Collection, consent 
and use
Data underpins AI, and the quality, 
complexity, availability and origins of data 
will influence the accuracy and validity of the 
AI-based systems it powers. A factor affecting 
the usability of data in analytics is its potential 
to be inconsistent. This includes inconsistency 
due to the poor quality of the data collected, 
the way the data has been recorded or 
the potential for the data to have been 
impacted by bias. This may be the bias of 
the contributor, whose data are captured, or 
bias of the collector. Our use of different data 
collection methods – ranging from verbal 
information, to paper documents, to sensors 
networks – inevitably results in a range in the 
level of quality and reliability of data. 
Trust in the integrity of data is essential 
for a dataset to be consistent, reliable 
and effectively contribute to an AI or ML-
based technology. This involves ensuring 
that appropriate quality controls and 
processes – such as ethics and consent 
– are in place when it was collected and 
that the methodology of collection is well 
documented and available to users of 
the data.
One of the main challenges for AI is centred 
on concerns about unintended consequences 
of sharing data including appropriate use and 
interpretation and unauthorised disclosure or 
use of data. Aggregation and anonymisation 
of individual data is a common approach 
used to reduce the risk of personal disclosure 
within a dataset.
6.2.1 Identification and access 
to personal data
AI methods may require data owners to 
expose or give away their confidential or 
potentially sensitive data to those building 
the models. This requirement generates 
privacy and competitive implications, as the 
data may contain trade secrets or private 
information relating to people. 
Information is considered personal if it is 
about an individual who is identifiable or 
reasonably identifiable. Personal information 
encompasses a broad range of information 
and might include name, email address or 
unique identifiers such as photos or videos. 
A further element of personal information is 
sensitive personal information, which often 
encompasses information or opinion about an 
individual’s health, race or ethnicity, political 
opinion, religious beliefs, sexual orientation 
or criminal record. In this case, algorithmic 
frameworks can detect identifiable people 
from a range of data because the detection is 
based on the ability to categorise information 
with little analytical recourse as to how the 
information was generated.
However, the situation is more complex 
when considering reasonably identifiable 
information. Reasonably identifiable 
information refers to identification arising 
from data aggregation processes. In this case, 
data that do not readily identify an individual 
can be aggregated to enable re-identification. 
By doing this, an AI system can determine 
whether the aggregated output is ‘about’ 
an individual. For example, mobile phone 
metadata can be used to identify individual 
life-style patterns (Isaacman et al., 2011) and 
can therefore result in the re-identification 
of an individual. In these situations, 
understanding the social context of data 
generation is crucial, as is understanding the 
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capabilities, resources and abilities of the data 
aggregating organisation. 
Identification of individuals is a risk, 
not specific to AI, but arising from the 
proliferation of detailed personal data used 
by AI systems. Simple algorithms can be used 
for re-identification of individuals, such as 
data linking (Culnane, Rubinstein and Teague, 
2017). Indeed, the more data that are available 
about an individual, the easier it will be to 
re-identify their record and data. While this is 
something that humans can do already, AI is 
highly effective at finding latent patterns in 
data, allowing it to re-identify data quickly and 
on a large scale. The pace of development in 
AI and the increasing detail of data collected 
about individuals outstrips the progress of 
de-identification. This results in datasets 
becoming easier to re-identify over time and 
the risk increases due to a combination of 
algorithmic progress in AI and the increasing 
availability of auxiliary data. 
AI’s ability to identify personal information is a 
complex technical and legal issue. In Australia, 
the Consumer Data Right is beginning to roll 
out across industries to ensure that consumers 
have the right to safely access their personal 
data and authorise the transference of their 
data to third parties. The Consumer Data Right 
will apply to specific data sets and is aimed 
at empowering the consumer with the use of 
their own data while also improving the flow 
of information in the economy, encouraging 
competition and creating opportunities. 
The Right focuses on the consumers choice 
and ability to share their data rather than a 
business’s right to share consumer data. An 
example of how this Right provides benefit 
to the consumer would include a consumer 
freedom to use a comparison website for 
home loans. In the future, it is possible that 
an AI or ML framework could be used to 
assist with tracing the ‘provenance’ of the 
re-identification process described above. 
However, the degree of legal interpretation 
skills required are still such that the ultimate 
identification of personal information will still 
remain a human analytical task, particularly 
given the legal uncertainty regarding 
interpretative processes of categorisation.
6.2.2 Data aggregation
Data aggregation may involve linking datasets 
or mining information from continuous 
streams of data generated by internet-
enabled technologies. Data aggregation 
can present both opportunities and risks for 
people, organisations and governments. For 
example, the accumulation and aggregation 
of large amounts of data will provide a more 
accurate insight into the complexities of social 
life, which can enhance policy and service 
insights (Executive Office of the President 
and National Science and Technology Council 
Committee on Technology, 2016). Enhanced 
insights into activities and increased access 
to data and analytical outputs, could also 
enable better choice-making mechanisms for 
people (Productivity Commission, 2016: 84). 
For example, smartphones can now monitor 
driving behaviours, including distance driven, 
driving speed, location, how abruptly the car 
brakes and phone use during driving (Canaan, 
Lucker and Spector, 2016). By providing 
drivers with these data or by supplying 
customers with automated reminders and 
real-time coaching to track safe driving 
behaviours, individual driving habits could be 
improved. This has obvious benefits for the 
insured individual, the insurer and society at 
large (Clarke and Libarikian, 2014).
The combination of enhanced forms of data 
collection and analysis are also giving rise to 
improved knowledge for resource allocation 
(Productivity Commission, 2016: 89). For 
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example, smart grids operate in conjunction 
with smart meters. Smart meters provide a 
number of benefits for both consumer and 
supplier alike because they generate near to 
real-time data on energy consumption. For 
the supplier, the collective use of smart grids 
provides a more detailed understanding of 
electricity demand at every stage in the grid. 
The activities of the individual, the building 
and the environment are connected, and 
it becomes possible to see the effects of 
individual action in the home and its related 
impact across the grid.
However, the increasing prevalence of data 
accumulation, particularly in the public 
sector, is giving rise to concerns regarding 
key public policy issues (British Academy 
and The Royal Society, 2017: 42). Examples 
include the mandatory opt-out process of 
the My Health Record implementation; the 
use of census data for government-wide 
data analytics and automated welfare debt 
collection processes. Concerns have been 
raised regarding data accumulation strategies 
in the private sector, particularly in relation 
to data-driven customer services. Collective 
monitoring of these services (Yeung, 2016; 
Calo, 2017: 423) may lead to new forms of 
surveillance (Zuboff, 2015; Yeung, 2016: 10; 
Cohen, 2017). For example, sensors and 
cameras embedded in vehicles can detect 
driver states such as emotion, frustration and 
fatigue (el Kaliouby, 2017; Goadsuff, 2018). 
These sensor technologies can detect risky, 
impulsive or inattentive patterns of decision 
making (Canaan, Lucker and Spector, 2016). 
However, it is possible for organisations to 
derive intimate knowledge from these data, 
perhaps inadvertently (Calo, 2017: 421).
Data governance structures could help ensure 
the appropriate use and handling of data, 
including determining legally acceptable 
bounds of data aggregation involving 
personal information.
6.2.3 Data governance in an age 
of big data
6.2.3.1 Data anonymisation 
Data anonymisation allows information in a 
database to be manipulated in a manner that 
makes it difficult to identify data subjects 
(Ohm, 2010: 1701). This is often achieved by 
ensuring personal identifiers are removed 
from the datasets (Australian Computer 
Society, 2017). These techniques are often 
used by data controllers to anonymise data 
before release to protect an individual’s 
sensitive information. However, this faith in 
anonymisation has been criticised (Ohm, 
2010: 1704), because it is usually possible 
to reverse engineer or de-anonymise data 
that has been de-identified (Narayanan and 
Shmatikov, 2008; Ohm, 2010: 1708; Srivatsa 
and Hicks, 2012).
Protecting data from de-anonymisation 
requires reliable protection from data 
breaches, which remain an ongoing problem 
for both commercial and governmental data 
holders. The advent of the Internet of Things 
(which refers to the proliferation of internet-
enabled technologies in everyday use) and 
ubiquitous computing will lead to burgeoning 
databases and new vulnerabilities. In the near 
term we can anticipate that new kinds of data 
will be collected for the purposes of ML and 
automated decision making, generating new 
stockpiles of data to be targeted for theft. 
Policymakers will need to respond to these 
changes. 
6.2.3.2 Data protection and privacy
Data innovation should not progress at the 
expense of data protection and privacy. 
Information privacy law could play a role in 
defining and determining the acceptable 
bounds of data aggregation, especially where 
personal information is involved. As data 
collection becomes increasingly widespread 
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in public and private sectors, Australia and 
New Zealand’s information privacy laws will 
need to be reconsidered. 
Existing privacy laws regulate personal data, 
which is generally defined as information that 
makes an individual identifiable. However, 
it is not easy to determine whether certain 
information is personal data because people 
can be re-identified when de-identified data is 
cross-matched with other datasets (Australian 
Computer Society, 2017). The principal 
legislation governing privacy and data 
protection in Australia is the federal Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth), which regulates the handling 
of personal information by the private sector 
and federal government agencies.11 It contains 
13 Australian Privacy Principles based on the 
1980 OECD Guidelines and the EU Directive. 
Australian Privacy Principles collectively 
govern collection, use, disclosure, storage, 
security, access and correction of personal 
information. Personal information is defined in 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (s6) as ‘information 
or an opinion about an identified individual or 
an individual who is reasonably identifiable: 
(a) whether the information or opinion is true 
or not; and (b) whether the information or 
opinion is recorded in a material form or not.’ 
The Privacy Act and other state and territory 
privacy legislation views information in binary 
terms, meaning the data must either be 
personal or non-personal. The extent to which 
information can identify an individual will 
differ between datasets, and legislation
11 Public sectors of various states and territories are 
governed by separate legislations: Information Privacy 
Act 2014 (ACT), Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), Information Act (NT), 
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), Personal Information 
and Protection Act 2004 (Tas), and Privacy and Data 
Protection Act 2014 (Vic). South Australia issued 
administrative rules requiring compliance with a set 
of Information Privacy Principles, while in Western 
Australia, some privacy principles are included in the 
Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). See Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Other privacy 
jurisdictions’ at https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/
other-privacy-jurisdictions 
in Australia differs in how it deals with this 
challenge. Context is relevant in classifying 
information as personal. However, in some 
instances the wording in the legislation can 
be viewed as suggesting that the context in 
which people are identifiable from a dataset 
is an intrinsic property of that dataset.12 
While the contextual definition helps 
to ensure appropriate data governance, 
challenges arise when the same dataset may 
fall into the definition only at particular times 
or in certain circumstances.
There is a challenge to ensure that the 
benefits of aggregated data are harnessed 
without undermining an individual’s right 
to privacy. The current privacy framework 
in Australia and New Zealand emphasises 
consent, or individual control, over personal 
data. Under the system of ‘notice and consent’ 
(Tene and Polonetsky, 2013: 260), the data 
subject (the user) is given notice, often in the 
form of a privacy policy, of the intended use of 
data at the time of data collection. However, 
the notice and consent model is problematic 
for a number of reasons (Solove, 2013; Barocas 
and Nissenbaum, 2014). For example, it is well 
documented that consumers often do not 
read detailed privacy policies (Nissenbaum, 
2010: 105; Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, 
2013: 67), while oversimplified policies can 
fail to explain privacy choices meaningfully 
(Nissenbaum, 2011: 36). Even with sufficient 
information, consumers are likely to trade 
off long-term privacy for short-term benefits 
(Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005). 
12 Unlike legislation in the ACT, NT or (after 2012) the 
Commonwealth, the definition of personal information 
in Queensland, Victoria and NSW states a person 
must be identifiable ‘from the information’. It is 
possible that these words mean information does not 
become personal information merely because there 
is potential for linking with other information. When 
a similar wording used to exist in the Commonwealth 
Act, former OAIC guidance suggested such strict 
interpretation was inappropriate. The former guidance 
is no longer accessible. 
11 Public sectors of various states and territories are governed by separate legislations: Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT), 
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), Information Act (NT), Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), Personal 
Information and Protection Act 2004 (Tas), and Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic). South Australia issued administrative 
rules requiring compliance with a set of Information Privacy Principles, while in Western Australia, some privacy principles 
are included in the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Other 
privacy jurisdictions’ at https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/other-privacy-jurisdictions 
12 Unlike legislation in the ACT, NT or (after 2012) the Commonwealth, the definition of personal information in Queensland, 
Victoria and NSW states a person must be identifiable ‘from the information’. It is possible that these words mean 
information does not become personal information merely because there is potential for linking with other information. 
When a similar wording used to exist in the Commonwealth Act, former OAIC guidance suggested such strict interpretation 
was inappropriate. The former guidance is no longer accessible.
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Improved data protection policies are 
required which inform the individuals of how 
their data are being used, the conclusions 
being drawn from it, and a right to access, 
correct, and delete their data. Due to the 
covert nature of re-identification, is it 
necessary that companies are able to establish 
and demonstrate the provenance of the data 
they use. It should be beholden on them, and 
therefore indirectly on the supplier of the 
data, to demonstrate that data were collected 
with consent and is permitted to be used for 
the purpose intended.
The Australian government is forming a 
National Data Advisory Council that will help 
the National Data Commissioner create laws 
that will help govern the release of data, 
along with protections for privacy, as part of 
a Data Sharing and Release Act (Australian 
Government, 2018e). 
6.2.3.3 Data licences 
Privacy policies often contain highly 
individualised and specific terms on how 
data are collected, processed and used. In the 
copyright domain, there are six standardised 
Creative Commons (CC) licences, which 
reflect different combinations of lawful uses 
and conditions (Creative Commons Australia, 
2013). A similar licensing framework could 
potentially be applied to personal data, in 
which a limited number of licence types 
specify the different terms of data usage, for 
example: 
• Use limited to entity to which data are 
provided and purposes closely aligned with 
purpose of collection. Data deleted when no 
longer required for that purpose
• Use limited to entity to which data are 
provided, but purposes can be related to 
primary purpose. Data deleted when no 
longer required for that purpose
Moreover, the value of an individual’s 
personal information is often unknown by 
both the organisation and the individual 
at the time of collection when consent is 
usually requested. This may make it difficult 
for the data controller (an organisation that 
determines the purpose for which personal 
data are processed) to specify upfront the 
types of purposes that the data may be used 
for. Additionally, there could be new data 
controllers (or third-party organisations) who 
use the data after collection depending on 
how the data are combined and processed. 
Future purposes and use by new data 
controllers are often unexpected and would 
require amended consent, which is likely a 
costly and complex exercise.
The current system places a heavy burden on 
individual users to self-manage their privacy 
in the context of numerous entities collecting 
their data (Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, 2013: 
68; Solove, 2013: 1888). While data controllers 
are in a position to analyse risks, people 
generally lack the information or expertise. This 
imbalance could lead data controllers to exploit 
privacy risks to their advantage. Penalties for 
data misuse or opportunities for redress for 
breaches of privacy could discourage sharing or 
publication of identifiable data without consent.
However, weighing the costs of privacy 
protection and the benefits of big data 
innovation is not straightforward. The benefits 
and harms of privacy choices are distributive 
in a society (Strahilevitz, 2013). One privacy 
choice could benefit some to the detriment of 
others. If consent places the responsibility on 
individuals, then individuals are likely to make 
privacy choices in isolation from broader 
social factors. This may inadvertently create 
the ‘tyranny of the minority’ (Barocas and 
Nissenbaum, 2014: 61), where a small number 
of people who volunteer information make it 
possible for knowledge to be inferred about 
the majority who have withheld consent.
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• Use limited to entity to which data are 
provided but uses can be unrelated to 
primary purpose of collection. Data deleted in 
accordance with ordinary company policy
• Data can be shared with related entities and 
use can be unrelated to primary purpose 
of collection. Data will not necessarily be 
deleted after any particular fixed period
• Data can be broadly shared and used 
provided it is de-identified under the 
data controller’s data risk governance 
framework (or some general standard). 
These could each be associated with more 
detailed ‘standard conditions’ privacy 
policies. The advantage of standardisation 
is that computers could be programmed 
to communicate directly with each other, 
without human intervention, automatically 
negotiating terms of data management 
between a data subject and a data controller 
based on relatively simple settings. 
6.2.3.4 Reforming the data consent model 
A review identified several possible reforms 
to the current legislative framework for data 
consent (Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, 2013). 
First, the burden of privacy management 
could be shifted away from data subjects 
to data controllers. This involves reduced 
emphasis on individual consent and increased 
priority on disclosure to a regulator or a 
central repository. In addition, data controllers 
could demonstrate accountability through 
‘responsible data stewardship’, resulting in 
higher privacy standards for compliance. 
The Australian Computer Society (ACS) has 
suggested the focus should not be on the 
data itself, but the impact from the use 
of data. This would be a move away from 
examining who owns the data, to the ‘rights, 
roles, responsibilities, and limitations for those 
who access data in the various processes 
from collection, use, sharing and storage’ 
(Australian Computer Society, 2017). 
An idea gaining popularity are Data Trusts. 
A data trust takes the concept of a legal trust 
and applies it to data. The trustors could 
be individuals or organisations that hold 
the data and grant some rights they have 
to control the data to a set of trustees who 
then make decisions on who has access to 
the data and what the data can be used for. 
This legal structure provides independent 
stewardship of data for the benefit of society 
or organisations (Artificial Lawyer, 2018). 
6.2.3.5 Privacy certification and rating
Australia’s Chief Scientist, Dr Alan Finkel, 
has proposed the creation of a recognised 
mark for consumer technologies called the 
‘Turing Certificate’, which would indicate 
whether the technology adheres to certain 
ethical standards (Finkel, 2018c). It has 
been suggested that the Turing Certificate 
would be a voluntary system suitable only 
for low-risk consumer technology, such as 
smartphone applications and digital home 
assistants (Finkel, 2018b). The mark would 
be informed by standards developed by 
experts in consultation with consumer and 
industry groups, and when applied, the 
products, procedures and processes of the 
applicant company would be reviewed by an 
independent auditor. Privacy standards could 
also be embedded into part of the ethical 
certification process. 
Another method that may help consumers 
make better purchasing decisions would be 
a privacy-friendly label. Currently, Energy 
Star ratings assess the energy efficiency 
of electrical appliances. A similar system 
could be used to demonstrate whether a 
technology application is privacy-friendly. It is 
possible that the visualisation of privacy risks 
could make privacy choices more accessible 
to the average consumer and potentially 
increase the transparency and disclosure of 
privacy risks by data controllers. Inspired by 
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food nutrition labels, Cranor (2012) proposed 
the design of standardised and simplified 
privacy nutrition labels to replace privacy 
policies for consumers. Labelling may even 
encourage competition between data 
controllers to provide more privacy-friendly 
solutions, including computer-to-computer 
negotiations over data management terms. 
6.2.3.6 Legislative reform for aggregated data
The Australian Data Sharing and Release 
Bill, which is being drafted based on 
recommendations from the Productivity 
Commission, aims to create a new data 
governance framework that enables 
researchers to harness the value of 
government data (Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2018). A report 
from Allens Hub provided the following 
recommendations for possible reforms related 
to the aggregation of data (The Allens Hub for 
Technology, Law & Innovation, 2018):
• Rationalisation of the current patchwork 
of laws about how government shares 
information internally and externally, and 
clarification of the Bill’s relationship with 
existing data protection laws 
• Clarifying definitions and concepts relating 
to data sharing and release 
• Acknowledging quality, context, 
community perspectives and amenability 
of data to reuse
• Ensuring decisions are based on principles 
of fairness and justice given the risks of 
uneven data availability 
• Developing a data ethics framework and 
accountability mechanism and increasing 
education and training to promote 
responsible data use. 
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6.3.1 Data standards
In 2017, the World Economic Forum released 
its Global Risks Report, which identified AI 
as a key risk in part due to the slow pace 
of the development and setting of globally 
accepted standards and norms for its use and 
application (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
International standards will affect various 
industries. Organisations are therefore 
observing practice overseas, and within, 
leading AI developers to identify and set best-
practice standards. The GDPR will apply to 
6.3 Data integrity, standards and interoperability
The provenance, quality, and integrity of 
data will become more important in an 
environment where the collection, disclosure, 
and analysis of data become continually 
blurred. Data, and personal information 
in particular, are not simply provided by 
people but rather generated automatically 
by internet-enabled sensors, devices, and 
appliances (Andrejevic and Burdon, 2015). 
Data can also become dated, and thus so 
can the AI models that are based on them. 
In this environment, issues of data integrity 
will become more visible and thus more 
accountable across a much wider network of 
participants.
Establishing accepted and common standards 
that ensure data integrity can accelerate 
the potential for data sharing and linkage. 
This may in turn offer opportunities for the 
development of new technologies and 
predictive systems for individual, societal and 
system-wide needs. 
The use of common metadata registries, 
such as those conforming with international 
standard ISO11179, will facilitate the accurate 
capture and management of descriptive 
and structural health metadata (including 
assumptions and methodologies used in 
data capture) and will aid more precise data 
combination and linkage, reuse of data and its 
governance.
The data-integrity principles set in place by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics provide 
a succinct basis on which to base general 
Australian standards. The prerequisites 
of data integrity are ‘objectivity in the 
collection, compilation and dissemination 
of data to ensure unbiased statistics which 
are not subject to confidentiality breaches 
or premature release’. Adherence to these 
principles is largely supported by legislative 
frameworks.
Box 26: Power of data linkage
Data linkage is a powerful tool that 
can significantly impact on individual 
wellbeing. Professor Fiona Stanley and 
Professor Carol Bower used data-linkage 
epidemiology studies to guide the basic 
science investigating the role of folate in 
birth defects.
They investigated the way in which 
folate in a mother’s diet could reduce 
the incidence of neural tube defects. 
Birth defects of the brain or spinal cord 
happen early during pregnancy, often 
before women know they are pregnant. 
Such defects range from anencephaly, 
the improper development of the brain 
and skull, to spina bifida, the disordered 
formation of the spinal column. This 
research contributed to global studies 
and precipitated the Australian federal 
and state governments’ 2007 introduction 
of the compulsory enrichment of bread-
making flour with folate (Bower, 2014). 
Enabled by data linkage, this research has 
also been used to generate health benefits 
within areas of heart disease and cancer. 
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service providers (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2017). Therefore, while the 
right to data portability is viewed as an 
important update to traditional information 
privacy rights, it also has a significant 
innovation-oriented focus that seeks to 
enhance consumer protections and stimulate 
competitive digital economies. 
The types of personal data covered by the 
GDPR right to data portability include:
• Personal information actively and 
knowingly provided (e.g. name and 
address)
• Observed data arising from the use of a 
service or a device (e.g. search histories, 
traffic data, location data and raw data 
from wearable devices). 
However, the right to data portability does 
not extend to all circumstances and has 
limitations: 
• The right does not apply when the 
data processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the data controller, 
or when a data controller is exercising its 
public duties or complying with a legal 
obligation (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2017)
• The right only applies to digital data 
provided to a data controller by an 
individual. It therefore does not cover 
personal information acquired by the 
controller from other sources
• More importantly, the right does not 
apply to portability regarding profiling or 
analytics work undertaken by organisations 
collecting data. It therefore does not 
include ‘inferred’ or ‘derived’ data where an 
algorithmic assessment has been made 
about an individual based on behavioural 
monitoring (Information Commissioner’s 
all organisations that have an establishment 
in, trade with, or collect information on, 
the EU and it will be increasingly important 
for industries working internationally to 
understand the requirements.
Achieving greater unification in global 
standards for AI and data use, across industry 
and government, will help to minimise the 
potential risks from its use and adoption. In 
particular, establishing aligned settings for 
data privacy and confidentiality will greatly 
support organisations ensure decisions made 
or tasks completed using AI do not result 
in unintended, or potentially irreversible, 
consequences.
6.3.2 Data portability
Data portability refers to the ability of 
an individual to obtain, reuse or transfer 
personal data from and between different 
organisations and services. The right to data 
portability is enshrined in Article 20 of the 
EU GDPR. Under this Article, an individual 
can request their personal data from a data 
collector in a structured, commonly used, and 
machine-readable format for their own use. 
Consumers are protected from having their 
data stored in closed platform silos that are 
incompatible with other platforms, which 
has the effect of locking the consumer into 
a service provider (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2017). 
Conceivably, the right to data portability 
will encourage the adoption of common 
data storage and data-processing standards 
across different services, organisations, 
and IT environments (Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, 2017). Portability 
standardisation is intended to empower 
people by providing them with more control 
over their data and also to foster competition 
between data collectors by making it easier 
for consumers to switch between different 
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Office (UK), 2018). Accordingly, while 
the right seeks to increase the control 
people have over the use of their personal 
data, including creating new options of 
consumer-oriented trade, the purpose of 
the right, and indeed the GDPR in general, 
is to regulate personal data rather than 
competition in the EU data ecosystem 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
2017; Lynskey, 2017). Corporations can 
thus still safeguard their competitive 
advantage by being able to retain 
algorithmically-driven insights. 
The Australian Government is developing 
a new right to data portability, much like 
Article 20 of the GDPR. The development 
of an Australian data portability right is 
important because of unfolding Australian 
policy developments via the Productivity 
Commission’s recent report on ‘Data 
Availability and Use’ (Productivity Commission, 
2016) and the Open Banking Review. Both 
appear to herald a new response to Australian 
information-privacy regulation that places 
a much greater emphasis on consumer 
protection as a desired societal outcome of 
information privacy law.
The Australian Productivity Commission’s 
Comprehensive Right is focused on expanding 
consumer control and use of data to stimulate 
digital economy innovations that are separate 
from information privacy regulatory models. 
Both the EU and Australian policy positions 
will give rise to a much greater focus on the 
exchange of information to customers, which 
will have the flow-on effect of establishing 
legal standards of data compatibility 
and interoperability. 
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2018e – My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth): 
s77). The transfer, processing or handling of 
such data outside of Australia is permitted 
only if such records do not include ‘personal 
information in relation to a consumer’ or 
‘identifying information of an individual 
or entity’ (Australian Government, 2018e – 
My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth): s77).
If the data are stored offshore and not end-to-
end encrypted, there is a possibility that the 
data are readily available to the government of 
the country in which the data are stored. This 
is true even when the cloud storage provider 
offers encryption at rest (inactive data or data 
that is not moving). The legal jurisdiction 
covering the data matters when there are 
no globally agreed privacy standards. If the 
data becomes available in an unencrypted 
form on an offshore server, it presents a 
problem for effective privacy oversight and 
may hinder appropriate redress for people 
whose information is included in the dataset. 
If the data are stored offshore but has end-to-
end encryption (with keys held in Australia) 
then it is assumed that the encrypted data are 
available to the government of the country 
in which it is stored. If the encryption is 
sound, this may be considered an acceptable 
risk. However, it is important to note that 
most systems for end-to-end encrypted file 
storage expose some metadata, such as who 
accessed a file and when. Even for end-to-
end encrypted data, some countries are 
considering laws that would force software 
companies to provide their government 
with a secondary mechanism of access to 
that encrypted data. It will be important to 
consider not purchasing encryption software 
6.4 Data storage and security
13 For example, in Europe, different governments require different types of data to be stored locally. These range from financial 
records, gambling winnings and user transactions, and government records as discussed by Selby. Other countries impose 
restrictions to data collected from specific sectors, such as financial, health and medical information, online publishing, and 
telecommunications data. See Cohen, Hall, & Wood, 2017.
Large and often sensitive datasets required 
by AI will necessitate appropriate data 
storage and input methods. Data handling 
considerations are not unique to AI. The issue 
of data storage and security would exist 
regardless of whether AI is applied to the 
data. However, it becomes even more difficult 
to solve when an AI system is dependent on 
access to all the data.
6.4.1 Onshore and offshore 
data storage
Data can be stored onshore (locally) or 
offshore (overseas). Data sovereignty is 
the concept that information is subject to 
the laws of the nation within which it is 
stored. Data-localisation legislation requires 
network providers to store original or copies 
of collected data about internet users, on 
servers located within the jurisdiction. 
These laws have been justified to ensure the 
privacy and security of citizens’ data, provide 
better information security against foreign 
intelligence agencies, and support domestic 
law enforcement activities (Selby, 2017). 
Data-localisation measures vary in scope 
(Chander & Lê, 2015). Countries such as China, 
Russia, and Indonesia, have enacted broad 
data-localisation laws requiring most personal 
information and data to be stored within their 
respective borders. Most countries, however, 
have narrow data-localisation laws, imposing 
the requirement only on certain types of 
personal information and specific industry 
sectors.13 For example, Australian laws are 
narrow and require electronic health records 
to be stored locally (Australian Government,
13 For example, in Europe, different governments require 
different types of data to be stored locally. These range 
from financial records, gambling winnings and user 
transactions, and government records as discussed 
by Selby. Other countries impose restrictions to data 
collected from specific sectors, such as financial, 
health and medical information, online publishing, and 
telecommunications data. See (Cohen, Hall, & Wood, 
2017).
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revealing who the customers were, or even 
how many had seen the advertisement or 
visited the store.
Secure computation platforms are freely 
available online (Damgård et al., 2012; 
Ejgenberg et al., 2012). Some use (partially) 
homomorphic encryption, which means that 
some computations (such as addition) can be 
performed while the data remains encrypted. 
However, their computational speed is limited 
– some simple computations run quite fast, 
but more complex ML algorithms rapidly 
become infeasible.
Differential privacy
Differential privacy addresses the 
complementary problem: it limits the amount 
of information that can be leaked by the 
answer to a query about any particular 
individual. In its simplest form it consists of 
randomly perturbing the algorithm’s output 
to introduce uncertainty about its true value, 
hence hiding individual details (Dwork, Roth 
and others, 2014). In very large datasets, local 
differential privacy can still yield accurate 
results: each individual input is randomly 
perturbed first, then the algorithm is applied 
to the differentially-private data. Both Apple 
and Google have run example projects using 
these techniques (Abadi et al., 2016), in 
addition to academic research. 
Differential privacy represents a bound-
on information leakage, not a guarantee 
of perfect privacy. If the same data are 
reused across multiple differentially-private 
mechanisms, information about people can 
be more accurately inferred.
Combining techniques from cryptography 
and multiparty computation with differential 
privacy is an area of research. Many federated 
data analysis platforms borrow some 
techniques from each, though not all are 
designed on rigorous and provable security 
guarantees.
from countries with such laws. If data are 
stored onshore in Australia, there is still no 
guarantee that it will be secure. Data breaches 
occur often, with attackers from within 
Australia and overseas. End-to-end encrypted 
cloud storage is a good tool to protect the 
data, along with standard mechanisms for 
secure access and deletion. 
6.4.2 Secure data storage
Providing technological solutions to ensuring 
reasonably secure storage of data, while 
allowing appropriate access for analysis, is 
an active area of research. There are several 
main directions, including: traditional access 
control; differential privacy and secure 
multiparty computation. These areas are 
not mutually exclusive and can be applied 
together. For example, secure research 
environment with formally restricted access 
control could use differential privacy to 
perturb answers before showing them to 
an analyst, and use secure computation for 
analysis on datasets stored elsewhere. 
Secure multiparty computation
Secure (multiparty) computation uses 
cryptography to allow two (or more) 
computers to evaluate a function on each 
of their private inputs, without revealing 
what those inputs are. For example, a set of 
pharmacists could compute the total number 
of sales of a particular medication, without 
revealing their individual sale totals. This 
does not guarantee that the resultant answer 
protects privacy: if the computation is an 
election outcome, and the vote is unanimous, 
then this reveals exactly how everyone 
voted. Secure computation has numerous 
practical applications and has been used by 
Google, which partnered with a third party 
to compute the total number of users who 
had seen an advertisement and subsequently 
bought the item in a store (Ion et al., 2017). 
Crucially, they were able to do this without 
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voluntary Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Cross-Border Privacy Rules (Sacks, 2017). 
Under CSL, network operators and operators 
of critical information infrastructures are 
required to store personal information and 
other important data that are collected and 
generated in China within the jurisdiction. 
Such data can be stored or provided overseas 
for business reasons only if it is truly necessary 
and the operators conduct a self-security 
assessment or pass an official security 
assessment when a threshold test is met (Chin 
et al., 2018). The security assessment is based 
on a two-pronged test (Chin et al., 2018): 
firstly, whether the transfer is lawful, legitimate, 
and necessary; and secondly, the risk of 
transfer is evaluated by looking at the nature 
of the data and the likelihood and impact of 
security breaches involving such data. 
While Europe’s GDPR and CSL appear to 
have similar cross-border transfer tests, there 
are material differences (Zhang, 2018). CSL 
does not provide for derogations that are 
found in the GDPR. Neither does the CSL 
contain mechanisms in the GDPR such as 
Binding Corporate Rules14 and standard data 
protection clauses for companies to gain 
approval.15 Lastly, data-localisation laws are 
likely to increase compliance costs since 
companies engaged in data collection from 
different countries will have to build local data 
centres in each jurisdiction. 
This is not to say that data-localisation laws 
may not be rational for individual countries 
seeking to protect citizen data and ensure 
local access (e.g. by intelligence and 
law-enforcement agencies). However, an 
international framework with consistent data 
protections and clear rules for transnational 
access would resolve some of these issues. 
14 Binding Corporate Rules allow multinational companies 
to transfer personal data out of the European Union 
within the same corporate group to countries that do 
not have an adequate level of data protection. 
15 Standard contractual clauses are used to transfer data 
outside the EU and are deemed to provide sufficient 
data protection by the European Commission.
Data storage is not solely a technology issue. 
Unless an entity is held accountable for 
data breaches and failures to protect and 
secure data, then there is little motivation 
for them to do so. Many entities appear 
unconcerned about data security, which has 
led to numerous and increasingly serious 
data breaches despite advances in security, 
cryptography and information security 
management. Appropriate regulations to hold 
entities accountable may change this. 
6.4.3 Data sovereignty and 
multinational companies 
Technical aspects
Data-localisation laws could create technical 
difficulties for multinational companies 
seeking to generate business insights from 
data collected across multiple jurisdictions. 
Many companies store data in ‘the cloud’, 
making it difficult for companies to see where 
the data are stored and processed (Synytsky, 
2017). However, to comply with the laws, 
companies need to know precisely what type 
of data are stored, and in what location. 
Legal compliance
Countries with broad data-localisation 
laws create privacy standards for data 
collected within their jurisdiction. This 
means multinational companies could 
have the additional burden of complying 
with privacy standards unique to each 
country on top of international and regional 
privacy legislative frameworks. For example, 
China’s Cybersecurity Law (CSL) introduces 
restrictions on cross-border data transfers 
that differ from international privacy regimes 
such as the European Union’s GDPR and the 
14 Binding Corporate Rules allow multinational companies to transfer personal data out of the European Union within the 
same corporate group to countries that do not have an adequate level of data protection. 
15 Standard contractual clauses are used to transfer data outside the EU and are deemed to provide sufficient data protection 
by the European Commission.
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6.4.4 Federating data
Government and industry are significant data 
generators. However, in most cases the true 
power and potential that data could offer 
for insight into their operations, customers 
or constituents remains untapped and 
underused due to challenges in data linkage 
– in particular, the potential for breaches of 
privacy. 
There is an opportunity for government and 
industry to share and leverage datasets across 
organisations, for building more powerful and 
insightful predictive models. Doing so has 
traditionally required co-locating all available 
data, or bringing a common format, which 
is often difficult and inefficient for legal, 
contractual and practical reasons. 
Federated ML allows data owners to work 
together to build shared predictive models 
from data, without having to physically 
bring that data into one place. Instead 
they share information only about how the 
model performs on the data they own. This 
distributed-optimisation approach means 
that data from multiple organisations can be 
drawn on and reflected in a single model that 
generates insight and makes predictions as if 
it has access to all the data. 
There is an opportunity to establish an 
ecosystem of federated ML technologies 
across government and industry, based on 
the use of open formats and application-
programming interfaces, which will 
encourage and support innovation in AI 
development and support new market 
development. The principle of federated data 
has already been successfully demonstrated 
and is an emerging model in use globally, and 
by Australian government agencies. Examples 
include ATO’s standard business reporting 
platform and the Australian Government’s 
NationalMap federated spatial visualisation 
platform.
Box 27: Data federation 
in practice
CSIRO’s Data61 is working with the 
Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet on a project to improve the 
searchability, quality, indexing and 
discoverability of available datasets. 
The software, known as MAGDA (making 
Australian government data available), 
supports better ways for locating and 
accessing data from across the country, 
combining these with personal data for 
more targeted analytics. 
Further, IT companies (such as IBM) are 
also investing in federation technologies 
to provide a unified interface to diverse 
data (Lin and Haas, 2002).
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• Articles 21 and 22 provide rights to 
object to data processing, particularly 
in providing a right not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling. 
It is unclear exactly how Article 22 will apply 
(Artificial Intelligence Committee - House 
of Lords, 2017; Veale and Edwards, 2017; 
Kaminski, 2018), though it has been argued 
that it establishes a general prohibition of 
decision making based solely on automated 
processing, unless certain exemption 
situations arise (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2017). 
While some of the GDPR protections are 
similar to the protections of Australian 
information privacy law – namely the 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs 12 and 
13 regarding access and correction) – the 
regulatory focus in the EU on automated 
processing is novel. One of the perennial 
criticisms of the Australian Privacy Act is that it 
is under-litigated and therefore does not have 
significant judicial consideration of how the 
key protections and components of the Act 
should be interpreted (Burdon and McKillop, 
2013). As such, it is unclear whether the 
Australian framework would provide the same 
degree of protections to personal information 
in an AI-processing and decision-making 
context. 
As society moves towards a digital future 
where new forms of individual data are 
collected, stored and used, detailed historical 
accounts of individual activities and 
behaviours will increase. The above discussion 
also raises questions around ‘digital death’ 
– that is, who has access to accounts and 
ownership of digital assets after death. There 
may also be issues of automated and inferred 
decision making of deceased persons based 
6.5 Data management and disposal
Australia and New Zealand’s information 
privacy principles guarantee certain 
protections for individuals. Traditional 
information privacy law provides protections 
that seek to imbue fairness in the exchange 
of personal information. People have a limited 
range of process rights that provide a degree 
of control over how personal information 
is collected, handled and used by data 
collectors. Individuals can access and amend 
collected personal information, request to 
see personal information held about them 
and ask that ‘out of date’ information about 
them be deleted or amended. Similarly, data 
collectors are obliged to inform users about 
when and why collections are undertaken, 
to collect personal information only for 
relevant and specified purposes, to store 
personal information securely and to ensure 
that subsequent uses are in accord with the 
purpose of collection. 
The question is whether these protections will 
still have the same substantive application 
in structures of automated collection and 
analysis. Along with the traditional types of 
information privacy protections highlighted 
above, the EU GDPR introduces several 
enhanced information privacy protections 
for people relating specifically to automated 
profiling, which would include an AI decision-
making context (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2016). These include:
• Articles 13 and 14 provide enhanced 
transparency measures that require 
data controllers to inform people about 
the existence and scope of automated 
decision making
• Articles 17 and 18 provide the ability to 
rectify or erase personal information used 
as part of an algorithmic output and the 
output itself 
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• Safe Outputs – refers to the residual 
risk in publishing results derived from 
sensitive data (are the statistical results 
non-disclosive).
The proliferation of artificially-intelligent 
algorithms suggests the need to further 
modify the Five Safes framework. In the 
world of AI, the Safe People element 
may be replaced with algorithms. The 
environment an algorithm operates in may 
be very different from that of a human 
researcher, and the restrictions and scrutiny 
placed on an algorithm may be far more 
intrusive than those that can be applied to a 
human. Consequently, some of the implicit 
assumptions in the Five Safes framework 
need to be re-examined. A proposal from 
the Australian Computer Society (outlined in 
Figure 10) suggests the following:
• Safe Algorithms – for an artificially 
intelligent algorithm, the behaviours 
and associated access conditions can be 
enforced under many circumstances, but 
will need supervision if adapting over time. 
Any biases that develop also need to be 
monitored.
• Safe Projects – this category still refers to 
the legal, moral, and ethical considerations 
surrounding the use of data. ‘Grey’ areas 
might exist when exploitation of data may 
be acceptable if an overall public good is 
realised or with consent from the person 
who has provided the project outcome 
(knowledge) or who benefits from the AI-
driven service. The Safeness of the project 
that an algorithm undertakes should be 
known before the algorithm is applied to 
the data. 
on extended, historical data holdings. This 
could lead to arguments about the creation 
or identification of new forms of legal identity 
predicated on decision-making inferences 
regarding the historical accumulation of 
deceased individual life-long data repositories. 
6.5.1 Managing disclosure risk
Organisations around the world – including 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics – use the 
‘Five Safes’ framework (Desai, Ritchie and 
Welpton, 2016) to help make decisions about 
the appropriate use of data considered 
confidential or sensitive. The framework has 
five dimensions: safe people, safe projects, 
safe setting, safe data and safe outputs. 
• Safe People – refers to the knowledge, 
skills, and incentives of the users to store 
and use the data appropriately (is the 
person accessing the data appropriately 
authorised or trusted to use it in an 
appropriate manner). 
• Safe Projects – refers to the legal, moral, 
and ethical considerations surrounding use 
of the data (is the data being used for an 
appropriate purpose). 
• Safe Setting – refers to practical controls 
on the way data are accessed (does the 
access facility limit unauthorised use. At 
one extreme, researchers may be restricted 
to using the data in a supervised physical 
location, while on the other, there are no 
restrictions on data downloaded from the 
internet). 
• Safe Data – refers primarily to the 
potential for identification in the data (has 
appropriate and sufficient protection been 
applied to the data). It could also refer to 
the sensitivity of the data itself or to the 
quality of the data and the conditions 
under which it was collected. 
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The potential for continuous ‘learning’ by 
algorithms presents challenges. It has been 
noted numerous times that AI is prone to 
amplify sexist and racist biases from the real 
world (Reese, 2016; Cossins, 2018) and evolve 
to positions well beyond those intended 
by developers. A Safe Algorithm needs 
to be constantly monitored for their Safe 
Level – which may change over time or be 
recalibrated. As AI and technology evolves, 
it could be appropriate to recalibrate the 
elements of a safe framework to help make 
decisions about effective use of data that is 
confidential or sensitive. 
• Safe Setting – when the researcher is an 
algorithm, the operating environment can 
be locked, disconnecting the algorithm 
from other sources of input. This, however, 
does not allow evaluation of any biases in 
the algorithm itself. 
• Safe Data – when the observer is an 
algorithm, the context which the algorithm 
brings to the data can be strictly limited 
through limiting access to other datasets.
• Safe Outputs – there is a distinct difference 
to be further examined – whether the output 
from an algorithm is single and discrete or 
feeds an operational loop (such as a steering 
algorithm or cruise control algorithm). 
Figure 10. Five Safes framework for algorithms
Adapted from: Australian Computer Society, 2018b.
Will the results 
lead to disclosure? Is this use of the 
data appropriate?
Has appropriate and sufficient 
protection been applied to the data?
Is the algorithm 
transparent and 
scrutinisable in an 
ongoing manner?


















In New Zealand, information sharing and 
information matching are two separate 
frameworks in the Privacy Act. The 
information-sharing framework provides for 
the authorisation and oversight of Approved 
Information Sharing Agreements. The 
information-matching framework provides 
a detailed set of rules dealing with the 
supervision and operation of authorised 
information-matching programs, with the 
Privacy Commissioner having a regulatory 
role to monitor the use of data matching by 
government departments. In 2011, the New 
Zealand Government approved new principles 
for managing the data and information it 
holds and approved a Declaration on Open 
and Transparent Government. Further, there 
is a new Privacy Bill before the New Zealand 
Parliament, and a new role of Government 
Chief Data Steward has been created. 
Supported through the National Innovation 
and Science Agenda, initiatives such as 
Platforms for Open Data are enabling 
Australian Government agencies to work with 
CSIRO’s Data61 to test and validate techniques 
for allowing trusted access to high-value 
government datasets, while preserving the 
data’s confidentiality and integrity.
To take full advantage of the opportunities 
presented by data-driven AI, governments, 
businesses and the community will need to 
increase their levels of awareness, adoption 
and acceptance of AI’s use. This will require a 
deeper level of trust in the integrity of AI-
based systems. There is a role for researchers, 
companies and governments to ensure 
appropriate safeguards are in place in the 
development and deployment of AI, so that 
opportunities are maximised, without trust 
being compromised.
6.6 Building on our strengths
Australia and New Zealand have a significant 
opportunity to be among the leading 
technology developers and adopters of 
data-driven AI systems and technologies. 
The countries have well established, and 
globally recognised, strengths in some of 
the key, data-driven capability areas core 
to AI, including data sharing or federation, 
trustworthy systems, ML, image analytics, 
natural language processing and automation. 
In addition to this, Australia and New Zealand 
are culturally diverse and serves as a desirable 
population in which to gather robust 
datasets, a core requirement for unbiased 
and effective AI.
We also have deep research capability and 
industry strength in some of the primary 
sectors expected to be affected by AI, 
including energy, manufacturing, agriculture 
and health. 
Realising this opportunity will require 
investment in a focused and coordinated 
effort, linking national AI capabilities 
and domain knowledge to the particular 
challenges and use cases for AI identified by 
industry and government. This will only be 
achieved by actively seeding and nurturing 
a deep partnership between government, AI 
and digital researchers and industry, aimed at 
identifying and driving opportunities for rapid 
technology experimentation and adoption, as 
a national priority. 
The Australian Government has already 
taken significant steps towards adopting a 
more federated approach to data sharing 
and management, enabling coordination 
and accessibility, with control of the raw 
data continuing to reside with its custodian 
organisation. 
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may result in discrimination in other ways 
(Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). 
For example, developers may build a model 
with inadvertent or indirect discriminatory 
features, without human oversight or without 
the ability for a human to intervene at key 
decision-making points, with unpredictable 
or opaque systems or with unchecked 
intentional direct discrimination (World 
Economic Forum, 2018b). Recent research by 
Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) demonstrates 
that some existing commercial AI applications 
have embedded race and gender biases. For 
example, testing Microsoft, IBM and Chinese 
company, MegVii, for accuracy of gender in 
facial recognition revealed accuracy rates for 
Caucasian men of more than 95 percent but 
only 20-35 percent for darker skinned women 




A challenge to understanding risks for 
particular population groups is the quality 
of data that is available about those groups. 
Human rights treaty bodies have repeatedly 
highlighted the need for governments 
to better collect and use data on gender, 
ethnicity, race, age and physical or mental 
disability (Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2018). AI systems need large datasets that 
may be expensive to build or purchase, 
or which may exclude open data sources, 
resulting in data that are of variable quality or 
drawn from a narrow set of sources. Data on 
which AI is trained may exclude people about 
whom data are not collected or not collected 
well, thereby embedding bias (Buolamwini 
and Gebru, 2018).
Even where good data are available, the 
design or deployment of AI-learning systems 
This chapter is based on input papers prepared by the generous contributions of Professor James 
Maclaurin and Dr John Zerilli (Discrimination and Bias); Professor Maggie Walter and Professor Tahu 
Kukutai (Indigenous Data Sovereignty); Associate Professor Reeva Lederman (Trust); Professor Mark 
Andrejevic (Trust and Accessibility); Dr Oisín Deery and Katherine Bailey (Ethics, Bias and Statistical 
Models). The original input papers and views of the experts listed can be found on the ACOLA website 
(www.acola.org).
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There is a widespread belief that algorithmic 
decision-making tools are more objective 
because they are less biased than human 
decision makers. Such assertions imply that 
legal protection against unfair discrimination 
might not be relevant to ‘objective’ 
algorithmic decision making. Human 
prejudice and algorithmic bias differ in 
character, but both are capable of generating 
unfair and discriminatory decisions. Tackling 
this problem will be particularly challenging 
owing to the contested nature of fairness and 
discrimination. 
To assess the risks of bias in automated 
decision making, one must begin by looking 
at bias in human decision making. Research 
into human decision making has generated 
important results over the past thirty 
years (Pomerol and Adam, 2008). It is now 
understood that human prejudice is the result 
7.2 Risks of data-driven bias in AI
7.2.1 Discrimination based on data 
aggregation
Over the past decade, there has been 
an unprecedented acceleration in the 
sophistication and uptake of various 
algorithmic decision-making tools, which 
draw on aggregated data. Examples 
include automated music and TV show 
recommendations, product and political 
advertising and opinion polling, medical 
diagnostics, university admissions, job 
placement and financial services. However, 
the use of aggregated data in these contexts 
carries the risk of amplifying discrimination 
and bias, and problems of fairness arise (see 
for example, Hajian, Bonchi and Castillo, 2016; 
O’Neil, 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017b). 
This may be a bias in the algorithm or a bias 
in the input data that is reflected in what the 
algorithm learns and subsequently applies. 
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Box 28: Case study: Bias in natural language-processing AI systems
A new technique has been developed 
for representing the words of a language 
which is proving useful in many NLP tasks, 
such as sentiment analysis and machine 
translation. The representations, known as 
word embeddings, involve mathematical 
representations of words that are trained from 
millions of examples of actual word usage. 
For example, a good set of representations 
would capture the relationship ‘king is to 
man as queen is to woman’ by ensuring that 
a particular mathematical relationship holds 
between the respective vectors (specifically, 
king – man + woman = queen).
Such representations are at the core of 
Google’s translation system, although they 
are representations of entire sentences, not 
just words. According to researchers at the 
Google Brain Team, this new system ‘reduces 
translation errors by more than 55-85 percent 
on major language pairs measured on 
sampled sentences from Wikipedia and news 
websites’ (Wu, Y., et al., 2016) and can even 
perform translations between language pairs 
for which no training data exists.
However, researchers at Boston University 
and Microsoft Research (Bolukbasi et al., 
2016) noticed that Google’s Word2Vec dataset 
was producing seemingly sexist outputs. For 
example, just as the relationships ‘man is to 
woman as king is to queen,’ and ‘sister is to 
woman as brother is to man,’ were captured 
by word embeddings, so too were the 
relationships ‘man is to computer programmer 
of various failures of reasoning (Arpaly, 2003). 
For example, we often reason probabilistically 
from very small samples and we regularly fail to 
update our beliefs in light of new information 
(Fricker, 2007; Gendler, 2011). At other 
times we abandon probabilistic reasoning 
altogether, relying instead on ‘generic’ 
reasoning (Begby, 2013), judging that groups 
have particular characteristics irrespective 
of information about the frequency of those 
traits (Leslie, 2017). These generic judgements 
are harmful as they are largely insensitive 
to evidence (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; 
Saul, 2013). For example, long-held beliefs 
about the criminality of certain culturally and 
linguistically diverse groups are not usually 
overcome by merely supplying evidence of 
the inaccuracy of such beliefs (Bezrukova 
et al., 2016). Moreover, emotions exert a 
powerful influence on human decision making 
(Damasio, 1994) and negative emotions, like 
fear, make us particularly prone to prejudice. 
There are federal laws in Australia that prohibit 
various discriminatory grounds of reasoning. 
These include the Racial Discrimination Act, 
the Sex Discrimination Act (protecting also 
gender, marital status and sexual orientation), 
the Age Discrimination Act and the Disability 
Discrimination Act (Khaitan, 2015). However, 
prejudice and resulting discrimination also 
affect the operation and institutions of the law 
itself. Research suggests that the tendency 
to be unaware of one’s own predilections is 
present even in those with regular experience 
of having to handle incriminating material in 
a sensitive and professional manner (McEwen, 
Eldridge and Caruso, 2018).
The problem of discrimination is widespread 
and complex, and to date we have had legal 
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2016; Crawford and Calo, 2016; Lum and Isaac, 
2016; O’Neil, 2016; Shapiro, 2017). Algorithms 
designed to be accurate and fair routinely 
assess individual creditworthiness, desirability 
as employees, reliability as tenants, and value 
as customers. However, their probabilistic 
accuracy may in fact militate against fairness 
in most cases (Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller 
and Goel, 2017; Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, 
Goel, et al., 2017). Bias in algorithmic decision 
makers can be either intrinsic or extrinsic 
(similar to humans), but differs in character 
from the corresponding human failings. It is 
useful to distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic 
bias in decision-making systems. 
Intrinsic bias is built-in in the development of 
the AI system or results from inputs causing 
permanent change in the system’s structure 
and rules of operation. For example, a 
as woman is to homemaker,’ and ‘father 
is to doctor as mother is to nurse.’ 
In order to produce accurate outputs, NLP 
systems relying on word embeddings need 
to learn the biases in the bodies of text on 
which they are trained (Caliskan, Bryson and 
Narayanan, 2017). Thus, if these models are to 
successfully learn the relationships that exist 
between words in actual uses of language, 
they must learn relationships that are biased. 
Bias in the texts on which a model is trained 
are naturally going to be captured in the 
geometry of the word-embeddings vector 
space. There is a risk that the application of 
this technology may exacerbate or amplify 
biases within the data (Bolukbasi et al., 2016).
One way to address the underlying cause 
may be to address systemic bias in society, 
rather than in the NLP systems themselves. 
It has been suggested that ‘one perspective 
on bias in word embeddings is that it merely 
reflects bias in society, and therefore one 
should attempt to de-bias society rather than 
word embeddings’ (Bolukbasi et al., 2016). 
However, that result is not something that can 
be achieved by means of a statistical model, 
if it can be achieved at all. 
Therefore, caution is advised with the output 
from statistical models. The developers and 
the users of any statistical model must not 
regard the model’s output as more objective 
than the human-produced data on which it 
is trained. Additionally, developers and users 
must take this into account, especially in 
cases where bias in the data are impossible 
or difficult to eliminate.
protections that are generally accepted to be 
effective, even though it is difficult to assess 
their actual efficacy on the accuracy and 
fairness of public decision making. The use 
of such tools rests on the assumption that 
behaviours and experiences are universal and 
measurable. But even standardised tools – or 
‘structured professional judgments’ as they are 
known – present a bias in how individuals are 
perceived, how behaviours are formulated and 
how decisions are informed (Tamatea, 2016). 
It is in this context that algorithmic-decision 
tools have been vigorously promoted (Palk, 
Freeman and Davey, 2008; Craig and Beech, 
2009; Baird and Stocks, 2013; Hardt, Price and 
Srebro, 2016; Lawing et al., 2017).
7.2.2.1 Algorithmic bias
Algorithmic decision-making tools may fail 
to reduce bias in decision making (Angwin, 
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human resources system designed by a male 
team to implement a set of rules that fail to 
accommodate the needs of female employees 
is intrinsically biased in its design. Ingrained 
unconscious prejudice in human reasoners 
that is effectively impervious to counter-
evidence is also intrinsic. Intrinsic bias can 
occur: 
• as a result of prejudiced developers or of 
ill-conceived software development
• from the inherent constraints imposed 
by the technology itself (Friedman and 
Nissenbaum, 1996)
• if the data are represented in a manner 
that might have unexpected effects on 
the output of an algorithm. For example, 
an algorithm that polls companies 
represented in an alphabetical list leads to 
increased business for those earlier in the 
alphabet (Mittelstadt et al., 2016)
• from the result of programming errors, such 
as when poor design in a random number 
generator causes particular numbers to be 
favoured (Mittelstadt et al., 2016)
• as a result of fundamental historical bias, 
as when an algorithm is tied to rules 
that reflect current science, law or social 
attitudes. 
Extrinsic bias derives from a system’s inputs 
in a way that does not effect a permanent 
change in the system’s internal structure 
and rules of operation. The output of such 
systems might be inaccurate or unfair but the 
system remains ‘rational’ in that new evidence 
is capable of correcting the fault. The recent 
explosion in the use of AI is largely driven 
by the development of algorithms that are 
not rule-based in the style of expert systems, 
but instead are capable of learning. Such 
‘deep learning’ networks can avoid intrinsic 
bias insofar as they can learn from their 
mistakes; but the cost of being able to learn is 
vulnerability to extrinsic bias. This has become 
a pressing issue in the development of ethical 
AI (Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996; Johnson, 
2006). Extrinsic bias results from the fact that 
such apparently objective tools derive their 
power from historical data and hence actually 
aggregate decisions made by the very people 
whose potentially biased decision making we 
are seeking to supplant (Citron and Pasquale, 
2014). Extrinsic bias can occur: 
• errors and biases latent in ‘dirty’ data 
tend to be reproduced in the outputs of 
machine learning (ML) tools (Diakopoulos, 
2015; Barocas and Selbst, 2016b). This 
is a significant problem, and one that is 
compounded by copyright and intellectual 
property laws that limit access to better 
quality training data (Levendowski, 2017)
• from the use of unrepresentative datasets. 
For example, face recognition systems 
trained predominantly on Caucasian faces 
might reject the passport application 
photos of culturally and linguistically 
diverse people (Griffiths, 2016). Speech 
recognition systems, too, are known to 
make more mistakes decoding female 
voices than male ones (Tatman, 2016). 
Such situations arise from a failure to 
include members of diverse social groups 
in training data. The obvious solution is to 
diversify the training sets (Crawford and 
Calo, 2016; Klingele, 2016), although there 
are political and legal barriers preventing 
this (Levendowski, 2017)
• when the diversification of training data 
presents a difficult technical problem. 
Demographic parity is achieved when a 
dataset is equally representative of two 
groups (e.g. men and women). However, 
where fairness is sought regarding many 
different identity characteristics, it is 
impossible to achieve demographic parity 
for all of them
• if the data available is strongly skewed 
in favour of a particular demographic 
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7.3 Indigenous data 
sovereignty
AI is data driven and therefore relies on 
ongoing access to data. However, such data 
requires input from individuals or devices 
owned by individuals. Questions therefore 
arise such as who owns the data? How should 
it be used? Who should have access to the 
data and under what circumstances? And who 
makes the decisions about the ownership, 
use, control and access to data and its value? 
These questions have been of increasing 
concern and interest for Indigenous peoples 
around the globe.
The data used in AI is a socio-cultural artefact 
that is the product of human subjectivities 
(Walter and Andersen, 2013). The construction 
of algorithmic rules involve choices about 
which assumptions are incorporated and 
which are not. How those choices fall is 
fundamentally linked to the epistemic and 
ontological realities of algorithm designers 
and data generators. Therefore, AI rules 
often resemble their creators in terms of 
their prioritisation of knowledge holders 
and sources, and their perspective of how 
the social and cultural world operates. In the 
vast majority of cases those creators are not 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander or Māori 
(Kukutai and Walter, 2015). 
Indigenous data sovereignty (IDS) is a 
response to the intensification of data 
collected about Indigenous people and 
issues of importance to them, whether by 
commercial, government, research entities, 
NGOs or international agencies. IDS is 
concerned with the rights of Indigenous 
peoples to own, control, access and possess 
data that derives from them, and which 
pertain to their members, knowledge systems, 
customs or territories (Kukutai and Taylor, 
2016; Snipp, 2016). IDS is supported by 
Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights of self-
group, discarding data in order to achieve 
demographic parity is likely to decrease 
the accuracy of the system (Corbett-
Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, et al., 2017).
Not all ‘dirty’ data suffers from being 
unrepresentative. COMPAS scores, based on 
questionnaires completed by prisoners, are 
predictive of risk of reoffending, but a recent 
study in the US shows a strong correlation 
between COMPAS score and race (Larson et 
al., 2016). African Americans routinely have 
higher scores and so find it harder to get 
parole. The effects of historical injustice are 
writ large in such statistics. African Americans 
are likely to have lower incomes, to live in 
crime-ridden neighbourhoods, and to have 
diminished educational opportunities. This 
vicious circle is exacerbated by previous 
discriminatory patterns of policing (Crawford 
and Calo, 2016; Larson et al., 2016; Lum and 
Isaac, 2016). This bias does not originate 
from unrepresentative data, which could be 
corrected by including more culturally and 
linguistically diverse groups in the training 
set. It stems from intrinsic human bias, 
with machines simply inheriting the bias. 
So, an algorithm that accurately predicts 
recidivism also unfairly penalises an already 
disadvantaged group. Moreover, because of 
these persistent correlations between race 
and disadvantage, modern AI, harnessing big 
data and ML, persistently detects race even 
when it receives no data specifically about 
this protected category (Veale and Edwards, 
2017). 
Research in data science shows that we can 
develop algorithms that are, in some sense, 
fairer. The challenge, however, is that different 
notions of fairness are in conflict, meaning 
that it appears to be impossible to be fairer 
in every sense of that term (Hardt, Price and 
Srebro, 2016; Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, 
Goel, et al., 2017; Kleinberg, Mullainathan and 
Raghavan, 2017). 
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ethnicity as it added little explanatory power 
to the models once socioeconomic risk factors 
were accounted for (Vaithianathan et al., 2013). 
However, Māori children were much more likely 
to be exposed to the risk factors associated 
with maltreatment, reflecting inequities in 
access to the determinants of wellbeing. More 
broadly, techniques of collecting data from 
device use, wearable technology or sensors 
embedded in the built environment may 
recapitulate what McQuillan (2017: 101) calls 
‘the capture of a territory’. For McQuillan (2017: 
101), these data-capturing processes mirror 
‘historical colonialism’ in that their ‘effect […] 
is to shift the locus of control and decision 
making’ from Indigenous populations to the 
colonisers. Both Australian and Aotearoa New 
Zealand governments are using algorithms 
and tools such as predictive risk modelling in 
a wide variety of frontline services. Despite 
an increasing call for transparency and 
accountability in machine-driven decision-
making (Lepri et al., 2017), the logic underlying 
algorithms is rarely accessible to the 
communities that they affect (Eubanks, 2018a).
While AI systems can produce numerous 
positive outcomes for society, the 
marginalised social, cultural and political 
location of Māori and Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples suggest that these 
outcomes will not be shared equally. We are 
unlikely to see, for example, the immediate 
benefits of precision diagnostics and AI-
assisted surgery in the strained public systems 
where most of our Indigenous populations 
receive health care. The considerable risks 
embedded in the ubiquity of AI are also 
unevenly distributed, and there are significant 
challenges for Māori and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander  peoples relating to bias, 
stigma and accountabilities. For these reasons, 
Indigenous people need to be included in 
the discussions of data sovereignty and the 
management of data that may be used for 
decision-making purposes.
determination and governance over their 
peoples, country (including lands, waters 
and sky) and resources as described in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Implicit in IDS 
is the desire for data to be used in ways that 
support and enhance the collective wellbeing 
of Indigenous peoples. In practice, that means 
Indigenous peoples need to be the decision 
makers regarding how data about them are 
used or deployed, including within social-
program algorithms.
Indigenous peoples are included in a 
diverse range of data aggregations, from 
self-identified political and social groupings 
(e.g. tribes, ethnic and racial groups), to 
clusters of interest defined by data analysts 
and controllers. The definition of Indigenous 
identity varies across datasets, administrative 
regimes and cultures. Indigenous 
communities may have social processes of 
deciding who is included, but these systems 
do not necessarily scale to big data or data-
matching technologies. Moreover, AI systems 
create models and inferences from sources 
that Indigenous communities themselves 
might not have the ability to see or use and 
which may be incomplete. For example, 
economic data might fail to show informal 
economies in Indigenous communities, 
where particular cultural arrangements 
influence how resources are accrued and 
distributed. Definitions of household and 
family may also differ from those assumed in 
data processing. Indigenous families might 
therefore share resources in ways that may 
be invisible in electronic transaction records, 
leading to incorrect assumptions about their 
vulnerability. 
Indigenous identifiers need not be explicitly 
included in algorithms for Indigenous peoples 
to experience the disproportionate impacts of 
AI-informed decision making. For example, a 
study on child maltreatment in New Zealand 
using predictive risk modelling excluded 
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7.4 Trust 
AI will depend on the confidence that 
society places in the technology. The issue 
of trust in AI systems raises a number of 
definitional problems, including trust that 
the algorithms will produce the desired 
output, trust in the values underlying the 
system, trust in the way data in the system 
are protected and secured, and trust that 
the system has been developed for the good 
of all stakeholders. Such questions of trust 
take users far beyond the simple matter of 
whether they believe the technology works.
Trust is the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important 
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party (Mayer, 
Davis and Schoorman, 1995). When trust is 
discussed with respect to technology, there 
are similar expectations that people can give 
themselves over to the technology and it will 
perform reliably in a predetermined way. 
The problem of trust in technology and 
automation is not new (see Lee and See, 
2004). However, the complexity of AI means 
that it is more difficult for users to gain a 
deep understanding of the technology and 
consequently, can lead to additional issues of 
trust. The potential benefits of AI for health, 
wellbeing and other areas of society, mean 
that issues of trust need to be explored and 
dealt with further to ensure they do not 
create any unfounded barriers to use. 
AI systems offer great potential benefits 
in a diverse range of application areas 
from transportation, finance, security, legal 
practice, to medicine and the military. Most 
of the systems under consideration in these 
fields involve what is termed ‘weak AI’ in that 
it assists in the performance of specific tasks 
that involve probabilistic reasoning, visual 
or contextual perception and can deal with 
Box 29: IDS movements in 
Australia and New Zealand
IDS movements are active in Australia 
and Aotearoa New Zealand and are 
grappling with the complexities of 
Indigenous-data usage in AI. In Australia, 
the Maiam nayri Wingara Indigenous Data 
Sovereignty Collective, in partnership 
with the Australian Institute of Indigenous 
Governance, issued a communique from 
a 2018 national meeting of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander leaders. This 
communique stated the demand for 
Indigenous decision and control of 
the data ecosystem including creation, 
development, stewardship, analysis, 
dissemination and infrastructure. In 
Aotearoa New Zealand the Te Mana 
Raraunga Māori Data Sovereignty 
Network Charter asserts Māori rights and 
interests in relation to data and requires 
the quality and integrity of Māori data 
and its collection. Māori have often been 
the subject of intrusive data surveillance 
and misuse but have well-tested ‘tikanga’ 
(ethics, processes, principles) on the 
protection and sharing of knowledge 
for collective benefit. Groups like Te 
Mana Raraunga are exploring ways that 
tikanga can be used to rethink scientific 
approaches to data governance, use and 
validation. For a country that aspires to 
be a ‘world leader in the trusted, inclusive 
and protected use of shared data’ (New 
Zealand Data Futures Forum, 2018), issues 
relating to ethics, trust and confidence are 
both timely and critical in New Zealand. 
For advocates of Māori data sovereignty, 
the goal is not only to protect Māori 
people and communities from future 
harm and stigma, but also to safeguard 
Māori knowledge and intellectual property 
rights, and to ensure that public data 
investments create benefits and value in a 
fair and equitable manner that Māori can 
fully share in. 
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complexity in ways that far outpace the human 
mind. AI systems are not yet able to deal with 
ethical judgements, the effective management 
of social situations or mimic all facets of 
human intelligence. Nonetheless, they still 
provide significant opportunities to increase 
our ability to make effective use of data.
AI systems that try to anticipate human needs 
are mostly found in household systems that 
use data to determine or anticipate the need. 
For example, AiCure reminds patients to take 
medication and confirms their compliance 
(Hengstler, Enkel and Duelli, 2016). Other 
examples include household robots that can 
fetch, deliver and clean. In a clinical setting, 
AI health systems include applications that 
can, for example, potentially replace the 
work of radiologists by performing diagnoses 
(Hsieh, 2017), or applications that simulate 
some of the features of a human psychologist 
(D’Alfonso et al., 2017).
Car manufacturers are well on the way 
to developing autonomous and semi-
autonomous vehicles. BMW already has a semi-
autonomous vehicle on the market, Daimler 
has a fully autonomous truck planned for 2025 
and Nurnberg in Germany has operated a fully 
autonomous train since 2008. In the military, 
there are scenarios where lone mission 
commanders direct unmanned military 
vessels controlled by AI, and in the US, the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency is 
working on ways to use AI to extract military 
information from visual media captured in the 
field and turn available photos and videos into 
useable sources of intelligence.
The areas described above – health, 
transportation and military services, alongside 
other areas discussed in Chapter 2 of the 
report – are central to society’s safety and 
wellbeing. People are protective of these 
areas of their lives and are reluctant to cede 
control to automatous devices. Thus, trust 
is an important issue in the acceptance and 
adoption of such systems. 
While trust has traditionally been a concept 
used to describe human-to-human 
interactions, studies have shown that it is 
valid to use the concept of trust to describe 
the way in which the relationship between 
humans and computers, or automation, is 
mediated (see for example Zuboff, 1989). Trust 
in what were previously human-led processes 
(where trust was previously not guaranteed) 
needs to somehow be extended to a new 
environment where the same processes 
are now automated. Trust is also difficult to 
achieve where complex algorithms are being 
implemented and a full understanding of 
the technology is often hard to attain (Lee 
and See, 2004). Lack of trust in automating 
technologies, including AI, can lead to misuse 
or disuse, which can compromise safety or 
profitability (Lee and See, 2004).
Trust in AI depends on several factors. 
Firstly, the technology needs to have proven 
reliability: ‘a technology based on the 
delegation of control will not be trusted 
if it is flawed’ (Hengstler, Enkel and Duelli, 
2016). In AI applications, useability, reliability 
and consistent operation all engender trust 
(Siau and Wang, 2018). Users of automation 
consider four factors to be important in trust: 
• Performance (what the technology does), 
including specifically operational safety and 
maintenance of data security (Lee and See, 
2004; Hengstler, Enkel and Duelli, 2016)
• Process, including useability and whether 
or not it can be trialled (Lee and See, 2004)
• Purpose, or why the technology was 
developed and whether it benefits the 
consumer (Hengstler, Enkel and Duelli, 
2016) and is visible (such as the automated 
train, Rogers, 2003)
• Designs that humanise technologies are 
more trustworthy. Robotic designs need to 
make users feel that they have a significant 
level of control (Hengstler, Enkel and 
Duelli, 2016).
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People experience greater feelings of 
trust if the innovating firm is known to 
them (Hengstler, Enkel and Duelli, 2016). 
Consequently, positive brand identification 
is important, but firms also need to build 
relationships with consumers through 
information provision and their involvement 
in project development. This issue highlights 
the difference in two forms of trust in AI –trust 
in the technology and trust in the technology 
provider (Siau and Wang, 2018). Both are 
important to whether or not users are willing 
to interact with AI.
A further important factor in trust is the 
notion of explainability, where the actions 
of the AI are easily understood by humans. 
AI is being used by systems to arrive at 
important decisions in the lives of people, 
such as admission to education or provision 
of finance. Increasingly, consumers are calling 
for the right to an explanation in of decisions 
made by AI, but legal frameworks are yet to 
respond adequately.
Previous work suggests that: 
• people seek explanations of AI when cases 
are contrastive (they wonder why one 
thing happened and not another)
• people use their cognitive biases to 
selective explanations for how AI performs 
• people are not always swayed by the most 
likely explanation for how AI has behaved, 
unless they understand the cause of the 
most likely explanation
• explanations for AI are social and are 
influenced by a person’s beliefs (Miller, 
2017). 
Trust in AI will be seen to be dependent 
on how much developers respond to these 
problems of explainability.
7.5 Access to 
personal data
A nationwide survey conducted in Australia 
in 2014 revealed that when it comes to 
large-scale data collection, there is strong 
support (over 90 percent) for greater control 
over personal information and for more 
information about how it is being used 
(Andrejevic, 2014). Greater transparency in 
this context does not mean simply letting 
people know that their information is being 
harvested. It means providing them with 
a clear idea about how it is being used – a 
key point with respect to the development 
of data-driven AI systems. An individual’s 
personal data profile, in isolation, does not 
provide information about how it interacts 
with the data of millions of others (Turow, 
Hennessy and Bleakley, 2008). Because of the 
emergent character of AI decision-making 
processes, it is not possible to specify in 
advance the affect that particular forms of 
data may have on life-impacting decisions. 
The 2014 survey also indicated strong 
support (over 90 percent) for the ability to 
request that one’s personal data be deleted 
from a particular database. As discussed 
above, the individual’s right to access, reuse 
or delete personal data is enshrined in the 
EU GDPR. According to the aforementioned 
survey, people should be able to have some 
control over their information, even when 
it is collected in a transactional context. In 
practice, this right depends upon forms of 
knowledge that are difficult to obtain in the 
case of third-party data collection. It also 
depends upon a largely outdated conception 
of personal information (Andrejevic and 
Burdon, 2015). As discussed earlier, it is 
possible to ‘re-identify users’ in meaningful 
ways (ways that can be tracked back to 
name, address and other specific personal 
information) by aggregated data from 
multiple unrelated datasets. The ‘right to be 
forgotten’ may retain some meaning in the 
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case of a search engine like Google, but how 
does one request to have the record of one’s 
clickstream or browsing history removed and 
how does one determine which companies 
have a copy of it?
When it comes to government and law-
enforcement access, if information about a 
particular individual is requested, existing 
restrictions on the collection and use of 
personal data can be used as a foundation for 
determining access. However, increasingly, 
targeted monitoring is replaced by group 
or classification monitoring: the request to 
access all information about those who fit a 
particular behavioural profile. In many cases, 
this profile may not even contain what is 
conventionally considered to be personally 
identifiable information. However, as already 
established, it is possible to re-identify 
personal information from non-personally 
identifiable information. 
This poses serious issues for regulation of 
access because standard protections for 
personal information rely on the model of 
targeted information collection. In these cases, 
it might be more appropriate to monitor 
use than access – that is, to determine 
which decisions can be made based on data 
mining and which ones are ruled out. Or, a 
regulatory decision could be made regarding 
which types of information are available for 
automated forms of decision making and 
which are ruled out. For example, a decision 
might be made to rule out the use of genetic 
information in hiring decisions. Some of these 
decisions might fall within existing regulatory 
regimes, to the extent that some classes of 
information would amount to decision making 
based on categories that are protected from 
discrimination (e.g. certain genetic markers 
might have high correlation with ethnic 
background and their use in decision-making 
processes could constitute discrimination). 
By definition, automated systems generate 
‘emergent’ outcomes – that is, they discern 
patterns and correlations that cannot be 
deduced in advance (which is the entire point 
of enlisting such systems). So, for example, 
a job-screening system might determine 
that the web browser used to submit a 
job application correlates more strongly 
with subsequent job performance than 
the content of the application. The finding 
is useful because it is unanticipated, but it 
would not be possible to inform applicants 
in advance before the finding is generated. 
Once the finding is generated, informing 
applicants after the fact is useless. Once 
again, the structural issue here suggests that 
regulation of use may be more meaningful 
than the attempt to provide informed 
consent (which would state something like, 
‘all data collected from this application will 
be used in conjunction with existing datasets 
by automated systems to predict future 
job performance’ and would not lead to 
meaningful informed consent). 
The logic of automated decision making lends 
itself to the use of data for unanticipated 
purposes. There are large potential benefits 
to having the data accessible for this use. For 
example, it might be determined that certain 
lifestyle patterns can be used to anticipate and 
intervene pre-emptively in the treatment of 
some illnesses. Finding these new connections 
would require speculative data mining. Once 
again, it will likely become necessary to 
regulate use (by data class or decision class, or 
both – that is, to say that some forms of data 
cannot be used speculatively or that some 
decisions cannot rely solely on AI-generated 
recommendations). 
Although it is possible to require the deletion 
of data, the declining cost of storage and 
the potential future value of linking existing 
datasets to reveal new information and 
patterns provide incentive to data collectors 
to retain information. 
It will be increasingly difficult to regulate 
data collection because of the proliferation 
of internet-enabled devices and contexts 
in which data are generated, gathered and 
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stored. As new forms of information collection 
emerge, it will be difficult for regulatory 
regimes to catch up: should information 
about an individual’s mood, anxiety levels or 
emotional expressions be protected? What 
about their biological responses captured by 
personal fitness devices like Fitbit? The key 
challenge for regulators will be to develop 
guidelines that can be applied to the 
development of new forms of monitoring. 
It might be decided, for example, that 
biometric information should be unavailable 
to advertisers. This is unlikely to happen, but 
it indicates the type of decision that a society 
might make in order to set guidelines for 
controlling the implementation of new forms 
of automated decision making. 
7.6 Initiatives by the 
Australian Government
Research still needs to be undertaken to 
establish ways to design suitable objectives 
into machine-learning approaches which 
will consider – often conflicting – ethical 
imperatives, such as reducing racial, gender 
or ideological bias, valuing privacy and 
ensuring reliability. 
In response to the Productivity Commission’s 
comprehensive inquiry into Data Availability 
and Use, the Australian Government 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
released a report outlining approaches to 
address ethical issues associated with the use 
of data across government, community and 
industry (Australian Government, 2018k). The 
Australian Government has committed A$65 
million over the forward estimates to reform 
the Australian data system and introduce 
a range of measures to implement the 
Productivity Commission’s recommendations. 
The main goals of the reforms are to ensure 
that the necessary frameworks are in place to 
protect the privacy of Australians, to establish 
the best use of our collective data and to 
develop government oversight on the way 
that all sectors use data. These reforms are 
intended to provide greater access and use of 
Australian data, and to generate and promote 
innovation while adhering to best practice 
ethical use. The government has committed 
to the following:
1. A consumer data right as a new 
competition and consumer measure to 
allow people to harness and have greater 
control over their data
2. A National Data Commissioner to support 
a new data sharing and release framework 
and oversee the integrity of data sharing 
and release activities of Commonwealth 
agencies
3. A legislative package that will streamline 
data sharing and release, subject to strict 
data privacy and confidentiality provisions.
There are also existing frameworks for 
government departments that use automated 
decisions. These frameworks will need to 
deal with the ethical sharing of data and 
privacy concerns, as well as accountability for 
improper use of data.
A number of laws stipulate that relevant 
ministers are accountable for decisions 
made by automated systems (Elvery, 2017). 
In addition, a 2004 report to the Attorney 
General outlines 27 principles for government 
departments that use automated decision-
making processes (Administrative Review 
Council, 2004). These include drawing a clear 
distinction between decisions that require 
discretion (that should not be automated) 
and situations that require a large volume 
of decisions, where the facts are already 
established (that are suitable for automation). 
An inter-agency report also covers this 
issue in detail and highlights the need for 
external agencies to be involved in shaping 
automated-decision policies and being able 
to review the data involved (Department of 




The application and implementation of AI are already underway 
and set to evolve in exciting ways. This report has mapped 
many of these directions, identifying the opportunities 
and the challenges that will accompany implementation. 
Knowledge will need to be exchanged across 
institutions, public and private sectors and 
geographical locales. Successfully navigating 
the ethical, legal and social considerations 
of AI will be a defining task for the field. 
Facilitating this interdisciplinary connectivity 
through national, independently-led, 
AI bodies would provide a platform for 
innovation and the required collaboration of 
HASS and STEM specialists. 
Successful implementation of AI will need to 
be developed within sustainable, ethical and 
socially responsible boundaries that prevent 
development of undesired technologies. 
Many opportunities and challenges will 
be played out in global fora, so Australia 
and New Zealand will need to ensure they 
participate in the development of safe AI 
frameworks. National frameworks based on 
integrity, principles of fairness and wellbeing 
will also be important. 
Understanding what kind of society Australia 
or New Zealand want to be will be critical to 
the development of national frameworks and 
will require engagement with society to help 
shape this vision. A process like the ‘Australia 
Australia and New Zealand are well equipped 
to advance AI. Both countries are establishing 
new AI-based products and services across 
sectors including finance, health, arts, 
transport and manufacturing. People are 
interacting with AI-powered chatbots, music 
is being composed using AI, the mining sector 
is using AI to automate operations and there 
is increasing use of precision agriculture 
devices to collect and analyse data on crops 
and livestock. The breadth of applications 
provides new social and economic 
opportunities. However, other countries are 
outspending both Australia and New Zealand 
on AI technology development. To adopt 
and apply AI technologies effectively, we will 
need to understand the technologies at a 
level that will only come from engagement 
in development. 
Australia and New Zealand’s leading expertise 
in AI development and application, alongside 
expertise in relevant ethical, legal and 
social considerations, will be key to the safe 
implementation and advancement of AI. 
Development and implementation of AI will 
benefit from the insights of many disciplines. 
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2020 summit’, but in this instance focused on 
a single topic, could help define the desired 
AI-enabled society. What can be said with 
confidence is that AI development should be 
centred on addressing inequity, improving 
prosperity and on continued betterment. 
Vision for Australia 
and New Zealand
AI research and implementation are 
transnational and the data and expertise 
it relies on cross borders. However, it is 
unavoidable that Australia and New Zealand 
will be affected by forces we cannot control. 
Given appropriate investment in research and 
development, by calling upon homegrown 
expertise and by attracting world-quality 
talent, we can play an important role in 
guiding the international development of AI.
This development should emphasise our 
values. In this report, we have placed 
equity and wellbeing at the heart of 
the development of our vision for AI. 
AI can magnify existing bias and lock 
the already disadvantaged out of further 
opportunities. However, if its development 
and implementation are guided by a concern 
for equity, it can play an important role in 
minimising these problems. AI promises 
enormous benefits to Australia and New 
Zealand, but these benefits can only be 
realised if they are shared.
Our position as relatively small countries with 
diverse populations provides advantages that 
can be exploited. We make an ideal test bed for 
new developments and an ethical AI strategy 
should enable us to attract significant overseas 
investment. Our reputation as a forward-
looking, open and liberal society also allows us 
to play an important role in the development 
of international frameworks for regulating 
AI. We have the opportunity to ensure that 
the development of AI does not come at the 
expense of human rights, either at home or 
internationally. An AI strategy that places equity 
at its forefront will strengthen our international 
reputation in this arena and ensure that we are 
not left behind by some of the most important 
developments of the 21st century.
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APPENDIX 1 
AUSTRALIAN AI CAPABILITIES 
AND INITIATIVES
The 2015-16 Excellence in Research for 
Australia evaluations show that many 
Australian universities are undertaking 
world-class AI and image processing 
research activities (ARC, 2015). While only 
the Australian National University was ranked 
well above world standard (ERA Score 5), 12 
Australian institutions are ranked above world 
standard (ERA Score 4) and a further 12 are 
considered to be at world standard (ERA 
Score 3). Only three Australian universities 
performed below world standard (ERA Score 
of 2) (ARC, 2015). Data61, the CSIRO data 
science consultancy, is another hot spot of 
AI R&D in Australia. Data61 has the highest 
concentration of data scientists in Australia 
and an emphasis on industry engagement 
and the application of data science including 
AI and ML to real world problems (Innovation 
and Science Australia, 2017). 
Australia does not rank in the top ten 
countries worldwide by volume of AI 
publications, but is ranked 7th globally for 
field-weighted citation impact for papers 
published between 2011 and 2015, which 
indicates that it is performing highly (Times 
Higher Education, 2017). 
Australia filed 0.4 percent of AI-related IP5 
patents between 2010 and 2015, down 
slightly from 0.7 percent during 2000-05. This 
is well behind the share of leading countries 
such as Japan (27.9 percent) and South 
Korea (17.5 percent) and is comparable with 
countries such as Switzerland (0.4 percent) 
and Italy (0.3 percent). 
Publicly released national plan 
None yet released.
Key documents
• The effective and ethical development of 
artificial intelligence: An opportunity to 
improve our wellbeing (2018), Australian 
Council of Learned Academies (ACOLA)
• Artificial Intelligence: Australian Ethics 
Framework (Discussion Paper), Data 61
• Artificial Intelligence: Technology 
Roadmap, Data61
• Australia 2030: Prosperity Through 
Innovation (2018), Innovation and 
Science Australia
• A Robotics Roadmap for Australia (2018), 
Australian Centre for Computer Vision
• Human Rights & Technology Project, 
Australian Human Rights Commission 
(2018-2020)
Research and development
Percentage of GDP spent on R&D (2015): 
1.88 percent (OECD, 2018b) 
R&D spend (2015): US$25.4 billion 
(The World Bank, 2018) 
Share of global IP5 AI patent families 
(2000-2005): 0.72 percent (OECD, 2017b)
Share of global IP5 AI patent families 
(2010-2015): 0.44 percent (OECD, 2017b)
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Gross expenditure on research and 
development in Australia was estimated to 
be around 1.88 percent of GDP in 2015; lower 
than the OECD average of 2.36 percent.
Policy, laws, government
The Economist Automation Readiness 
Index Ranking 2018: 10th (70.4)
Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness 
Index: 8th (7.48)
With Singapore, Australia is considered to 
be at the forefront of AI development and 
experimentation in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) 
region (FTI Consulting, 2018). However, policy 
and legal reforms to support and regulate the 
use of AI in Australia remain fragmented. The 
2018-19 budget contained a A$29.9 million 
investment in AI, including the creation of a 
technology roadmap, a standards framework 
and a national AI ethics framework (Australian 
Government, 2018d). In an innovation 
roadmap published in May 2018, Innovation 
and Science Australia recommended that the 
Australian Government’s Digital Economy 
Strategy ‘prioritise the development of 
advanced capability in AI and ML in the 
medium to long-term to ensure growth of 
the cyber–physical economy’ (Innovation and 
Science Australia, 2017). The Digital Economy 
Strategy, Australia’s Tech Future, was released 
in December 2018 and focuses on four key 
areas: developing Australia’s digital skills and 
leaving no one behind; how government 
can better deliver digital services; building 
infrastructure and providing secure access to 
high-quality data; and maintaining our cyber 
security and reviewing our regulatory system 
(Australian Government, 2018a). 
In 2018, the Australian Council of Learned 
Academies (ACOLA) was awarded a project 
grant by the Australian Government 
through the Australian Research Council’s 
Linkage Learned Academies Special Projects 
(LASP) program Supporting Responses to 
Commonwealth Science Council Priorities 
(project number CS170100008). The project, 
The effective and ethical development 
of artificial intelligence, examines the 
technological, social, cultural, legal, 
ethical, and economic implications of the 
deploying artificial intelligence in Australia 
and New Zealand. Through the final report, 
ACOLA will provide an evidence base to 
support government decision making and 
help to ensure that safe and responsible 
implementation can provide maximum 
benefit for the economic and societal 
wellbeing of Australia and New Zealand.
The Automation Readiness Index assesses 
countries’ preparedness for the augmentation 
and substitution of human activity presented 
by autonomous technologies that is expected 
to occur in the next 20-30 years. It ranks 
Australia 10th of the 25 countries assessed, 
with a score of 70.4/100. Australia was 
ranked 7th for its innovation environment, 
190
11th for education policy and equal 10th 
for labour market policies. The study notes 
the importance of state governments 
in achieving readiness in countries with 
decentralised political structures, such as 
Australia. It commends the New South 
Wales Government’s leadership including 
their proactive efforts in studying and 
experimenting with the application of AI 
technologies in education (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2018a). 
UK-based consultancy, Oxford Insights, ranked 
Australia 8th of 35 countries (between Japan 
and New Zealand) in their Government 
AI Readiness Index. This index provides 
a broad indicator of how prepared the 
national government is for implementing 
AI in its public service delivery and is based 
on a composite score derived from nine 
metrics related to public service reform, the 
economy and skills and digital infrastructure. 
The UK and the US top the list, although 
some key jurisdictions including China and 
Singapore were not assessed (Stirling, Miller 
and Martinho-Truswell, 2017). In 2018, the 
Australian Government awarded a A$1 billion 
contract to IBM to develop AI, blockchain and 
cloud initiatives for government agencies 
(IBM, 2018). 
The Australian Human Rights Commission 
is undertaking a major research project 
examining the impacts of technology on 
human rights, with a particular focus on 
AI technology (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2018a). 
Australian states and territories are 
considering the impacts of AI. The 
Victorian Parliament launched the all-party 
parliamentary group on AI to explore the 
opportunities and challenges that AI will 
present to the state. The New South Wales 
Department of Education has commissioned 
researchers to investigate how to best prepare 
young Australians for the future impacts of AI 
on society, and the ethics of AI (Walsh, 2017; 
Buchanan et al., 2018; Parliament of Victoria, 
2018). 
The Federal government is forming a National 
Data Advisory Council that will help the 
National Data Commissioner create laws 
that will help govern the release of data, 
along with protections for privacy, as part of 
a Data Sharing and Release Act (Australian 
Government, 2018e). This will have significant 
ramifications for data science and AI research 
in Australia.
Societal response
Most Australians know little about AI and 
related technologies. A survey by Ipsos 
revealed that attitudes towards AI are mostly 
positive or neutral (Riolo and Bourgeat, 2018). 
However, there were concerns about the risks 
of driverless vehicles, the use of robots in the 
armed forces and the use of AI in financial 
markets. The potential for robots and AI to 
replace jobs was also viewed negatively 
by the majority of respondents (Riolo and 
Bourgeat, 2018). Australians are also likely to 
believe that customer service is becoming too 
automated and impersonal (Chatterton, 2018). 
Attitudes towards autonomous vehicles (AVs) 
also provide a useful proxy for people’s trust 
in AI systems. A study of attitudes towards 
driverless vehicles reported that 37 percent 
of survey respondents were positive about 
AVs, 23 percent negative with the remaining 
40 percent neutral (Pettigrew, 2018). A 2017 
survey found that 51 percent of Australian 
men and 41 percent of women would travel 
in an AV (Roy Morgan, 2017). A 2016 survey 
of Victorian road users found that 74 percent 
of participants were concerned about the 
technology in AV failing and more than half 
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of the respondents said they would not be 
comfortable in a car that could completely 
drive itself (Page-Smith and Northrop, 2017). 
A global poll of 28 countries conducted by 
Ipsos found that Australians are less optimistic 
about the perceived benefits of AVs than 
people from other countries. They are also 
more likely to trust governments to regulate 
AVs over the companies that design and 
manufacture them (Wade, 2018). 
Australia’s Chief Scientist, Alan Finkel, has 
stated a voluntary ethical AI certification 
could support trust in AI for low-risk 
applications (Finkel, 2018a). 
Industry uptake
Asgard, Roland Berger estimate of AI 
start-ups: 27 start-ups (16th) (Roland Berger 
and Asgard, 2018) 
A 2017 report, Amplifying Human Potential: 
Towards Purposeful Artificial Intelligence, which 
surveyed 1,600 senior business decision 
makers in organisations with more 1,000 
employees or more than $500 million in 
annual revenue, across seven countries (China, 
India, Germany, US, UK, France and Australia), 
revealed that Australian organisations were 
the least likely of those surveyed to have 
plans to deploy AI-related technologies (21 
percent of respondents) (Infosys, 2017). A 
similar but smaller survey conducted in 2017, 
found that Australia is skewed towards later 
adoption than the rest of the world. However, 
respondents predicted increased investment 
and use of AI processes and offerings over the 
next five years (daisee, 2017). 
Australia also lags behind on automation, 
with only 9.1 percent of publicly-listed firms 
engaging in this field. This is significantly 
lower than the level of engagement in 
leading countries such as Switzerland 
(25.1 percent), the US (20.3 percent) and the 
UK (12.3 percent) (AlphaBeta, 2017). However, 
Australia is recognised as a world leader in 
the deployment of automation in the mining 
sector (Australian Centre for Robotic Vision, 
2018). 
The Australian Centre for Robotic Vision 
identified around 1,100 Australian companies 
engaged in the robotics sector across 
diverse sectors including manufacturing, 
services, healthcare, resources, infrastructure, 
agriculture, the environment, space and 
defence. Data from 442 of these companies 
indicated that they employ almost 
50,000 Australians and generate more than 
A$12 billion revenue annually (Australian 
Centre for Robotic Vision, 2018). 
A global survey of AI start-ups found 27 based 
in Australia, placing it 16th globally. The US 
dominates, with almost 1400 AI start-ups 
listed, followed by China (383) and Israel (362) 
(Roland Berger and Asgard, 2018). 
Workforce skills and training
Canadian AI consultancy, Element AI, 
determined that there are 22,000 PhD-
educated AI-experts globally, of whom 657 
were in Australia. The leading countries 
were the US (9,010 experts) and the UK 
(1,861 experts), although the company 
notes that experts from Asia are likely to 
be underrepresented as it uses data from 
LinkedIn, which has a higher penetration 
in the US and other English-speaking 
countries. The study also found that of the 
5,400 researchers who had presented at 
recent international AI conferences, 76 were 
based in Australia (Element AI, 2018). Part 
of the Federal Government’s A$29.9 million 
investment will support research projects and 
PhD scholarships in AI and machine learning 
(Australian Government, 2018d). 
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Digital infrastructure
Global Open Data Index: 2/94 (79 percent) 
(Open Knowledge International, 2016) 
The Inclusive Internet Index 2018 
Ranking: 25/86 (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2018b) 
Australia is ranked equal second to Great 
Britain by the Global Open Data Index. The 
index measures the openness of government 
data by assessing whether key datasets are 
openly licensed, machine readable, easily 
downloadable, up-to-date, publicly available 
and free of charge. Australia scored 79 percent 
overall, with a majority of its datasets fully 
open (Open Knowledge International, 2016). 
Australia is ranked 25th of 86 countries in 
the Inclusive Internet Index 2018. Australia 
was ranked 12th for the availability metric 
due to good infrastructure, but only 28th for 
both affordability (the cost of access relative 
to income and the level of competition in 
the Internet marketplace) and readiness (the 
capacity to access the internet, including 
skills, cultural acceptance and supporting 
policy) (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2018b). 
Australia ranked 50th globally, with an 
average connection speed of 11.1 Mb/s 
in Akamai’s Q1 2017 State of the Internet 
Connectivity Report. This was eighth fastest 
amongst countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 
slower than New Zealand (seventh in the 
region with an average speed of 14.7Mb/s) 
and less than half the average speed of global 
leader South Korea (28.6 Mb/s) (Akamai, 2017). 
For mobile connections, Australia performs 
significantly better with the highest average 
mobile connection speed in the Asia Pacific 
region at 15.7 Mb/s, just beating Japan at 15.6 
Mb/s (Akamai, 2017). OpenSignal’s State of 
LTE February 2018 report, which focuses on 
the amount of time users have access to a 
particular network rather than geographical 
coverage, ranks Australia 13th for availability 
of a 4G network (OpenSignal, 2018). 
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NEW ZEALAND AI 
CAPABILITIES AND INITIATIVES
Publicly released national plan
None yet released, though the national crown 
innovation entity has released a key white 
paper (Callaghan Innovation, 2018).
Key documents
Artificial Intelligence: Shaping a Future New 
Zealand (2018), AI Forum New Zealand 
Thinking Ahead: Innovation Through Artificial 
Intelligence (2018), Callaghan Innovation
Research and development
Percentage of GDP spent on R&D (2015): 
1.28 percent (OECD, 2018b)
R&D spend (2015): US $2.6 billion 
(The World Bank, 2018)
Gross expenditure on research and 
development in New Zealand was 
1.28 percent of GDP in 2015; lower than 
the OECD average of 2.36 percent.
The AI Forum has identified five New Zealand 
universities working on AI research.
The University of Technology, Auckland, 
is developing language and speech 
technologies, as well as mind theory. The 
university has developed ‘neuromorphic’ data 
processing technologies modelled on brain 
processes, and is researching robotics vision, 
unmanned aerial vehicles and bee monitoring 
(The AI Forum of New Zealand, 2018).
The University of Otago has established an 
interdisciplinary research centre to examine 
the benefits and problems associated with 
AI, and related ethical issues. The Centre for 
Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy will 
focus on urgent AI issues. A relationship with 
the government is likely to be formalised 
(Gibb, 2018; The AI Forum of New Zealand, 
2018). The University of Otago is also 
researching computer vision and human 
models of memory and language (The AI 
Forum of New Zealand, 2018).
The University of Auckland has developed 
‘life-like artificial systems’. The research 
includes the development of the virtual 
digital baby, BabyX, and has resulted in the 
creation of start-up Soul Machines, which 
creates avatars that act as interfaces for digital 
platforms. The university is also researching 
game AI, applied AI case reasoning, multi-
agent systems and data mining (The AI Forum 
of New Zealand, 2018).
Victoria University of Wellington undertakes 
research into machine learning, neural 
networks, data mining and cognitive 
science, as well as projects on evolutionary 
computation (The AI Forum of New 
Zealand, 2018).
A number of applications are being 
researched, with an emphasis on agriculture 
or biosecurity. A University of Canterbury 
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researcher is developing an AI that can 
identify from photos invasive insects, plants 
and fungi on imported goods (LiveNews, 
2018). The university is also working on 
machine learning and algorithm engineering, 
as well as brain-computer interfaces to 
examine microsleeps (The AI Forum of New 
Zealand, 2018).
Policy, laws, government
The Economist Automation Readiness 
Index Ranking 2018: N/A
Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness 
Index: 9/35 (7.38)
New Zealand is ranked 9th of 35 countries 
in the Government AI Readiness Index 2018, 
which provides a broad indicator of the 
national government’s capacity to implement 
AI in its public service delivery. Its score of 
7.38 places it just behind Australia. The UK 
and the US top the list with scores of 8.40 and 
8.21 respectively (Stirling, Miller and Martinho-
Truswell, 2017). 
The New Zealand Government intends to 
develop an ethical framework and action plan 
to manage the opportunities and challenges 
presented by AI. Despite this, Oxford Insights 
ranks the New Zealand Government 9th of 35 
OECD governments for its capacity to absorb 
and exploit the potential of AI technologies 
(Stirling, Miller and Martinho-Truswell, 2017). 
The Government supported the AI Forum of 
New Zealand – an independent organisation 
with representatives from academia, 
industry and government – to analyse the 
potential impact and opportunity of AI on 
New Zealand’s society and economy. This 
report, released in May 2018, examines the 
AI landscape globally and in New Zealand; 
discusses the potential economic benefits, 
labour market impacts, and social implications 
of AI in New Zealand; and provides 
recommendations to assist policymakers to 
advance the AI ecosystem (The AI Forum of 
New Zealand, 2018). The report recommends 
actions to: 
• forge a coordinated AI strategy for New 
Zealand
• create awareness and understanding of AI
• support the adoption of AI by industry and 
government 
• improve access to trusted, high-quality 
data sources
• grow the AI talent pool
• address the potential legal, ethical, and 
social effects of AI.
Government representatives have signalled an 
intention to rapidly develop the AI plan (New 
Zealand Government, 2018b). 
The University of Otago is undertaking 
a three-year multi-disciplinary project 
investigating the implications of AI 
technologies on New Zealand law and public 
policy (University of Otago, 2018). The New 
Zealand Law Foundation has established an 
Information Law and Policy Project [ILAPP], 
with NZ$2 million of funding available since 
2016 to develop law and policy around IT, 
data, information, artificial intelligence and 
cyber-security.
In May 2018, the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission released a paper for public 
discussion on privacy and data issues. It 
outlined approaches to formulating policy 
frameworks for algorithms and privacy, citing 
international bodies. It also emphasised 
the need to consider privacy safeguards 
for metadata (New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission, 2018).
New Zealand leads a group of seven digital 
nations which are investigating enhancing 
digital government based on open markets 
and open source principles. Estonia, Israel, 
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New Zealand, South Korea and the UK were 
the original five members, and Canada and 
Uruguay joined in 2018 (Digital Government 
New Zealand, 2018). 
Societal response
The New Zealand AI Forum notes that ‘AI 
raises many new ethical concerns relating to 
bias, transparency and accountability. AI will 
have long term implications for core legal 
principles like legal responsibility, agency 
and causation’ (The AI Forum of New Zealand, 
2018). 
A Samsung poll on technology adoption 
in New Zealand found that around a third 
of respondents would be open to using AI 
assistants in smart homes. Over 50 percent 
of respondents believed AI could help them 
save time each week. Around two-thirds were 
worried about being hacked or having their 
voice stolen. The most popular automated 
task for a smart home was setting alarms and 
locks when people leave (Paredes, 2018). 
Industry uptake
Asgard, Roland Berger estimate of AI 
start-ups: 6 start-ups (equal 27th) (Roland 
Berger and Asgard, 2018) 
A global survey of AI start-ups found 6 based 
in New Zealand, ranking it equal 27th globally. 
The US dominates, with almost 1,400 AI start-
ups, followed by China (383) and Israel (362) 
(Roland Berger and Asgard, 2018).
A New Zealand AI Forum survey found that 
20 percent of organisations had adopted 
AI systems. However, respondents were 
overwhelming large enterprises that have 
invested significantly in IT. These organisations 
were most commonly implementing AI 
systems to:
• improve business processes, including 
financial analytics and reporting
• augment current applications
• automate processes, including transactions 
and customer service interfaces 
(e.g. chatbots)
enhance cybersecurity (The AI Forum of New 
Zealand, 2018)
New Zealand’s innovation agency, Callaghan 
Innovation, predicts that AI will affect key 
industry sectors including:
• an extreme impact on agriculture, 
enabling smart and more efficient 
application of water and sprays, optimised 
animal health monitoring, and improved 
crop yield prediction
• a medium impact on the digital sector, 
including applications across the finance, 
accounting, legal and e-commerce sectors
• a high impact on the energy sector, 
enabling system and cost optimisation, 
and smart grids
• an extreme impact on the health sector, 
including use in augmented diagnoses and 
personalised healthcare.
In particular, Callaghan Innovation considers 
it important for New Zealand businesses to 
explore machine learning and deep learning 
AI technologies (Callaghan Innovation, 2018). 
The agency offers innovation support services 
to business including access to AI specialists.
Workforce skills and training
Canadian AI consultancy, Element AI, 
determined that there are 22,000 PhD-
educated AI-experts globally, of whom 
only 85 were in New Zealand. The leading 
countries were the US (9,010 experts) and the 
UK (1,861 experts) (Element AI, 2018). 
The New Zealand AI Forum notes that ‘there 
is an acute worldwide shortage of machine 
learning experts with competition for talent’ 
(The AI Forum of New Zealand, 2018). 
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In 2017, New Zealand had 2,166 postgraduate 
students in computer science or IT at the 
honours level and 1,405 at the masters or 
PhD level. These numbers are expected to be 
boosted via ICT graduate schools hosted by 
several high profile universities (The AI Forum 
of New Zealand, 2018). 
Digital infrastructure
Global Open Data Index: 8/94 (68 percent)
The Inclusive Internet Index 2018 
Ranking: Not ranked
New Zealand is ranked equal 8th for the 
openness of government data sources in 
the Global Open Data Index. Its overall 
score of 68 percent indicates a generally 
positive attitude towards open data, but only 
13 percent of the assessed data sets were 
completely open, which suggests that there 
are some shortcomings in data practices. 
This score is comparable to countries such 
as Canada (69 percent).
New Zealand ranked 27th globally with an 
average connection speed of 14.7 Mb/s 
in Akamai’s Q1 2017 State of the Internet 
Connectivity Report. This was the seventh 
fastest speeds recorded amongst countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region, and faster than 
Australia’s average of 11.1 Mb/s, though 
significantly slower than the average speeds 
of global leader South Korea (28.6 Mb/s) 
(Akamai, 2017). 
New Zealand had average mobile connection 
speed 13.0 Mb/s in the first quarter of 2017, 
ranking it third behind Australian and Japan 
in the Asia Pacific region (Akamai, 2017). 
However, it ranks poorly in OpenSignal’s 
State of LTE February 2018 report, with only 
69.07 percent availability of its 4G network.186 
Geographically, New Zealand’s 4G networks 
now provide access to about 90 percent of its 
population (Akamai, 2017). 
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a term used in social and political science to denote an individual's capacity for 
choice within a given context
aggregated data
refers to the process of gathering data from multiple sources and condensing 
that data into report-based or summarized form. This may involve linking ‘static’ 
data sets, or mining information from continuous streams of data generated by 
Internet-enabled technologies
algorithm
a set of mathematical processes used by machines to perform calculation, 
processing and decision making 
algorithmic bias 
an occurrence where an algorithm reflects and reproduces human bias. Human 
bias can be replicated in the algorithm as a result of coding decisions or the 
use of biased data 
algorithmic decision-
making
decision-making assisted by AI techniques such as ML
algorithmic transparency 
algorithmic transparency means having visibility over the inputs and decision-
making processes of tools relying on algorithms, programming or AI, or being 
able to explain the rules and calculations used by AI if these are challenged
anonymisation of data 
the process of encrypting or removing personally sensitive or identifiable 
information from data sets, so as to ensure protection of privacy
anti-trust policies 




also known as 'generalised AI', this refers to the potential future capacity of AI 
to conduct and perform intelligent action, or thinking, to the same extent and 
ability as humans 
artificial neural networks 
a key component of ML that seeks to replicate the process of human learning 
using mathematical models comprised of a network of nodes representative of 
artificial neurons. 
assistive technology 
devices or systems that enable people with a disability to perform tasks that 
would otherwise not be possible 
augmented reality 
the use of technology to 'augment' or alter an individual's visual, auditory or 
olfactory experience of the real world environment
automation 
the process by which a procedure is performed by a machine or technology 
without the need for human intervention
autonomy 
the capacity to engage in self-governance. In an AI context, autonomy 
may refer to the capacity of AI to independently (or, in some cases, semi-
independently) make decisions
big data 
very large data sets which are unable to be stored, processed or used via 
traditional methods. Frequently determined in relation to data volume, variety, 
velocity and veracity. 
black box
a term used to describe technologies whose underlying functions, processes, 
and outputs are obscured from the user's view, or made deliberately opaque
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blockchain 
a distributed, publicly accessible database of information that is spread over 
multiple computers, and that updates itself automatically
chatbots
an AI-powered computer program that can communicate and conduct a 
conversation either via voice or text, often by drawing on NLP techniques
cloud storage the storage of data on servers that can be accessed remotely via the Internet
computer vision 
an AI technique wherein AI systems have the capacity to 'see', identify, analyse 
and process images in a similar fashion to humans
cryptography 
refers to a broad set of techniques for encrypting sensitive or personal 
information
data controller
an entity within an organisation that controls the procedures and purposes of 
data collection and usage
data governance 
the people, processes, and technologies that ensure effective data 
management within an organisation
data integrity 
the people, processes, and technologies that ensure the accuracy and 
consistency of data within an organisation
data linkage 
the process of aggregating different data sets in order to derive common 
information about people, places, and events 
data mining 
the process of extracting anomalies, patterns and correlations from large data 
sets
data portability 
the ability of an individual to obtain, reuse, or transfer personal data from and 
between different organisations and services
data provenance a lineage of the records, entities, and systems that produce data
data sovereignty 
the concept that information is subject to the laws of the nation within which 
it is stored
data subjects an end user whose personal data is subject to collection and analysis
data surveillance the process of collecting and analysing data without the owner's direct consent
deep learning an ML system with multiple layers of neural networks
dialogue systems a system designed to converse with a human user 
digital inclusion 
the project of ensuring all people can be included in, and ultimately benefit 
from, advances in digital technologies
digital infrastructure 
the technical infrastructures required to support the implementation and 
integration of digital technologies throughout a society
digital technologies 
technologies whose underlying processes are informed by digital binary – that 
is, 1s and 0s
digital tools 
digital services and software interfaces that enable people to author and edit 
content 
dirty data
a data set that contains errors or is inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent and 
unstructured
equity 
furthering the concept of equality, equity recognises the different needs and 
circumstances of each individuals and provides individuals with the resources 
needed in order to realise a fair outcome 
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explainability 
ensuring that the actions, outputs, and decision-making processes of an AI 
system are transparent and easily understood by humans
facial recognition 
AI systems that can compare, identify and verify an individual from an image or 
video 
fake news
false news stories that can involve deliberate disinformation or propaganda, 
frequently spread via social media and designed to appear as genuine news 
reports 
federated learning 
a technique – developed by Google – of extracting data for the purposes of AI 
development, without compromising privacy
FinTech intelligent financial service technologies
general purpose 
technologies 
technologies that have widespread applications and uses, such as electricity 
and the Internet
inclusive design 
a series of design principles which seek to accommodate and involve those 
experiencing difference, disability or disadvantage
Indigenous data 
sovereignty 
the right of Indigenous People to govern the collection, generation, ownership 
and use of their data 
intelligent virtual agents computer-controlled assistants that can interact with humans
internet of things (IoT )
refers to the proliferation of Internet-enabled devices and technologies. These 
devices and technologies can produce, analyse and share large quantities of 
data through sensors and user interactions
interoperability 
the capacity of systems to connect, share and exchange data, and utilise 
exchanged information 
long term a timeframe of greater than 20 years 
machine learning (ML)
the ability of computers to execute tasks through processes of ‘learning’ that 
derive inspiration from (but are not reducible to) human intelligence and 
decision-making. ML involves the capacity of machines to process and adapt 
rapidly and independently to large quantities of data, without being explicitly 
programmed to do so. 
medium term a timeframe of 10 to 15 years
messy data see 'dirty data'
metadata
data that provide information about other data; for example, a digital image 
may include metadata that provides information about the resolution of the 
image, when it was created, who the author is and so on
meta-intelligence 
the ability to develop an understanding of what knowledge is in different 
contexts
micro credentialing
mini-qualifications obtained online through tertiary and job training 
institutions 
narrow AI
also known as 'weak AI', narrow AI refers to AI systems that are good at a highly 
specific task or range of tasks
natural language 
processing (NLP) 
encompasses all AI technologies related to the analysis, interpretation and 
generation (of text-based) natural language
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personalised medicine 
also known as 'precision medicine', personalised medicine is an umbrella term 
that encompasses medical and scientific techniques for targeted and tailored 
medical treatment of individuals
platforms 
digital infrastructures and intermediaries that enable various entities to create, 
interact and transact in diverse ways, and whose revenue models are often 
premised on the extraction and usage of data
predictive analysis a technique that uses data to forecast outcomes
predictive risk modelling 
an automated algorithmic process used to predict outcomes. A risk score is 
determined and applied to the probably of an adverse event occurring 
profiling
in information science, profiling refers to the construction of a user's profile via 
techniques of data analysis and mining
short term a timeframe of 5 years
smart devices internet-enabled devices (see 'Internet of Things')
smart grids
an electricity supply network that uses Internet-enabled technologies to 
communicate between customers, distributors, retailers and emergency 
response units
softbots
an abbreviation for 'software robot', a program that is imbued with the capacity 
to act on behalf of another user, organisation or program
spear phishing an email attack intended to steal data from a specific individual or organisation
superhuman AI also known as artificial emergent intelligence 
supervised learning
where an AI learns a function from data labelled by humans, or is taught a 
function directly by a human
systemic bias 
a form of bias that is deeply embedded in the underlying structure of a society 
or institution
unmanned aerial vehicles 
aircraft that are autonomous, or remote controlled, but do not have a human 
pilot on board (e.g. drones).
unsupervised learning 
where an AI learns a function independent of human intervention or guidance, 
by improving its actions against a well-defined objective
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
AI artificial intelligence
AIFNZ Artificial Intelligence Forum of New Zealand
APIs application programming interfaces
APPs Australian privacy principles
APRA Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission
AVs autonomous vehicles
CEDA Committee for Economic Development of Australia
COMPAS correctional offender management profiling for alternative sanctions
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
CSL China’s Cybersecurity Law
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
EU European Union
FDA Food and Drug Administration (USA)
FinTech financial service technologies
GDP gross domestic product
GDPR general data protection regulation
GFC global financial crisis
HASS humanities, arts and social sciences
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoT Internet of Things
IP intellectual property
ML machine learning 
MOOCs massive open online courses
NHS National Health Service (UK)
NLP natural language processing
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SMEs small-to-medium sized enterprises
STEM science, technology, engineering and mathematics
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom
UNCRPD United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
US United States
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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